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The De Facto Reporter's Privilege
AB 5 TRAC T. While the overwhelming majority of states have established constitutional, statu-
tory, or common-law protections for reporters who shield the identity of a confidential source,
there is no uniform, crosscutting federal reporter's privilege. As a consequence, reporters subpoe-
naed in federal cases often lack effective formal protections. This can have a chilling effect on news-
gathering: sources - and reporters - may find little comfort in knowing that a source's anonymity
is preserved only at a judge's or prosecutor's discretion or by a reporter's willingness to go to jail.
For decades, both those in favor of a formal federal reporter's privilege and those opposed to
it have marshaled historical arguments. Proponents point to the imprisonment of reporters in the
past and argue that a privilege will ensure that confidential sources continue to provide the press -
and ultimately, the public - with information. Opponents argue that the press has long flourished
without a federal source of protection and that there is no indication that this flow of information
will be constricted in the future.
Yet both sides of this debate have limited their historical inquiry to a small number of pub-
lished reporter's privilege cases. In this Article, I argue that such an accounting is incomplete. Fo-
cusing only on traditional black-letter law does not give us the whole picture of how reporters have
fared. Drawing on a variety of historical sources, including newspaper articles, autobiographies,
legislative records, and both published and unpublished cases, I conclude - contrary to the pre-
vailing view that reporters enjoyed little protection at common law-that there is a well-estab-
lished tradition in the American legal and political system of protecting the press. I argue that
longstanding efforts by judges, legislators, and prosecutors to shield reporters and their sources
have created a web of informal, yet functional, protections. I refer to this as the "de facto" reporter's
privilege.
Illuminating the contours of this de facto privilege offers a number of insights. Most im-
portantly, it demonstrates that merely pointing to the historical absence of a formal privilege is not
a sufficient reason to oppose its creation. Such an inquiry fails to account for the full ecosystem of
protections - both formal and informal - that have long protected the press. Instead, legislators
and policymakers must also ask whether these informal protections remain robust. And if they do
not, formalized protections may be not only appropriate, but necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, members of the press have refused to disclose the identities of
confidential sources in judicial and legislative proceedings. Today, the over-
whelming majority of states and a number of federal circuits extend some form
of evidentiary protection to the press.2 The rationale undergirding these protec-
tions has evolved over time, but the most common justification for the reporter's
privilege today is that revealing confidential information would cause reporters'
sources to dry up. This, in turn, would stem the flow of information to the
press - and by extension - to the public.' Evidentiary privileges are generally
rooted in such instrumental rationales. They reflect society's desire to promote
open communication in situations where it is deemed especially valuable and
where absent a privilege it is likely to be inhibited.
And yet, no uniform, crosscutting federal reporter's privilege exists, leaving
journalists and their sources without adequate defenses when reporters are called
into federal court. Those who favor a federal reporter's privilege make the same
instrumental arguments that buttress state evidentiary protections: a privilege
will encourage communication between confidential sources and the press and
ensure the continued flow of information to the public. Those who oppose a
federal privilege argue that the press has never had one before and that there is
little evidence that a privilege is needed now.5
1. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 19 (Houghton
Mifflin & Co. 1906) (1867) (describing his brother's imprisonment in 1722 for refusing to
reveal the author of an anonymous article); see also Sam J. Ervin Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Priv-
ilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1974) ("James Franklin's refusal to discover the author
has often been repeated by other newsmen under similar conditions.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. See infra Sections I.A.3, I.C.
3. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen
governmental officials possess an unchecked power to compel newsmen to disclose infor-
mation received in confidence, sources will clearly be deterred from giving information, and
reporters will clearly be deterred from publishing it, because uncertainty about exercise of the
power will lead to self-censorship." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285 (John T. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) (arguing that to justify a privilege against disclosure, the communication must
be confidential; this confidentiality must be essential to the communication; the communica-
tion must be one society wants to foster; and the injury of disclosure must be greater than the
benefit); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter's Privilege, 34 HOFSTRAL.
REV. 39, 39-41 (2005) (describing the instrumental goals of evidentiary privileges).
5. Other arguments are also made in favor of or in opposition to a privilege. See, e.g., Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the press becomes the investigative arm
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The idea that no formal privilege exists - and that such a privilege is not
needed-is well entrenched in the law,6 in legal scholarship,7 and in the minds
of legislators.8 In a recent congressional debate over a proposed federal shield,
for example, one legislator opposed the bill on the basis that "[t]he press has
flourished for over 200 years without a Federal privilege."' No privilege has ever
existed, the congressman reasoned, and the press functions perfectly well. So
why create a new privilege now?
This view, which has proven to be a powerful force opposing a federal priv-
ilege, relies on two assumptions. o The first is that the absence of a federal priv-
ilege has not impeded the flow of information to the press. This is, of course, a
difficult assertion to prove or disprove: it is impossible to determine how many
more confidential sources would have come forward had a privilege existed. The
second assumption is that the behavior of confidential sources is driven primarily
by the formal protections enshrined in the law. Yet it seems equally likely that
confidential source behavior is driven not only by whether a formal privilege ex-
ists, but also by whether such protections are extended in practice." This Article
of the government in the absence of a privilege); David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Re-
considered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 903 (2009) (arguing that " [t]he most compelling objection to
a comprehensive constitutional solution" is the difficulty of determining who should be able
to use the privilege to protect confidential sources). But instrumental arguments are often
granted primacy in the debate over the creation of a federal privilege. See discussion infra Sec-
tion III.A.
6. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685 (majority opinion) ("At common law, courts consistently
refused to recognize the existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal
confidential information to a grand jury.").
7. See, e.g., 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5426 (1st ed., rev. 2017); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen journalism and
the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 534 (2007).
8. See discussion infra Section III.A.
9. 153 Cong. Rec. 27308 (2007) (statement of Rep. Steve King).
10. See infra Part IV for further discussion of these assumptions.
ii. There are many reasons why sources may decide to provide confidential information. See, e.g.,
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95 (reviewing the potential motivations of sources). David Pozen
has fleshed out the contours of the ecosystem surrounding leaks and has demonstrated that
the government's upstream decision-making process about whether and to what extent the
government will tolerate leaks may also have an influence on sources' behavior. David E.
Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures
of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 587-96 (2013). However, members of the press have
consistently reported that their sources' behavior is likely influenced by their perception of a
reporter's ability to protect their identity. See, e.g., Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An
Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 269 (1971) (presenting evidence that sources were
more fearful of speaking with reporters in the wake of high-profile reporter's privilege con-
troversies); RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection
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argues that -although the press in the United States does not enjoy a formal
federal privilege -judges, legislators, and prosecutors have long sought to pro-
tect reporters through more informal measures. Taken together, these protec-
tions create a 'de facto' reporter's privilege.12
The idea that judges and policymakers might exercise their discretion to pro-
tect reporters and their sources, even absent a formal privilege, is not wholly
new. Journalists themselves raised this possibility in their coverage of early re-
porter's privilege disputes. Throughout the nineteenth century, newspapers ea-
gerly covered contempt hearings" for reporters who refused to reveal a confi-
dential source. Members of the press often speculated that judges went out of
in the Changing World ofAmerican Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 367-69 (2009) (same);
David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security and Leaks
in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 473, 498 (2013) (arguing that
while sources' motivations for leaking to the press are undoubtedly diverse and individualized,
"[a]ttention must also be paid to the ecosystem of secrecy and transparency, and whether
some legally imposed restraint on the government's pursuit of leakers would create conditions
under which employees felt more secure in making disclosures because the Department of
Justice would feel less confident in bringing prosecutions"). But see John E. Osborn, The Re-
porter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 57, 74 (1985) (arguing that the press continued to rely on confi-
dential sources through 1975, which suggested that "most of the respondents did not appear
to be affected or deterred by the various court rulings and other legal developments of the past
decade"). Moreover, empirical evidence proving how sources respond to perceived changes in
the legal pressures on reporters is not necessary. Common-sense reasoning has long played a
central role in the law surrounding privileges. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S.
399,407,410 (1998) (noting that although the "empirical information" was "scant and incon-
clusive,' the attorney-client privilege should survive after death because " [k]nowing that com-
munications will remain confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate
fully and frankly with counsel"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1169
(D.C. Cir. 20o6) (Tatel, J., concurring) (stating that "the equally commonsense proposition
that reporters' sources will be more candid when promised confidentiality requires no empir-
ical support"). But see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 ("[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that
there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaf-
firms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of
newsmen.").
12. In their treatise on civil procedure, Wright and Graham refer to the protections judges extend
to journalists who refuse to testify as a "de facto privilege." See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
7, § 5426 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the phenomenon of de facto or unwritten
law in other legal contexts, see, for example, JEFFREY S. ADLER, FIRST IN VIOLENCE, DEEPEST
IN DIRT: HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO, 1875-1920, at 112-13 (20o6), which demonstrates that be-
tween 1875 and 1920 in Chicago, approximately eighty percent of women who killed their
husbands escaped punishment, and argues that this reflected the establishment of an "un-
written law" that allowed battered women to use lethal force to protect themselves.
13. When a reporter violates a court order, the court's remedy is to hold the journalist in con-
tempt. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (2012). The court's power to sanction bad-faith conduct is
inherent. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991). It is also codified in statutory law
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their way to protect reporters by releasing them or by otherwise shielding them
from testifying.14 This theory made sense: judges who imprisoned journalists
often drew intensely negative media coverage."
The idea also surfaced in the context of legislative disputes over a statutory
shield6 -particularly in the immediate aftermath of Branzburg v. Hayes,1 7 the
Supreme Court's canonical 1972 decision rejecting a First Amendment-based re-
porter's privilege. Senator Edward Kennedy, for example, argued in 1973 that
"throughout our history, reporters have enjoyed a de facto privilege from sub-
poena in grand jury proceedings, a privilege of the sort consistently afforded to
doctors, lawyers, priests, husbands and wives, and others whose special relation-
ships of confidentiality have long received generous protection of society.""
Yet this idea largely failed to migrate into the legal literature. One notable
exception -Wright and Graham's treatise on federal procedure -reported that
"it has been suggested that the ritual jailing of reporters for short terms was a
form of fiction in which journalists were granted a de facto privilege by sympa-
thetic judges who were unwilling to diminish their own powers by the creation
today, which provides that when a court or grand jury witness refuses to testify, provide in-
formation, or comply with an order, the court "may summarily order his confinement at a
suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such
information,' with certain exceptions and limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (2012). The court may
impose civil or criminal contempt sanctions. Different procedural and substantive protections
apply for each. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27 (1994);
Hicks ex rel. Feiockv. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988). Courts are granted broad discretion
to fashion remedies for contempt, but those remedies must be narrowly tailored to achieve
legitimate objectives. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton & Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 801
(1987). For a general discussion of the history of the contempt power as applied to reporters,
see Daxton R. "Chip" Stewart & Anthony L. Fargo, Challenging Civil Contempt: The Limits of
Judicial Power in Cases Involving Journalists, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 425, 438 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Did He Blunder?, NEWPORT NEws DAILY PRESS, Jan. 7, 1932, at 6 (noting that a judge
had sentenced a reporter to not more than thirty days in jail but had released the reporter after
only five days in response to "an avalanche of protest").
15. See, e.g., infra notes 267-273 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Newsman's Privilege: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 259 (Feb. 20, 1973) [hereinafter Newsman's Privilege Hear-
ings] (statement of Rep. Jerome R. Waldie) ("[T]he ability to guarantee the confidentiality
of news sources was so integral and vital a part of the functions of the press in informing
society that it held a de facto status as the corollary to the general and established right of
society to freedom of the press . . . . District Attorneys did not, as a matter of course, demand
that confidential sources be revealed. Grand juries did not subpoena newsmen in droves to
demand that pledges of confidentiality be broken. Judges did not routinely jail newsmen for
the act of honoring these professional pledges of protection given to sources.").
17. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. Newsman's Privilege Hearings, supra note 16, at 13 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
1183
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of a de jure privilege."9 Some student notes from the 1950s also took up this
theme. One note colorfully observed that judges' treatment of reporter's privi-
lege claims "could lead one to conclude that the contempt power is being exer-
cised only as a matter of ritual much as a reluctant father administers a spanking
in a this-will-hurt-me-as-much-as-you frame of mind."20
More recent scholarship addressing the reporter's privilege is largely for-
ward-looking: it addresses how to define who qualifies for a privilege in the age
of bloggers and WikiLeaks, or whether the reporter's privilege can be reconcep-
tualized to provide more coherent and robust protection for sources or for the
press.1 Legal scholars have also observed that the Department of Justice's (DOJ)
voluntary guidelines limiting the federal government's ability to subpoena re-
porters offer many of the protections that would likely be introduced with a leg-
islative shield.22 But few legal scholars have focused on the pre-Branzburg history
of the reporter's privilege.2 3
19. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5426 (footnotes omitted).
20. W.D. Lorensen, Note, TheJournalist and His Confidential Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege
Be Allowed, 35 NEB. L. REV. 562, 579 (1956). The author further observed that "sympathetic
attitudes frequently reflected by judges and law officers towards those newsmen who have
been held in contempt perhaps reflects a latent recognition of merit in the journalist's posi-
tion." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Note, The Right of a Newsman To Refrain from Divulging
the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61, 69-75 (1950) [hereinafter Note, The Right of
a Newsman] (reviewing both published and unpublished reporter's privilege cases and noting
that in many unreported cases, judges seemed to go out of their way to protect reporters and
their sources).
21. See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting
the Newsgathering Privilege to journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Infor-
mation, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 130 (2002) (arguing that the privilege should be granted
to anyone "engaged in gathering news for public presentation or dissemination"); RonNell
Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2013) (arguing
that the privilege should be held by the source under their First Amendment right to anony-
mous speech); Papandrea, supra note 7, at 519-20 (arguing that the privilege should be con-
ferred on anyone who contributed information to the public domain with the intention that
the public access that information); Stone, supra note 4, at 5o-51 (arguing that the privilege
should be legislatively defined based on the reasonable expectations of the source rather than
on the nature of the journalist or publication).
22. See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 298 (2017) (argu-
ing that the guidelines "amount to a qualified reporters' privilege"). The guidelines explicitly
aim to promote constitutional values. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2010) (emphasizing that the
guidelines are intended to promote "freedom of the press" and "news gathering functions").
23. Those few articles that have discussed the pre-Branzburg history have rarely looked beyond
the published case law. Yet there are exceptions. An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation written in
1970 offers a deep and thorough examination of reporter's privilege cases -both published
and unpublished- prior toBranzburg. Aaron David Gordon, Protection of News Sources: The
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This Article fleshes out that history. It demonstrates that beneath the re-
ported case law, there exists a richer and more complex story about the reporter's
privilege. It brings to light the full ecosystem of protections -both formal and
informal, and from across all three branches of government-that have long
worked to protect the press. Illuminating this de facto reporter's privilege will
allow lawyers, judges, and policymakers to better appreciate the stakes of creat-
ing a new constitutional, statutory, or federal common-law privilege.
Part I outlines the black-letter law treatment of the reporter's privilege. It
reviews the formal approach to reporter's privilege cases evident in the case law,
in congressional failure to enact a statutory shield, and in the establishment of
widespread state-level protections. Part II fleshes out the contours of the de facto
reporter's privilege. By examining published and unpublished cases,24 as well as
newspaper stories, autobiographies, and legislative materials, it traces the infor-
mal - but functional - protections that have long been extended by the three
branches of government. Part III examines the state of this de facto privilege
today in order to shed light on whether these informal protections historically
extended to reporters remain available to the modern press. And Part IV exam-
ines the implications of the de facto reporter's privilege for contemporary debates
around formalization. It imports the de facto privilege lens into ongoing discus-
sions over the enactment of a statutory shield and over the establishment of a
History and Legal Status of the Newsman's Privilege (Dec. 17, 1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with author). In addition, the 1973 book, Your
Right To Know, written by former Ohio Congressman Charles Whalen, Jr., reviews the treat-
ment of reporter's privilege claims in courts and by legislators and also mentions a handful of
unpublished cases. CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT To KNow (1973). A second un-
published thesis from 1984 offers a detailed examination of reporters' efforts to shield the
identity of a confidential source in early legislative proceedings. Leigh F. Gregg, The First
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century: Journalists' Privilege and Congressional Investiga-
tions (Nov. 29, 1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison)
(on file with author). This Article contributes to the literature by identifying a number of new
reporter's privilege cases and disputes prior to Branzburg. It also reconciles a divide in the
literature. Prior to Branzburg, scholars paid more attention to the question of how reporter's
privilege disputes were resolved at common law. But these early scholars did not have the
benefit of digitized research tools, nor could they draw upon the sprawling complexities of
the post-Branzburg legal landscape. This Article is the first to link the pre-Branzburg history
of reporter's privilege claims with legal and legislative developments post-Branzburg. It is also
the first to examine both the formal and informal protections extended by all three branches
of government.
24. I use the terms "reported" and "published" interchangeably to refer to any case that appears
in a law reporter. I use the terms "unreported" and "unpublished" interchangeably to refer to
any case that does not appear in a law reporter, including cases referred to only in newspaper
articles.
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constitutional or federal common-law privilege and demonstrates how this his-
tory can be used to bolster the case for a formalized shield.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPORTER'S
PRIVILEGE
The prevailing view of the history of the reporter's privilege is that both the
judiciary and Congress have routinely rejected the press's claim to a privilege.
The judiciary, the story goes, has consistently rejected reporter's privilege claims
in court, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg. Meanwhile,
Congress has failed repeatedly to enact a statutory shield. By contrast, the over-
whelming majority of states have established robust, state-level judicial and leg-
islative protections. This Part traces this story and outlines the contours of the
formal protections extended or denied to the press.
A. The Courts' Refusal To Recognize a Reporter's Privilege
Until the mid-twentieth century, courts routinely denied the press's assertion
of an evidentiary privilege.2 5 This narrative became more complicated in the
wake of Branzburg- the Court's canonical but enigmatic reporter's privilege
case-which some lower courts read as permitting a qualified constitutional
privilege in certain contexts. But overall, the treatment of reporters' claims in
published cases2 6 historically has been unfavorable to the press.
25. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1971) (discussing the common law history).
26. This Section focuses on reported cases. My research also uncovered a number of unreported
cases prior to 1972 in which a court punished a reporter for refusing to reveal a confidential
source or required the reporter to testify. See, e.g., 2 Newsmen Freed in Contempt Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1967, at 24 (reporting that two reporters were held in contempt and jailed for
refusing to reveal sources, and were then released after surrendering the names of their in-
formants); The Brave Reporter's Christmas, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1886, at 2 (reporting that a
journalist was placed on house arrest for refusing to reveal his source of information); C.-J.
Pays Fine for Reporter, ADVOC. MESSENGER, Aug. 16, 1934, at 1 (reporting that two reporters
were repeatedly jailed for several hours and fined over the course of a week for refusing to
reveal the identity of two confidential sources, and were released only when the case was re-
solved); Columnist Fined on Contempt Charges, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN, Feb. 14, 1951,
at 22 (reporting that a columnist was fined $1oo for refusing to disclose his source); Court
Fines Reporter $25 for Refusing To Testify, DETROIT FREE PREss, Sept. 14, 1939, at 4 (reporting
that a reporter was fined for refusing to reveal the identity of a source); Dallas Reporter Freed
on His Promise to Talk, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 13, 1931, at 3 (reporting that a reporter was jailed
for refusing to reveal a source, then freed after naming his informant); In the Public Interest,
LEAVENWORTH TIMEs, July 21, 1915, at 4 (reporting that an editor was fined $250 for refusing
to disclose the identity of a source to a grand jury); Judge Orders Columnist To Pay Trio, EUGENE
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1. The Historical Evolution of Courts' Treatment of Reporter's Privilege
Claims in Published Cases
Newspapers and journalists have long asserted their right to keep authors
and sources confidential, even in the face of judicial hostility toward such claims.
The earliest American examples date back to the 1700s. In 1732, Benjamin Frank-
lin's brother was jailed for refusing to reveal the author of an article published in
his paper.2 7 And in 1735, publisher John Peter Zenger was charged with seditious
libel for refusing to surrender the name of an anonymous author.28 But the first
published case in which a journalist was punished for failing to surrender confi-
dential information arose in 1848.29 Reporter William Nugent was held in con-
tempt and imprisoned for refusing to tell the Senate who had provided him with
GUARD, Nov. 3, 1959, at 13 (reporting that a reporter who refused to disclose his source of
information in a libel case was held in contempt and was not permitted to present a defense
in the libel action) ; Judge Threatens Reporter: Fackelman Is Told To Answer Questions or Be Sent
to Jail, VALLEY MORNING STAR, Aug. 17, 1937, at 1 (reporting that a reporter revealed his source
after being threatened with imprisonment); Kansas Editor Is Fined, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1940,
at 8 (reporting that an editor was fined $25 for refusing to reveal his sources for "an editorial
on gambling and liquor conditions"); The McLean Contempt Case, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1874, at
1 (reporting that a reporter was jailed for refusing to reveal the identity of a confidential source
in a libel case); Newsman Yields on Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1961, at 44 (reporting that a
reporter was ordered to disclose his confidential source for a newspaper column); Newspaper
Reporter Cleared of Contempt, MACON CHRON.-HERALD, June io, 1954, at 1 (reporting that a
reporter was held in contempt and ordered jailed for refusing to reveal a source, then subse-
quently cleared after he agreed to testify); The Reporter and His Pointers, ICAN. WKIY. COM-
MONWEALTH, Aug. 19, 1886, at 5 (reporting that a reporter was jailed for failing to disclose a
source); Reporter Clarkson in jail, ATLANTA CONST., NOV. 21, 1896, at 1 (reporting that a re-
porter was jailed for refusing to reveal the identity of a source); Reporters Are Freed, LINCOLN
J. STAR, Dec. 11, 1929, at 3 (reporting that three reporters were held in contempt and ordered
jailed for forty-five days for refusing to reveal the identity of a confidential source before a
grandjury); Sent an Editor to Jail, ST. PAUL GLOBE, Nov. 15, 1895, at 4 (reporting that an editor
was jailed for refusing to reveal his source before a grand jury); Texas Publisher Can't Back
Corruption Charge, He Says, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 23, 1956, at 2 (reporting that a
newspaper publisher was fined $1oo and jailed for refusing to reveal a confidential source
before a grand jury, and was released after testifying that his only source was an anonymous
letter); They Must Testify, PHILA. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1888, at 9 (reporting that a judge rejected
reporters' claim to a privilege based on "professional honor"); Two Arizona Women Testify
Against Irene, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1930, at 1 (reporting that a reporter was released from
jail only after revealing her source).
27. See supra note 1.
28. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5426.
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a draft of a secret treaty.o Nugent filed a habeas petition against the Senate Ser-
geant at Arms. Although Nugent did not explicitly assert that his status as a re-
porter entitled him to protect his source, he challenged his confinement on the
grounds that the Senate had exceeded its constitutional authority. The appeals
court upheld his imprisonment."
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, judges in reported
cases continued to look unsympathetically upon reporter's privilege claims. The
first published case in which a reporter refused to disclose a source based on his
status as a member of the press occurred in 1874, when New York Tribune editor
William Shanks refused to reveal the author of an allegedly libelous article on
the grounds that it would violate his paper's internal policies.3 2 The New York
Court of Appeals denied his claim, reasoning that "[a] s the law now is, and has
for ages existed, no court could possibly hold that a witness could legally refuse
to give the name of the author of an alleged libel, for the reasons that the rules
of a public journal forbade it."3
In 1897, two decisions out of California similarly rejected reporters' claims to
an evidentiary privilege. In the first, the defendant in a murder trial claimed that
a statement he made to a reporter was privileged - an unusual example of a con-
fidential source asserting a privilege, rather than a reporter.34 The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that the reporter was "not shown to have been the wife
or to have stood to the defendant in any other relation of legal confidence," and
therefore "the claim scarcely merits comment."" Two weeks later, the issue arose
again. Two San Francisco Chronicle mployees were summoned before the state
legislature to testify about a series of articles alleging that state legislators had
accepted bribes.3 6 Both members of the press refused to reveal their source of
information, and both were cited for contempt. They filed habeas petitions,
which the Supreme Court of California denied. The court reasoned that " [i] t
cannot be successfully contended, and has not been seriously argued, that the
30. Nugent v. Beale, 18 F. Cas. 471, 471 (C.C.D.C. 1848).
31. Id. at 483.
32. People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
33. Id. at 230.
34. People v. Durrant, 48 P. 75, 86 (Cal. 1897).
35. Id.
36. Lorensen, supra note 20, at 576.
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witnesses were justified in refusing to give these names upon the ground that
the communication was privileged.""
This trend continued into the early twentieth century. In 1901, an Ohio court
rejected a reporter's argument that his source of information was privileged, rea-
soning that the information sought was material and relevant to the case and
therefore had to be surrendered." Ten years later, the Supreme Court of Georgia
rejected a reporter's claim that surrendering a source before a board of police
commissioners would cause the reporter to lose his job and would tarnish his
honor.9 Similar examples followed in New Jersey, Hawaii, and Colorado.4 0 The
federal judge in Hawaii, for example, wrote that the "canon of journalistic ethics
forbidding the disclosure of a newspaper's ource of information" was "worthy
of respect and undoubtedly well-founded" -yet it "must yield when in conflict
with the interests of justice."41
The next three decades saw relatively few published cases addressing the re-
porter's privilege. Between 1920 and 1950, the courts handed down as few as two
reported cases addressing the issue.4 2 But it arose again in earnest in the 1950s.
Judges rejected privilege claims in at least six reported cases in this decade.4 3 The
most notable of these cases was Garland v. Torre, handed down by then-Second
37. Exparte Lawrence, 48 P. 124, 125 (Cal. 1897). This case was the first of eight cited inBranzburg
to support the claim that no privilege existed at common law. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 685 (1972).
38. Clinton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 655, 655 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1901).
39. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (Ga. 1911). The Georgia Supreme Court cited the 1874
imprisonment of William Shanks to support its conclusion that the press could not avail itself
of any special evidentiary privilege. Id.
40. In 1913, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a privilege argument raised by ajersey Journal
reporter. The reporter refused to reveal his source for an article alleging corruption among
local officials. The court reasoned that such a privilege had "no countenance in the law" and
would be "detrimental to the due administration of law." In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011, 1012 (N.J.
1913); accord In re Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 475, 476 (1914); Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375, 379
(Colo. 1919). Plunkett, Grunow, and Joslyn were among the eight cases cited in Branzburg to
support the claim that no privilege existed at common law. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685.
41. In re Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. at 476.
42. State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 4 21 (N.J. 1943); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N.Y. Cry., 199
N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1936).
43. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); Brewster v. Bos. Herald-Traveler Corp., 20
F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re
Howard, 289 P.2d 537 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950);
Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 123 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1956). For a list of all published reporter's
privilege cases between 1911 and 1968, see Jeffriey C. Schreck, Case Comment,Journalist'sPriv-
ilege: In re Farber and the New Jersey Shield Law, 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 545, 546 n.7 (1979).
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Circuit Judge Potter Stewart.44 This was the first reported case in which a jour-
nalist argued for an evidentiary privilege grounded in the First Amendment.45
In 1957, Marie Torre, a TV columnist for the New York Herald Tribune, wrote
a column about how difficult it had been for CBS executives to complete taping
for a Judy Garland special. Torre quoted one CBS executive as speculating that
Garland did not want to complete the show because "she thinks she's terribly
fat."4 6 Garland sued CBS for libel and breach of contract and subpoenaed Torre
to reveal the name of her source. Torre refused, and the court held her in con-
tempt. She appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the court's decision vi-
olated the First Amendment because it impeded the flow of news to the public.
She also argued that a common-law evidentiary privilege applied.4 7
The court did not reject the constitutional claim outright. Rather, it held that
the information Garland sought was relevant, material, and went to the heart of
the plaintiff's claim, and therefore any First Amendment interest Torre might
have had in protecting her source was overcome by the public's countervailing
interest in hearing Torre's testimony.48 The Second Circuit suggested that the
outcome might have been different had the court been "dealing here with the use
of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confiden-
tial sources of news" or "with a case where the identity of the news source is of
doubtful relevance or materiality."4 9 Torre spent ten days in jail but was ulti-
mately released without revealing her source.so
By the 196os, courts had largely reached agreement that there was no re-
porter's privilege at common law," but they continued to grapple with the more
44. 259 F.2d 545.
45. See Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and
the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist's Privilege, 14WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1063, 1072
(20o6). Yet newspaper ecords suggest that reporters raised this constitutional argument in
unreported cases and in the context of legislative proceedings earlier than 1958 and that these
constitutional arguments were occasionally successful. See infra note 191.
46. Joel Jacobsen, Remembered justice: The Background, Early Career and Judicial Appointments of
Justice Potter Stewart, 35 AKRON L. REV. 227, 244 (2002).
47. Garland, 259 F.2d at 550.
48. Id. The court also rejected Torre's claim to a common-law evidentiary privilege. Id.
49. Id. at 549-50.
50. Nick Ravo, Marie Torre, 72, TV Columnist Jailed for Protecting News Source, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 5,
1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/o5/nyregion/marie-torre-72-tv-columnist-jailed
-for-protecting-news-source.html [http://perma.cc/W8HS-EBUU].
51. See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 440 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (stating that the
court would follow other jurisdictions in denying a reporter's privilege); Brewster v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D. Mass. 1957) (noting that no American jurisdic-
tion had recognized a common law reporter's privilege).
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novel question of how the First Amendment might apply to these claims. In
1961, the Hawaii Supreme Court applied a balancing test to a reporter's claim
that his testimony should be granted First Amendment protection.52 Like the
Second Circuit, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the public's interest in
obtaining the reporter's testimony outweighed any competing constitutional in-
terest in permitting the reporter to protect his source." Other courts reached a
similar conclusion.54 But the precise scope and application of this balancing test
remained unclear.
2. Branzburg: The Supreme Court Speaks on Reporter's Privilege Claims
The social unrest of the late 196os and early 1970s led to a spike in reporter's
privilege claims." The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were often un-
successful in their efforts to penetrate criminal drug rings and activist move-
ments like the Black Panthers, and they began to turn to reporters as an alterna-
tive - albeit unwilling- source of information.5 6 At the same time, the press
pursued government misconduct at home and abroad with increased fervor, and,
52. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961).
53. Id. at 480 (citing Garland, 259 F.2d 545).
54. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa. 1963) (holding that the "public welfare will be
benefited more extensively and to a far greater degree by protection of all sources of disclosure
of crime, conspiracy and corruption than it would be by the occasional disclosure"); State v.
Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Wis. 1971) (applying a balancing test to find that "the appellant
ha[d] a constitutional right to the privilege not to disclose his sources of information" but
that " [u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, we think the public's right to know
outweighs the appellant's right of privilege").
55. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d o8i ( 9 th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S.
665; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1970), as modified on denial ofreh'g (1971), ajf'd sub
nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729 (Or. 1968); Adams, 46 F.R.D.
439; Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93; see also Ervin, supra note 1, at 243-46 (discussing the link between
social unrest and the increase in reporter's privilege disputes); Fargo, supra note 45, at 1073-
74 (same).
56. See Stephen Bates, The Reporter's Privilege, Then and Now 3-4 (Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on the
Press, Politics & Pub. Policy, Research Paper R-23, 2000). An appendix to an amicus brief
submitted by the New York Times and other media companies in Branzburg illustrates the ex-
tent to which the government relied on press subpoenas to collect information about left-wing
groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Brief for The N.Y. Times Co. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-75) (listing
123 subpoenas served upon NBC and CBS between January 1969 and July 1971, many of
which sought information about left-wing groups).
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in the process, began to rely more heavily on confidential sources.17 In 1972,
these tensions came to a head when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Branzburg v. Hayes."
Branzburg consolidated four petitions involving three journalists. The first
was a petition submitted by the United States out of the Ninth Circuit. In May
of 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter, was subpoenaed by a grand
jury to testify about his reporting on the Black Panther movement.
9 The New
York Times was granted standing to intervene and moved to quash the subpoena
on the grounds that Caldwell's testimony would destroy his relationship with
Black Panther members and would "suppress vital First Amendment free-
doms."6 0 The district court denied the motion and directed Caldwell to appear
before the grand jury.6 1 Caldwell refused, and the court found him in con-
tempt.6 2 But the Ninth Circuit reversed.63 " [W] here it has been shown that the
public's First Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requir-
ing a journalist to submit to secret GrandJury interrogation," the court reasoned,
"the Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the wit-
ness's presence before judicial process properly can issue to require attendance."64
The second consolidated case also involved the compelled testimony of a
journalist covering the Black Panther movement.6 5 in July Of 1970, Paul Pappas,
a Rhode Island-based television reporter, was called to New Bedford, Massachu-
setts to cover a Black Panther protest involving "street barricades, exclusion of
57. See Jones, supra note 21, at 1228-29.
58. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
59. Id. at 678. This May subpoena was the third one issued. Caldwell was initially served a sub-
poena duces tecum in February 1970. Id. at 675. This subpoena required him to bring notes and
tapes from his interviews with Black Panther members "concerning the aims and purposes"
of the organization. Id. at 676 n.12. The New York Times objected to the scope of the subpoena,
and an agreement between the government and the paper resulted in a continuance. Id. at
675-76. A second subpoena served in March omitted the documentary requirement. Id. at 676 -
77. The district court denied the motion to quash, and the grand jury term expired. Id. at 677-
78. The government issued a third subpoena in May. Id. at 678.
6o. Id. at 669 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
61. Id. at 677-78. The court did issue a protective order providing that Caldwell would "not be
required to reveal confidential associations, sources or information received, developed or
maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his efforts to gather news for
dissemination to the public through the press or other news media." Id. at 678.
62. Id. at 678.
63. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d io8i (9 th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S.
665.
64. Id. at lo89.
65. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
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the public from certain streets, fires, and similar turmoil."6 6 Pappas gained access
to the Black Panther office on the condition that he agree "not to disclose any-
thing he heard or saw inside the store except an anticipated police raid."67 Two
months later, Pappas was subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify about what he
had seen and heard inside the office.68 Pappas moved to quash the subpoena on
the grounds that this information was privileged. His motion was denied.6 9 Pap-
pas appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which affirmed
the denial of his motion to quash. The court reasoned that any chilling effect that
his testimony would have on the dissemination of information to the press was
"indirect, theoretical, and uncertain."o
The final consolidated appeal resulted from two state-court judgments
against the same reporter.71 In November of 1969, Paul Branzburg, a reporter
for the Louisville Courier-Journal, published an article describing hashish pro-
duction in Jefferson County, Kentucky.72 Branzburg was subpoenaed by a grand
jury to testify about the article. He appeared, but he refused to reveal the names
of the individuals he had witnessed manufacturing the drugs, arguing that the
identities of his sources were protected.73 The state trial court rejected his privi-
lege claim and ordered him to testify. Branzburg petitioned the state appeals
court for prohibition and mandamus, and his petition was denied.74
In January of 1971, Branzburg published a second article describing drug use
in Frankfort, Kentucky. In the course of his reporting, he "spent two weeks in-
terviewing several dozen drug users in the capital city."7 He was again subpoe-
naed to testify before a grand jury. Branzburg moved to quash the summons,
66. Id. at 674.
67. Id. at 672.
68. Id. at 672-73. Pappas initially appeared before the grand jury but refused to answer questions
relating to what he had witnessed inside the Black Panther office. A second summons was
served, and it was this summons that he moved to quash. Id.
69. Id. at 673.
70. Id. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 302 (Mass. 1970), as modified on denial of reh'g
(1971)).
71. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S.
665; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408
U.S. 665.
72. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
73. Id. at 668.
74. Id. at 668-69.
75. Id. at 669 (quoting Paul M. Branzburg, Rope Turns to Pot, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan.
10, 1971, at 1).
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and his motion was denied.76 He again petitioned the court of appeals for man-
damus and prohibition, and his petition was again denied. In May of 1971, the
Supreme Court granted Branzburg a writ of certiorari to review both judgments,
as well as the other two cases.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held in 1972 that reporters enjoy no
First Amendment privilege when compelled to testify before a grand jury. 78The
Court noted that the only existing testimonial privilege rooted in the Constitu-
tion was the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and it declined
to create a new constitutional privilege that only members of the press could en-
joy.7 9 The Court stressed that newspaper publishers have no special immunity
from laws of general applicability,so and that reporters do not enjoy a special
right of access to information not available to the public generally." Moreover,
the Court emphasized the importance of the grand jury's right to secure "every
man's evidence" and declined to abrogate this right in the name of protecting the
free flow of information to the press.8 2 The Court argued, " [W] e cannot seri-
ously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman's agree-
ment to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the
theory that it is better to write about crime than to do something about it.""
The Court further emphasized that its decision was consistent with prece-
dent. "At common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of
any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information
to a grand jury."84 And nearly every claim to a First Amendment privilege had
been denied since Marie Torre first advanced this argument in 1958." "We are
admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter's privilege will
undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news," the Court
76. Id. The court did issue an order protecting Branzburg from revealing "confidential associa-
tions, sources or information,' but requiring him to "answer any questions which concern or
pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually observed by [him]." Id. at
670 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
77. Id. at 671; see also 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (granting certiorari in Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665).
78. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
79. Id. at 689-90.
80. Id. at 682-83.
81. Id. at 684-85.
82. Id. at 688-91 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
83. Id. at 692.
84. Id. at 685.
85. Id. at 685-86.
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wrote, "[b]ut this is not the lesson history teaches us."86 From the very start of
the nation, the press had operated without constitutional protection for confi-
dential sources, and yet it had still "flourished."" The Court concluded that the
absence of a constitutional privilege "ha[d] not been a serious obstacle to either
the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press.""
But the implications of this decision were not so clear-cut. While some of the
Court's language implied a firm refutation of reporters' claims, at other points it
seemed more equivocal. The Court concluded that there was "no basis" for ex-
tending constitutional scrutiny " [o] n the records now before us."" Specifically,
it noted that the record lacked sufficient information about he effect that press
subpoenas had on the flow of information to the public. Yet it seemed to leave
the door open to reconsideration in light of new evidence.o
Justice Powell cast the deciding vote but wrote a concurrence that further
complicated the decision. His vote suggested that he had rejected a constitutional
privilege for reporters subpoenaed by a grand jury, yet his concurrence seemed
to support recognition of a qualified First Amendment privilege." The asserted
claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct," he wrote.92 The courts should bal-
ance constitutional concerns against competing societal interests on a "case-by-
case basis."
Justice Stewart penned a dissent, which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined.94 He criticized the Court's "crabbed view of the First Amendment,"" tak-
ing the position that the right to gather news is a necessary corollary to the right
86. Id. at 698.
87. Id. at 698-99.
88. Id. at 699 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 69o-91.
go. Id. at 693-94. For further discussion of the apparent contradictions in the majority's opinion,
see Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REv. 1, 20 (2016).
gi. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 710.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent that focused more
squarely on the Caldwell case. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
95. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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to publish it.9 6 And the right to gather news, in turn, implies a right to confiden-
tiality between a reporter and his source." " [W] e cannot escape the conclusion
that when neither the reporter nor his source can rely on the shield of confiden-
tiality against unrestrained use of the grand jury's subpoena power, valuable in-
formation will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be im-
poverished," he wrote."
Instead, Justice Stewart advocated for a three-part test for evaluating privi-
lege claims, one that would require the government to show that the information
was "clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry"; that
it was "reasonable to think the witness... ha[d] that information"; and that
"there [wa] s not any means of obtaining the information less destructive of First
Amendment liberties."99 He warned that denying the press at least a qualified
privilege risked "annex[ing] the journalistic profession as an investigative arm
of government."0 0
This perplexing set of opinions left the lower courts without clear guidance
as to the meaning and scope of the First Amendment's application in reporter's
privilege cases. Had Justice Powell, in his "enigmatic"1' concurrence, intended
to limit or otherwise alter the majority's decision?102 justice Stewart later sug-
gested that the vote was more like "four and a half to four and a half."'o
96. Id. at 727.
97. Id. at 728.
g8. Id. at 736.
99. Id. at 74o (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
ioo. Id. at 725.
101. Id.
102. In 20o7, Eric Freedman found a handwritten note injustice Powell's conference notes discuss-
ing his thoughts on the case. See Adam Liptak, A justice's Scribbles on Journalists' Rights, N.Y.
TiMEs (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/weekinreview/07iptak.html
[http://perma.cc/9T9V-HJ5V]. At conference, Justice Powell had noted: "It would be un-
wise ... to give the press any constitutional privilege and we're writing on a clean slate, so we
don't have to give constitutional status to newsmen. I'd leave it to the legislatures to create
one." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 165
(1990); see also Sean W. Kelly, Black and White and Read All Over: Press Protection After
Branzburg, 57 DUI L.J. 199, 209-10 (2007) (noting that in reference to Pappas, Justice Powell
wrote, "[A]s I have concluded there is no constitutional privilege, I have no choice but to af-
firm"; and that in reference to Caldwell, he wrote, "I will make clear in an opinion ... that
there is a privilege analogous to an evidentiary one, which courts should recognize & apply in
case by case to protect confidential information" (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)).
103. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J. 705, 709 (1975).
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3. Post-Branzburg Confusion
In the following decades, judges and scholars alike puzzled over the meaning
of Branzburg and its tangle of opinions.104 Courts have generally agreed that the
government cannot compel confidential information in bad faith."os But they
have diverged on virtually every other measure, causing a wide circuit split that
the Supreme Court has left unremedied for nearly fifty years. Courts disagree on
whether a qualified First Amendment privilege exists;106 whether any qualified
constitutional privilege that does exist applies to both confidential and noncon-
fidential information;0 7 and whether the Court's decision should be limited to
the grand jury context.0 8
104. There is an extensive body of legal literature examining the meaning, scope, and legacy of
Branzburg. See, e.g., Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter's Privilege, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 1341, 1342 (2008) (arguing that the Branzburg Court reached the right outcome and that
claims supporting the push for a legislative shield "rest on a shaky or even non-existent foun-
dation"); Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and First
Amendment Values, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 13, 5o (1988) (arguing that Branzburg should not
apply to privilege claims involving government sources because "[t]he years following
Branzburg witnessed a marked transformation both in the predominant use of confidential
relationships in the newsgathering process and in the Supreme Court's explication of the con-
stitutional doctrine that undergirds its analysis in Branzburg"); Richard A. Posner, A Political
Court, 119 HARv. L. REV. 31, 95 n.191 (2005) (referring to Branzburg as a "notorious example"
of the confusion that flows when the fifth vote for the majority writes separately and qualifies
the Court's opinion); Stone, supra note 4, at 44-45 (citing the confusion sown by Branzburg
to make the case for establishing uniformity in the law with the enactment of a statutory
shield); Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REv.
1951, 1954 (20o6) (arguing that Justice Powell's concurrence should not be "relegated ... to
nothing more than judicial residue").
105. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4 th Cit. 2013) (finding that there is "no
First Amendment testimonial privilege, absolute or qualified, that protects a reporter from
being compelled to testify by the prosecution or the defense in criminal proceedings about
criminal conduct that the reporter personally witnessed or participated in,' absent a showing
of an illegitimate motive).
io6. Compare Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 466 (9 th Cit. 1975) ("It is clear that Branzburg recog-
nizes some First Amendment protection of news sources."), with In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
Sio F.2d 58o, 583 (6th Cit. 1987) (" [T]he majority opinion in [Branzburg] rejected the exist-
ence of such a first amendment estimonial privilege.").
107. Compare Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cit. 1999) (holding that a qualified
privilege for reporters "applies to nonconfidential, as well as to confidential, information"),
with United States v. Smith, 135 F-3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that "newsreporters
enjoy no qualified privilege not to disclose nonconfidential information in criminal cases").
io8. Compare Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972) (limiting the Court's holding to
the grand jury context), with Sterling, 724 F.3d at 492 (finding that Branzburg foreclosed any
constitutional privilege in the criminal context for information sought in good faith).
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The courts also disagree on how to read the various opinions in Branzburg.
Some courts have treated Branzburg as a plurality decision.' Others have relied
on Justice Powell's concurrence to read the case as creating a qualified constitu-
tional privilege. 0̀ Still others have rejected wholesale the idea that Branzburg
permits a First Amendment privilege for the press in criminal cases, treating Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence as mere dicta."' One appellate judge recently observed
that "Justice Powell's concurrence and the subsequent appellate history have
made the lessons of Branzburg about as clear as mud."112
B. Congress's Refusal To Establish a Statutory Shield
In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Branzburg, dozens of shield laws
were introduced in Congress. While legislative efforts to enact a federal shield
law had begun as early as 1929," it was only in the wake of Branzburg that this
effort took off in earnest: seventy-one bills were introduced in Congress in the
year immediately following Branzburg alone.114 All of these attempts failed,1
iog. See, e.g., Smith, 135 F.3d at 968-69.
n1o. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F-3d 1289, 1292 ( 9 th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d
136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987).
iii. See, e.g., Sterling, 724 F.3d at 492, 495.
112. Id. at 523 (Gregory, J., dissenting in part).
113. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 241 1.23.
114. RonNell Andersen Jones,Avalanche or UndueAlarm?An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received
by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REv. 585, 595 (2008). One obstacle to these early shield laws
was the press itself. Many members of the press believed that Branzburg had been wrongly
decided. They eschewed any effort to create statutory protections on the grounds that protec-
tion should be based in the Constitution. See Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Dejj Vu All
Over Again: How a Generation of Gains in Federal Reporter's Privilege Law Is Being Reversed, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 42 (20o6).
115. Congress has enacted statutory protections for the press in related contexts. For example, in
1978 the Supreme Court held in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily that the government's earch of Stan-
ford's newsroom did not violate the First Amendment. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Two years later,
Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits law enforcement agents from
searching or seizing records or other information from those who disseminate information to
the public. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000aa to 2oooaa-12 (2012)). This legislation is clearly intended to protect reporters and
their sources. In an effort to cabin the scope of the discussion, however, this section focuses
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and eventually interest in enacting a shield law abated. Throughout the 198os
and 199os, few federal shield laws were proposed.1 16
But this legislative effort started anew after September 11,1"' likely prompted
in part by the imprisonment of well-known reporters like New York Times jour-
nalist Judith Miller."' In 2004, Senator Christopher Dodd spearheaded the
failed effort to pass the Free Speech Protection Act. 1 9 A revised shield law, titled
the Free Flow of Information Act, was introduced in the Senate the following
year. 120 Various versions of the Free Flow of Information Act were introduced in
both houses of Congress over the next eight years, and two of these bills were
favorably reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in 2007 and 2009.121
A version of the bill introduced in 2013 was gaining momentum when the Snow-
den leaks effectively derailed the process and likely robbed the bill of its sup-
port.122
These shield laws evolved over time. Every version contained basic protec-
tions for reporters, extending some form of qualified privilege for confidential
116. Jones, supra note 114, at 602 n.ioo (noting only one proposed shield law in the 198os);
Kathryn A. Rosenbaum, Protecting More Than the Front Page: Codifying a Reporter's Privilege for
Digital and Citizen Journalists, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1427, 1447 (2014) (noting that "atten-
tion to passing a bill waned without high-profile cases that invoked a reporter's privilege in
the 199os").
117. See The History of Shield Legislation, 31 NEWS MEDIA & L. 8 (2007), http://www.rcfp.org
/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-winter-2007/history
-shield-legislation [http://perma.cc/2UFQ-EB2P] (noting that only two shield laws were
proposed in Congress between 1979 and 2004).
118. In 2005, Judith Miller was found in contempt of court and jailed for nearly three months for
refusing to reveal a source. Susan Schmidt & Jim VandeHei, N.Y Times Reporter Released
from Jail, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2005/10/19/AR2oo51o900795.html [http://perma.cc/YK96-2BRT].
ig. Free Speech Protection Act of2oo4, S. 3020, lo8thCong. (2004); see also Leslie Siegel, Tram-
pling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter Shield Law ProvidingAbsolute Protection
Against Compelled Disclosure ofNews Sources and Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 509 (20o6)
(describing the legislative history surrounding the bill).
120. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, lo9th Cong. (2005). While both the 2004 and
2005 proposed shield laws offered protection against compelled disclosure of sources and
other confidential information, they differed in some important respects. For example, the
2005 bill focused on protecting news "entities" and their employees and contractors, id. § 5,
while the 2004 bill built its protection around the act of newsgathering, S. 3020 § 2. The 2005
bill also distinguished between civil and criminal proceedings, S. 1419 § 2, while the 2004 bill
established the same three-pronged test for both, S. 3020 § 3.
121. S. REP. No. 113-118, at 12-16 (2013).
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sources and unpublished information.123 But legislators revised these proposed
laws over time to account for shifting political pressures and changes in the me-
dia and technology landscape.124 The 2013 version of the Act, for example, intro-
duced a catchall provision that permitted judges to confer protection if, "on the
specific facts contained in the record, the judge determines that such protections
would be in the interest of justice and necessary to protect lawful and legitimate
news-gathering activities under the specific circumstances of the case."125 The
provision was included to account for the difficulties of defining who qualifies as
a "reporter" in an era of rapid technological change. 126
The implications of these failed legislative efforts are disputed. Some judges
and scholars have argued that they show a clear legislative intent not to create a
federal shield and that courts should not undermine Congress by recognizing a
common law privilege.12 7 Others have argued that the willingness of some fed-
eral judges to readBranzburg as creating a qualified constitutional privilege eased
the pressure to enact a statutory shield, but that the courts' recent contraction of
these protections lends new urgency to the project. 128 Still others have noted that
the media itself, reluctant to abandon its claim to an absolute privilege, opposed
123. See, e.g., S. 3020; S. 1419; Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 11oth Cong. (2007);
Free Flow of Information Act of 20o9, H.R. 985, 111th Cong. (2009); Free Flow of Infor-
mation Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).
124. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
125. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113 th Cong. § 11(i)(B) (2013); see also David
Greene, Senate Revises Media Shield Law for the Better, but It's Still Imperfect, ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.efforg/deeplinks/2o13/o9/senate-revises-media
-shield-law-better-its-still-imperfect [http://perma.cc/EZB6-MBE4] (endorsing the bill's
adoption of a "functional" definition of a reporter, in which protection is granted to anyone
who functions as a journalist, versus a "status" definition that limits protection to individuals
employed by or formally affiliated with a media organization).
126. See Lauren J. Russell, Shielding the Media: In an Age of Bloggers, Tweeters, and Leakers, Will
Congress Succeed in Defining the Term 'journalist" and in Passing a Long-Sought Federal Shield
Act?, 93 OR. L. REv. 193, 216 (2014) (explaining that the discretionary provision was inserted
as a compromise between lawmakers who advocated a broader definition of a journalist
and those who were concerned an overly broad definition would sweep in organizations like
WikiLeaks under the umbrella of the bill).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 505 (4 th Cir. 2013) ("We decline the invitation
to step in now and create a testimonial privilege under common law that the Supreme Court
has said does not exist and that Congress has considered and failed to provide legislatively.").
128. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5426 (noting that protections extended by the
Attorney General and the federal courts meant there was a "declining sense of urgency" that
caused efforts to enact a legislative shield to "grind to a halt"); Jones, supra note 114, at 602
(arguing that the "legislative fervor" of Congress diminished due to the reading of Branzburg
by the lower courts).
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many early legislative proposals.129 Regardless, the fact remains that Congress
has yet to enact a statutory shield for the press, despite many attempts over doz-
ens of years to do so.
C. Statutory and Judicial Protection Extended by the States
In contrast, the press currently enjoys widespread protection from the states.
These legislative and judicial shields were often established in the wake of the
high-profile jailing of a reporter. This familiar cycle -prosecutorial overreach
and public backlash, followed by a state-level legislative or judicial remedy- can
be traced back more than a century. The first state-level reporter's privilege stat-
ute was enacted by the Maryland legislature in 1896, partly in response to the
unpopular decision to jail Baltimore Sun reporter John T. Morris for refusing to
reveal a confidential source.3 0 Other states followed suit,"' often in response to
the public outcry that followed the imprisonment of a member of the press.132
129. See, e.g., Dalglish & Murray, supra note 114, at 18; see also id. at 42 (claiming that the media
may accept legislative proposals today that they previously opposed in recognition of "the
importance of getting some protection for journalists").
130. See Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413, 415 (Md. 1983) (noting that Maryland's shield law "was
prompted by a specific event: In early 1896, John T. Morris, a Baltimore Sun reporter, pub-
lished an article suggesting that certain elected officials and policemen were on the payrolls of
illegal gambling establishments,' and, after he was jailed for refusing to reveal his source for
the article, " [t] he Journalists' Club, alarmed at the prospect of reporters having to choose
between freedom and revealing the names of confidential sources, persuaded the General As-
sembly to enact protective legislation" (citation omitted)); cf Gordon, supra note 23, at 451-
87 (arguing that the incident with Morris likely played a role in the statute's enactment, but
that the importance of the Morris dispute may have been overstated by judges and legal his-
torians, and noting that the incident involving Morris may have occurred a decade prior to
the enactment of the state shield law).
131. In 1933, New Jersey enacted the nation's second state shield law. Other states acted soon there-
after: Alabama and California passed shield laws in 1935; Kentucky and Arkansas in 1936;
Arizona and Pennsylvania in 1937; Indiana and Ohio in 1941; and so on. John J. Watkins, The
Journalist's Privilege in Arkansas, 7 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 473, 479 n.23 (1984). By June of
1972, whenBranzburg was handed down, seventeen states had enacted shield laws. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.27 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 23, at 597-98, 6oo-oi (explaining that Kentucky's shield law was
passed partly in response to backlash following the imprisonment of two Danville Advocate
reporters for contempt, and that this same incident may have influenced the enactment of
Alabama's shield law as well); id. at 397 (noting that Louisiana's shield law may have been
enacted in response to the state court's denial of a privilege for a Baton Rouge State-Times re-
porter).
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Today, some state officials, including legislators and judges, have established
robust state-level shields.' As of 2013, thirty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia had enacted legislative shields.134 In ten additional states, courts had rec-
ognized some form of reporter's privilege.' State courts have located this pro-
tection in a variety of authorities, including the U.S. Constitution, 13 6 state
constitutions, common law,13' and court rules.13 1 Wyoming is the only state
that has not recognized some form of privilege, and some have speculated that
this is only because no reporter has ever been jailed in the state for refusing to
reveal a source.140
These state-level protections play a critical role in ensuring the free flow of
information to the press. This is particularly true for smaller, local news outlets
that may not have the resources necessary to mount costly legal battles against
subpoenas. But even larger media companies receive far more state-level sub-
poenas than federal ones.14 1 A study of press subpoenas issued nationwide in
133. Other state officials have also acted to protect reporters. For example, Paul Branzburg was
ordered jailed for six months but avoided imprisonment after the governor of Michigan re-
fused to extradite the reporter to Kentucky. Branzburg reportedly stated, "When the legal
drama ended, I still had not revealed my sources . . .. I knew all along it would end that way."
Kelly, supra note 102, at 205 (citing FRANcIs WILKINSON, ESSAYS IN ESSENTIAL LIBERTY: FIRST
AMENDMENT BATTLES FORAFREE PRESS 91, 93 (1992)).
134. For a list of these statutes, see United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3 d 482, 532 (4 th Cir. 2013). Ha-
waii's shield law has since expired. The state has not yet reinstated it, in large part due to
disagreements over who should qualify for protection. See Brett Oppegaard, Reader Rep: Ha-
waii Should Reinstate Shield Law Immediately, HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Nov. 7, 2016), http://
www.civilbeat.org/2o16/1/reader-rep-hawaii-should-reinsate-its-shield-law-immediately
[http://perma.cc/6P5K-RU941.
135. For a list of these state court decisions, see Sterling, 724 F.3d at 532. These judicial protections
were established relatively late. The earliest judicially-created, state-level reporter's privilege
was handed down in 1974. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 4 29 (Va. 1974).
136. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., 523 N.E.2d 277, 277-78 (N.Y. 1988) ("Article I, § 8 of the
New York State Constitution and, we believe, the First Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion as well, provide a reporter's privilege which extends to confidential and nonconfidential
materials. . .
137. See, e.g., id.
138. See, e.g., Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 118o, 1183-84 (Wash. 1982) (recognizing a
qualified common law privilege for journalists with respect to their sources of information).
139. See, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 509 (establishing an evidentiary privilege for reporters).
140. See Gregg Leslie, What's Up with Wyoming and theReporter'sPrivilege?, REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF PRESS (Fall 2008), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources
/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-fall-2008/whats-wyoming-and-reporters-p
[http://perma.cc/7MJS-PB5B].
141. Jones, supra note 114, at 633 (showing that roughly thirty percent of state subpoenas were
issued to newspapers with a circulation of more than 250,000).
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20o6 found that news organizations had received 1,049 state subpoenas in crim-
inal cases, as compared with only 153 federal subpoenas in criminal cases. 142 Sim-
ilarly, the press had received 588 state subpoenas in civil cases in which the news
outlet was not a party, as compared with 87 federal subpoenas.143
Moreover, news outlets in states with statutory shields were more likely to
fight a subpoena. Press outlets in states without a statutory shield "complied
fully, without opposing" 72.1% of all subpoenas issued.144 In contrast, news or-
ganizations in states with a shield law complied with only 53.9% of subpoenas.145
An amicus brief submitted in the Judith Miller case by 35 states noted that with-
out these state-level shields, "reporters in those States would find their news-
gathering abilities compromised, and citizens would find themselves far less able
to make informed political, social and economic choices."1 4 6
But state-level protections, no matter how robust, extend only so far in
shielding the press. In the absence of a cross-cutting federal privilege, this patch-
work of protections forms an uneven stopgap that suffers from at least two lim-
itations. First, these protections vary substantially from one state to another. 147
States have diverged, for example, as to whether the reporter's privilege is abso-
lute or qualified;14 8 whether it extends to nonconfidentiall4 9 and unpublished
142. Id. at 659.
143- Id-
144. Id. at 662. The study did not address the impact of state court decisions extending some form
of protection to the press. See id. at 587-93.
145. Id.
146. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Oldahoma et al. in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. United
States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (No. 04-1507), 2005 WL 1317523, at *4.
147. Some states provide an absolute privilege for all sources and newsgathering materials in every
civil or criminal case, administrative agency proceeding, or grand jury. For a list of states, see
Papandrea, supra note 7, at 546 n.177.
148. Compare, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c) (1) (LexisNexis 2013) (creating
an absolute privilege against compelled disclosure for "[t] he source of any news or infor-
mation procured by the person while employed by the news media or while enrolled as a
student, whether or not the source has been promised confidentiality"), with N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1992) (establishing a qualified privilege for nonconfidential infor-
mation).
149. Compare, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49-275 (2015) (protecting both confidential and nonconfi-
dential information), with N.M. R. EVID. 11-514 (providing explicit statutory protection only
for confidential sources).
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information; 0 and whether and how it applies in the civil versus criminal con-
text.151 States also have taken different approaches to defining who qualifies for
a privilege.1 52
Second, without federal protection, a reporter may be compelled to reveal a
source in federal proceedings, even if the reporter would have enjoyed protection
under state law. Because most high-profile cases that receive nationwide cover-
age today arise in federal court,' the goal of these state-level efforts - to incen-
tivize sources to provide information to the press-may be undermined.154
Sources may not necessarily know the exact state of reporter's privilege law, but
they will likely have a generalized awareness of high-profile cases in which a re-
porter is jailed for refusing to reveal a source - or, worse, reveals a source in re-
sponse to a subpoena.
150. Compare, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2017) (providing an absolute privilege for published
and unpublished information), with CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b) (extending privilege only to
unpublished sources), and CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2017) (same).
151. Compare, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011) (providing an absolute privilege in
civil cases and a qualified privilege in criminal cases), with CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2)
(2015) (providing the same qualified privilege in both the civil and criminal contexts).
152. Compare, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (protecting " [a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other
person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publi-
cation, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or
employed" and "a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or em-
ployed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected or em-
ployed"), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(1) (2015) (extending the privilege to "[a]ny per-
son, company, or entity, or the employees, independent contractors, or agents of that person,
company, or entity, engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photo-
graphing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium").
153. For example, when New York Times reporter Judith Miller was jailed for refusing to reveal a
confidential source in federal proceedings, the Times ran sixty-four stories and letters men-
tioning Miller in three months. And on July 7, 2005, the day after Miller was imprisoned, 285
newspapers in the Newspapers.com archives database ran stories about Judith Miller.
Roughly a third of those stories ran on the newspaper's front page. See 285 Matches for Judith
Miller on July 7, 2005, NEWSPAPERS.COM, http://go.newspapers.com/results.php?query=
judith+miller&splace= &date-field=july+7%2C+2005 [http://perma.cc/SGD6 -UCZ9].
154. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 20o6) (Tatel, J.,
concurring) (noting that denial of a federal privilege "would ... buck the clear policy of vir-
tually all states"); Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Oldahoma et al., supra note 146, at *3
(arguing that "increasing conflict has undercut the State shield laws just as much as the ab-
sence of a federal privilege"); cf Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (noting that "any
State's promise of confidentiality [between therapists and patients] would have little value if
the patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a federal court,' and
" [d]enial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation
that was enacted to foster these confidential communications").
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In sum, despite the substantial protections offered by the states, there are
still yawning gaps in the formal protections covering the press. Reporters sub-
poenaed in federal court have few effective defenses to shield confidential infor-
mation. And yet surprisingly few reporters have been jailed for contempt. The
next Part helps resolve this apparent contradiction, by illuminating the complex
web of informal protections the government has long extended to shield the
press.
II. UNCOVERING THE DE FACTO REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Prior to Branzburg, courts consistently declined to confer an express privilege
in published cases. Yet these decisions represent only part of the story. This Part
looks past the published case law on the reporter's privilege and asks how re-
porters actually fared when pressed to reveal a confidential source. It reviews an
array of historical records - including published and unpublished cases, news-
paper stories, and legislative materials - to demonstrate that beneath the official,
black-letter legal history, there exists a richer and more complex narrative.
It first argues that judges, legislators, and prosecutors have long sought to
protect reporters in ways short of conferring an express privilege, and it fleshes
out these de facto protections. It then surveys the current state of the de facto
reporter's privilege and concludes that some de facto protections may be weak-
ening."'
A. Judicial De Facto Privilege
While judges rarely conferred an express reporter's privilege prior to
Branzburg, they often extended protection in other ways. This Section looks to
both published case law and newspaper accounts of legal proceedings to identify
these less formal modes of protection. It first outlines the methodology used and
examines the benefits and limitations of relying on newspaper accounts as a
source of legal history. It then identifies the various ways by which courts have
protected reporters and their sources. It argues that judges have protected re-
porters by conferring an express privilege or by recognizing a Fifth Amendment,
loss-of-livelihood, or honor defense in both reported and unreported cases. It
155. In this way, this Article attempts an approach similar to what David Pozen has referred to as
a "positive theory in the middle range,' in that it is focused less on "higher-level normative
accounts of the information state" and more on how the surrounding ecosystem actually
works. Pozen, supra note II, at 634.
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then argues that judges have also protected the press by extending ad hoc privi-
leges, such as finding the reporter's testimony immaterial or declining to hold a
reporter in contempt.15 6
1. Methodology
To understand how reporter's privilege claims were treated on a day-to-day
basis, we must look beyond the black-letter canon of reporter's privilege cases.
This requires looking to contemporaneous econdary sources like newspapers,
as well as to reported cases in which a judge extended functional protection to a
reporter without conferring an express privilege. Only a handful of reporter's
privilege disputes were enshrined in the law reports in early America. These sec-
ondary sources and examples of functional protections extended to the press add
flesh to the more skeletal history found in the reported case law.
Newspaper accounts of legal proceedings, in particular, are uniquely poised
to help fill the gaps in our understanding of how early reporter's privilege claims
were resolved. This is especially true when judges merely released a reporter
without punishment, because in these instances often no appeal was taken and
no formal record of the proceeding survives.1 17 Further, newspaper accounts of
156. This Section confines itself to judicial treatment of direct privilege claims. The courts have
also extended protections in other realms that bear on press protections in this arena. The
most significant example of this is the 1971 decision in New York Times Co. v. United States
(Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971). There, the Court held that the government could not
issue a prior restraint against publication of classified material unless the information in ques-
tion would result in "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thirty years later, the Court ruled in Bartnicki v. Vopper
that the press is not liable for publishing information unlawfully obtained if the information
is of public importance. 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). These decisions obviously limit the risk and
exposure of the press when publishing leaked information and therefore offer the press an
important source of protection. But they do not squarely implicate the question of whether a
reporter is protected when compelled to reveal a confidential source. For a general discussion
of the yawning gap in protections between source and distributor, see Pozen, supra note 11, at
516.
157. There is a rich body of law and economics literature grappling with this problem of selection
bias in litigation. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90
MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). In The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, Priest and Ben-
jamin demonstrate that "the disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes." Priest &
Klein, supra, at 4.
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reporter's privilege disputes offer invaluable context to legal scholars. They pro-
vide insight into how the public reacted to a decision, how long a reporter was
jailed, or whether a judge expressed dismay or regret over the decision to jail a
reporter. Such narrative accounts help illuminate the multitude of ways in which
judges exercised their discretion to protect the press.
a. Newspapers as Legal Sources
The findings of this Article illustrate how newspaper sources can challenge
accepted historical narratives generated on the basis of published case law.
Newspapers are uniquely able to provide a contemporaneous historical account
of unreported cases, and relying on newspapers as a source of legal knowledge is
consistent with broader trends in scholarship. In recent decades, both judges"'
and scholars"' have been more willing to look beyond the confines of law re-
ports for legal authority. And technological developments offer the legal histo-
158. A number of scholars have tried to determine the extent to which the internet has opened the
door for judges to rely on authority outside of published case reports. For example, Frederick
Schauer and Virginia Wise argued in 1997 that " [a]s numerous technological, economic, and
institutional developments make lawyers' use of so-called 'nonlegal' sources more and more
prevalent, the informational line between law and nonlaw becomes increasingly tenuous."
Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
1080, 1082 (1997). They noted that there was no significant increase in the Supreme Court's
reliance on "nonlegal" sources, such as nonlegal journals and books, from 195o to 1990, but a
substantial increase in the use of nonlegal sources from 1991 to 1997. Id. at 1108; see also Robert
C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1673,
1689-90 (2000) (describing the significant expansion of the number and type of legal author-
ities cited in Supreme Court decisions from 1899 to 1999).
159. For examples of legal scholars relying on newspaper accounts of legal proceedings, see, for
example, Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married, loo COLUM. L.
REV. 957 (2000), who relied on newspaper accounts of a single trial to examine the evolution
of the doctrine of common-law marriage; James Oldham, Law Reporting in the London News-
papers, 1756-1786, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 177 (1987), who reviewed newspaper accounts of legal
proceedings in London from 1756 -1786 to understand the way the press covered trials; Jeremy
Patrick, Beyond Case Reporters: Using Newspapers To Supplement he Legal-Historical Record (A
Case Study ofBlasphemous Libel), 3 DREXEL L. REv. 539 (2011), who examined two newspaper
archives from 1898-1945 and from 1882-2003 to supplement he existing legal historical record
on blasphemous libel prosecutions and iscovered twenty-one new cases of blasphemous li-
bel; and Kim Stevenson, Unearthing the Realities ofRape: Utilising Victorian Newspaper Report-
age To Fill in the Contextual Gaps, 28 LIvERPooL L. REv. 405 (2007), who reviewed newspaper
archives to fill in key information about sexual rape and sexual offenses, which were often
elided or obscured in the case reports.
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rian a wealth of new possibilities: the digitization of millions of pages of histor-
ical newspapers has opened up new methods and avenues of legal research that
were not available to scholars even a decade ago.16 0
Newspapers are particularly useful when studying the colonial era, when
there was virtually no organized case reporting system. The first comprehensive
compilation of American law reports - federal, state, or colonial - was a collec-
tion of Connecticut cases published in 1789.161 But the reporting system in the
Nation's early years was haphazard and remained that way for nearly a cen-
tury.162 It was only after John B. West brought some semblance of uniformity
and order to publishing with the establishment of the West Reporter System in
the late 1870s that some law reporters began to publish lower court decisions
with greater regularity.163 Overall, however, the publication of lower state and
federal court decisions remained inconsistent, even through the nineteenth cen-
tury.164
16o. For example, Google began digitizing microfilm from newspapers' archives in 2008. Miguel
Helft, Google To Digitize NewspaperArchives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes
.com/2o8/o9/o9/technology/o9google.html [http://perma.cc/K2NE-9RFP].
161. EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CON-
NECTICUT FROM THE YEAR 1785 TO MAY 1788 WITH SOME DETERMINATIONS IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF ERRORS (1789).
162. See Thomas J. Young, Jr., A Look at American Law Reporting in the 19th Century, 68 LAw LIBR.
J. 294, 300 (1975).
163. For example, the Federal Reporter, which John B. West started publishing in 188o, contained
appellate and district court decisions. 1 FEDERAL REPORTER: CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1880); Thomas A. Woxland,
Forever Associated with the Practice of Law: The Early Years of the West Publishing Company, 5
LEGAL REFERENCE SERV. Q. 115, 116 (1985).
164. New York established a reporting system for lower court decisions in 1892. Gary D. Spivey,
Two Centuries of Law Reporting, 1 JUD. NOTICE (The Historical Soc'y of the Courts of the State
of N.Y., White Plains, N.Y.), Spring/Summer 2004, at 7, 9. But it was not until the mid-
twentieth century that lower court decisions were routinely preserved. See Charles J. Stiegler,
The Precedential Effect of Unpublished Judicial Opinions Under Louisiana Law, 59 Loy. L. REv.
535, 539 (2013). And it was not until the 1970s that unpublished decisions were recorded in
the law reports with any consistency. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF
JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES OF
THE ADvISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, FJC RESEARCH SER. No. 73-2, 13-14 (1973).
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Occasionally, a reporter or an enterprising lawyer would transcribe lower
court decisions in a particular district, but coverage was geographically and tem-
porally spotty.16s Many decisions were still only issued orally.166 And while the
outcome of an oral decision may have been recorded if a law reporter was present
in the courtroom, the language of the opinion was usually not preserved. As a
result, in the vast majority of early cases, the only record of the court's reasoning
was a newspaper account of the proceeding.16 7 Even then, these newspaper sto-
ries captured a mere fraction of the decisions that were issued daily in court-
rooms across America. 168
Of course, there are downsides to relying on newspaper articles as a historical
tool. Newspaper accounts of legal decisions may be more prone to flawed or bi-
ased coverage.169 journalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
often more concerned with the newsworthiness of a particular court proceeding
than with its legal importance. In turn, legal coverage often skewed in favor of
the sensational: cases involving murders, scandals, and acts of violence repre-
sented a disproportionate amount of the legal stories printed in this era.170 Crit-
ical, yet dry, legal developments often went unmentioned.
165. John 0. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law'sAlgorithm, 66 FLA. L. REv. 991, 1003 (2014). Many
written legal records from this era were also lost to fires. See, e.g., KURT X. METZMEIER, WRIT-
ING THE LEGAL RECORD: LAw REPORTERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY KENTUCKY (2016) (de-
scribing how a fire in 1865 destroyed virtually all legal records from the Kentucky Court of
Appeals).
166. See Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of Custody Law
Under Patriarchy, 17 LAw & HIST. REV. 247, 286 n.141 (1999) (noting that for much of the
nineteenth century, decisions were issued orally and preserved only if someone was present at
the proceedings to transcribe them). Lawyers would sometimes keep and circulate their writ-
ten notes on legal decisions. Some judges also kept internal records of their decisions, and
would occasionally publish a compilation. See METZMEIER, supra note 165 (explaining that
" [j]udges also kept notebooks, called bench books, that contained copies of decisions ren-
dered during their time on the court," and noting that occasionally judges published a volume
of reports based on these books).
167. See Jenni Parrish, A Guide to American Legal History Methodology with an Example of Research in
Progress, 86 LAwLIBR. J. 105, 111 (1994) (noting that "[f]requently, newspaper accounts are
the only source of information about trials in the nineteenth century"); Patrick, supra note
159, at 540-41.
168. This changed in the early to mid-twentieth century, with the continued expansion of West
Publishing and the reduced costs of maintaining court records. More lower court decisions
were preserved, and the publishing process began to become standardized, allowing lawyers
to cross-reference cases and legal issues more easily. Stiegler, supra note 164, at 538-39.
169. See infra note 224.
170. See Patrick, supra note 159, at 546-47.
1209
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The sensationalism of these stories also points to a powerful argument in
favor of using newspaper accounts. The drive to cover newsworthy moments in
the law yielded a diverse cross section of cases at every level of the legal system,
involving every manner of plaintiff, defendant, and issue."' Because of this im-
pulse, early newspapers serve as a surprisingly rich source of information about
legal and legislative proceedings.172 Newspaper accounts often chronicled not
only the legal arguments raised, but also the ways in which the judge or jury
responded to these claims, the reactions of the parties to a judge's decision, the
length of a reporter's imprisonment, and the conditions of the reporter's con-
finement." They were also often accompanied by editorials that shed light on
how these decisions were received and interpreted by the public. Taken together,
these accounts offer a window into the color and complexity of the early Ameri-
can legal system.
Because this Article spans a wide temporal and geographic range, it is im-
possible to identify every relevant source and hard to confirm the accuracy of
some newspaper reports. It is also difficult to contextualize each example pre-
sented and consider the unique regional or temporal conditions that may have
influenced the outcome of any particular reporter's privilege dispute. This raises
questions about the generalizability of these examples. However, many of the
cases cited here were picked up by a wire service or were otherwise reported
widely in papers across the country. As a result, some of these incidents likely
influenced public perceptions of the privilege on a national scale, even if the
events were purely local.
b. Research Approach
When structuring this Article's methodological approach, I sought to define
the category of "reporter's privilege" cases broadly. I included cases in which a
171. See, e.g., id.
172. See id. at 541; Parrish, supra note 167, at 114-15 ("Newspapers from the time period in question
are often an excellent source of information about the major figures and major legal events,
such as trials."); see also Oldham, supra note 159 (noting that the London newspapers of the
second half of the eighteenth century "contained a surprising amount of information about
court proceedings" (footnote omitted)).
173. Examples of such articles are discussed infra Sections II.A.2-4. See also Patrick, supra note 159,
at 540-41 (describing the different types of information newspaper accounts of legal proceed-
ings can provide in comparison with more traditional legal sources); Stevenson, supra note
159, at 4o6 ("The extent to which social and moral factors were and are taken into account
when determining guilt or innocence, and how that might affect the application of doctrinal
legal rules and principles, cannot be fully uncovered or evaluated using singular preferred
traditional sources such as the law reports and critique of judicial opinions.").
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reporter declined to reveal the identity of a confidential source, declined to reveal
confidential information, declined to respond to a subpoena, and declined to re-
veal nonconfidential information. The selection includes both cases in which a
reporter refused to reveal a source and cases in which a newspaper editor refused
to reveal an author. This approach complements he black-letter canon of re-
porter's privilege cases, which similarly includes examples of cases involving
both anonymous sources and authors.174
The fact patterns and procedural postures of these cases vary.1 75 I included
examples from both civil and criminal proceedings, as well as cases in which for-
mal contempt proceedings were initiated and those in which contempt was not
even threatened. For the purposes of this Section, I excluded cases resolved on
the basis of a state statute granting protection.176
174. This canon also includes cases in which an action was brought directly against the reporter or
newspaper. In Branzburg, the Court cited eight cases involving reporter's privilege disputes to
support its conclusion that "[a] t common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the
existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information
to a grand jury" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972). In one of those eight cases,
the court held that a reporter must surrender the name of his confidential source in the context
of a defamation case against his employer. See Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 441
(S.D. Tex. 1969).
175. Many of these historical examples involve reporter's privilege claims that arose in the course
of local proceedings or disputes -in other words, in contexts in which national security con-
cerns are not implicated. I contend that this should not be a bar to applying the de facto lens
to the national security context. First, the published and unpublished case law is equally de-
void of cases involving national security claims, so cabining off the historical judicial de facto
privilege to the non-national security context would necessarily require cabining the reported
case law as well. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 534 & n.114 (explaining that "common wisdom"
is that there have been eleven national security-related leak investigations, the first brought in
1973, but noting that the 1945-1946 pursuit of individuals involved with the left-wing maga-
zine Amerasia and the 1957 court martial of John C. Nickerson, Jr. for leaking classified infor-
mation about he Army's ballistic missile project could arguably qualify as well). Second, there
is little clear policy rationale for limiting the de facto privilege to the non-national security
context. The de facto privilege lens, broadly conceived, reveals a long history and tradition of
protecting reporters who are pressed to reveal confidential information. The motivations driv-
ing this protection -in particular, the desire to protect the public's access to information -
apply equally in the context of national security cases. While the public interest in determining
the source of a national security leak is presumably higher than in the non-national security
context, the public's interest in learning about the government's covert activities is often
heightened as well. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d 1141, 1173-74 (Tatel, J., concur-
ring) (noting that some leaks "caus [e] harm far in excess of their news value," and " [i] n such
cases, the reporter privilege must give way," while "in some cases a leak's value may far exceed
its harm, thus calling into question the law enforcement rationale for disrupting reporter-
source relationships").
176. Cases in which a judge gave an exceptionally broad or favorable reading to state statutory
shields arguably qualify as a form of judicial protection. I refrained from including these cases
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To identify relevant cases, I searched a variety of online newspaper archives,
including Newspapers.com; the Library of Congress's database, Chronicling
America; NewspaperArchive.com; ProQuest Historical Newspapers; Google's
Historical Newspaper archives; and the New York Times historical archives. I also
searched dozens of editions of Editor & Publisher and the Fourth Estate, two
weeldy trade newspapers that covered the publishing industry. Finally, I
searched Google Books and the HathiTrust Digital Library.7 7
My search revealed both cases in which reporters were protected and cases in
which they were held in contempt and granted no special treatment. I have enu-
merated these latter cases in a footnote for the sake of completeness.17 ' But be-
cause these examples are consistent with the reported case law - in other words,
they do not challenge the prevailing view of reporter's privilege claims - I have
not described them in greater depth.1 7 1
Defining the precise contours of the de facto privilege can be difficult, as a
judge's motivations in any particular case may be hard to discern. Although there
is no perfect solution to this problem, I have attempted to mitigate the issue by
highlighting examples where the text of the decision indicates that the judge was
sympathetic to a reporter's position; where outside observers suggested that a
desire to protect the reporter may have animated the decision; or where the cir-
cumstances of the decision signal in some other way that the judge was moti-
vated to protect a reporter or source.
in my review in order to avoid conceptual confusion between the protections extended by the
judicial branch versus those extended by state legislatures.
177. The search functions for many of these databases are crude, and searching disconnected words
like "editor" and "privilege" yielded too many results. To overcome this, I searched for phrases,
such as "reporter imprisoned" or "reporter released." I tried a wide variety of combinations of
terms -for example, matching "reporter," "journalist,' "editor," and "newspaperman," with
"jailed;' "in contempt,' "freed;' or "released.' I also tried phrases such as "refuses to reveal" or
"protects source." This approach is undoubtedly underinclusive. It did not, for example, cap-
ture relevant results like "editor John Doe released."
178. See supra note 26.
179. This Article does not provide a detailed comparison of the number of unpublished cases
granting favorable versus unfavorable treatment to reporters for two reasons. First, these cat-
egories are not mutually exclusive - for example, cases in which a reporter was initially jailed
but quickly released due to public outcry arguably fall within both categories. See, e.g., infra
notes 267-273. Second, I identified cases by plugging a wide variety of search terms into vari-
ous historical newspaper databases. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. This trial-and-
error approach does not lend itself well to strict empirical conclusions - a new combination of
terms could turn up new sets of relevant cases. That being said, these searches did not yield a
significantly larger number of examples on either side of the ledger. Broadly speaking, these
searches turned up very roughly the same number of examples of favorable treatment ex-
tended to the press as unfavorable treatment.
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2. Uncovering an Express Privilege
Prior to Branzburg, judges occasionally conferred an express reporter's privi-
lege, although these cases were rarely, if ever, published. Such unpublished ac-
counts are both few and scattered, but they nonetheless challenge the notion that
reporter's privilege claims were uniformly rejected at common law.
One of the first recorded instances of an express reporter's privilege took
place in the spring of 1912. A reporter for the Philadelphia Record published a
series of articles alleging widespread corruption in the city's property selection
process. When subpoenaed to testify, the reporter refused to reveal his source.0̀
According to newspaper accounts of the proceeding, the judge then "ruled in
effect that a newspaper man's confidence is inviolable, and decided that he had
no power to require the reporter to be sworn or examined unless the reporter
volunteered.""'
Newspapers around the country celebrated the decision as a vindication of
their right to protect confidential informants. The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote:
A question involving newspaper men and the inviolability of a confidence
bestowed in a newspaper man has been definitely settled in Milwaukee,
when a local Circuit Judge announced that he would refuse to require a
reporter to testify as to the source of his information in regard to a news
article that he wrote.18 2
In a similar vein, the Kansas Leavenworth Post ran the headline, "Inviolability
of Confidence Question Is Settled, Reporter Cannot Be Compelled To Reveal
His Source."' The Minnesota Brainerd Daily Dispatch's headline read, "Need
Not Break Confidence: Judge Holds Testimony of Newspaper Men Cannot Be
Forced."184 And in Alabama, the Muskogee Times-Democrat reported, "Newspa-
per Men Are Protected."8
180. Milwaukee Judge Refuses To Make a Newspaper Man Disclose His Source of Information, CINCIN-
NATI ENQUIRER, May 26, 1912, at 1; Need Not Break Confidence: Judge Holds Testimony ofNews-
paper Men Cannot Be Forced, BRAINERD DAILY DISPATCH, May 27, 1912, at 1.
181. Confidence Held Inviolable, FOURTH EST. (New York), June 1, 1912, at 3.
182. Milwaukee Judge Refuses To Make a Newspaper Man Disclose His Source of Information, supra
note 18o.
183. Newspaper Etiquette: Inviolability of Confidence Question Is Settled, Reporter Cannot Be Compelled
To Reveal His Source of Information Rules Milwaukee Court, LEAVENWORTH POST, May 31, 1912,
at 3.
184. Need Not Break Confidence, supra note 180.
185. Newspaper Men Are Protected, MUSKOGEE TIMEs-DEMOCRAT, May 29, 1912, at 1.
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Other accounts of successful privilege claims soon followed. In March of
1917, a judge in Chicago accepted a journalist's privilege claim. The Chicago
American had printed a story alleging that the vice president of the garment
workers' union had instructed union members to strike in violation of a court
injunction. An editor at the paper was subpoenaed to testify, but he refused to
reveal his source, arguing that a reporter could not be compelled to reveal the
identity of his confidential informants. 186 The judge agreed, ruling that
"[n] ewspaper eporters do not have to divulge the source of information if they
do not desire to do so."1 8 7
Over the next three decades, similar successes were reported in New York,
Tennessee, and Mississippi. In August of 1935, a judge in Queens, New York ac-
cepted a privilege claim from a reporter at the Brooklyn Eagle. " [T] his court rec-
ognizes the right of a newspaperman to refrain from divulging sources of his
information," he reportedly ruled from the bench. "If you feel that in doing this
(taking the stand), it may interfere with this right you are at liberty not to take
the stand at this time."' A Tennessee judge similarly extended a testimonial
privilege to a writer for the Nashville Tennessean. The reporter refused to divulge
his source for a story about bootleggers, arguing that doing so would violate
journalists' code of ethics."9 The judge declined to hold him in contempt. The
press "must of necessity get its information through others. Much is given in
confidence and I am unable to hold the witness in contempt on this matter."9 0
And in 1949, a judge in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, allowed a reporter to protect a
source on novel grounds: the freedom of the press.91
186. Chi. American StaffMay Be Dragged into Strike Mess, DAY BOOK, Mar. 8, 1917.
187. News Sources Confidential Says Chicago Judge, FOURTH EST. (New York), Mar. 17, 1917, at 2; see
also Chicago Circuit Court Makes Important Ruling, CHESTER TIMES, Mar. 9, 1917, at 9 ("That
no newspaper can be forced to disclose the source of its information concerning articles it
publishes and that no one can be forced to tell who wrote the article was the ruling made by
Judge Baldwin of the Circuit Court.").
188. Prosecution Rests in Trial ofRifle Gang: Court Backs Eagle Man Refusing To Testify on Events After
Arrests, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Aug. 20, 1935, at 2. The journalist had written a series of sto-
ries about a local rifle gang, and he was summoned as a witness at the trial of four of the gang's
members. The reporter refused to testify on the grounds that his sources of information were
privileged. The judge agreed. Reporter's Data Held Privileged by Court: Queens Judge Rules He
Need Not Testify on Methods of Police in Robbery Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1935, at 6.
189. Court Upholds Press on Shielding Source, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1948, at 25. Parts of the state were
dry at the time.
190. Id.; Court Upholds, Praises Tennessean Reporter in East State Inquiry, TENNESSEAN, June 1, 1948,
at 1.
191. When reporter Charles Pierce refused to reveal his source for a story about movie theaters
showing films on Sunday evenings (in violation ofMississippi state law), the judge reportedly
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3. Legal Defenses
Judges also protected the press by recognizing various defenses against dis-
closure. This Section reviews examples of this trend. It describes cases in which
judges recognized a Fifth Amendment defense, a loss-of-income or -livelihood
defense, and an honor defense. It argues that these defenses were occasionally
used as a way to shield reporters and their sources.
a. The Fifth Amendment Defense
There are a number of examples of reporters successfully invoking a Fifth
Amendment defense to protect the identity of a source - even when it seemed
unlikely that the reporter had been implicated in any crime.192 The most promi-
nent example is a 1915 Supreme Court case, Burdick v. United States." Although
this case is reported, it nonetheless fits within the de facto privilege narrative
because the Court declined to extend an express reporter's privilege in Burdick
but nonetheless found a way to protect the reporter and his source in practice.
In May of 1915, the New York Tribune published an article detailing wide-
spread fraud in the nation's customs department.194 A grand jury investigating
these allegations summoned George Burdick, the Tribune's city editor, to testify
about the newspaper's ource of information. Burdick refused, arguing that this
testimony would be self-incriminatory. In an effort to unmask Burdick's source,
held that "to force Pierce to reveal his source of information would be an encroachment upon
the freedom of the press." Protection of News Sources Upheld, DELTA DEMOCRAT-TIMEs, Aug. 17,
1949, at 1; Theaters and Police Wage Sunday Battle, STATESVILLE DAILY REc., July 25, 1949, at 9.
Even prior to the Mississippi case, a reporter had raised a First Amendment defense in the
context of a legislative hearing. In August 1938, an editor for the New Mexico Examiner efused
to reveal to the state legislature his source of information for an editorial alleging that the
state's governor was involved in an effort to buy congressional votes. An article reporting on
the hearing noted that the editor "based his refusal on the constitutional freedom of the press."
House Inquiry of Charges Is Completed, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 30,1938, at 1. The 1958 case Gar-
land v. Torre is often cited as the first case in which a reporter claimed a privilege rooted in
constitutional protections for the press. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); see, e.g., Fargo, supra note
45, at 1072. And yet the newspaper accounts of the Mississippi and New Mexico cases suggest
that reporters were raising First Amendment claims in court decades earlier.
192. For a discussion of contemporary examples of a reporter invoking a Fifth Amendment de-
fense, see infra Section III.A.
193. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
194. See id. at 85.
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President Woodrow Wilson granted the editor a full pardon. Still, Burdick re-
fused."' District Court Judge Learned Hand held him in contempt, reasoning
that "[ii t would be preposterous to let [Burdick] keep on suppressing the
truth."1 9 6 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Burdick was not compelled to
accept the pardon and could continue relying on a Fifth Amendment defense. 19
Observers have noted that it is unlikely that Burdick had been implicated in
any crime and that his Fifth Amendment claim was almost certainly intended to
protect his sources.98 Legal scholar Zechariah Chafee reasoned that despite the
contorted legal defense offered, Burdick secured "all the practical advantage of a
special newspaper privilege by dressing himself up in the United States Consti-
tution."'99 Chaffee argued that " [t]he prosecution would have been just as well
off and saved much trouble for many persons if Burdick had been quietly dis-
missed from the stand as soon as he declined to betray a confidence."2 00 Regard-
less of the Court's reasoning, he noted, "the fact remains that the city editor did
not talk."201
The New York Times' editorial writers agreed, concluding that the Court had
extended the privilege in fact, if not in law. While the decision "did not go into
the right of newspaper men to receive confidential information and protect their
informants," it did "ha[ve] the effect of settling that question, since in [the] fu-
ture any newspaper man interrogated concerning the source of his information
may not only plead his constitutional immunity, but refuse a pardon."2 02
b. The Loss-of-Livelihood Defense
Reporters and editors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often
argued that revealing a confidential source in court would threaten their liveli-
hood. They argued that unmasking one informant would cause all of their
195. Id. at 86.
196. United States v. Burdick, 211 F. 492,494 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
197. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 93-94.
198. See, e.g., Note, The Right of a Newsman, supra note 20, at 68 n.5o (noting that "there appeared
to be little ground for believing that Burdick was involved in the frauds he had exposed").
199. 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 498 (1947).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. A Misused Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1915, at 8. Curiously, five years later, a Seventh Circuit
case presented a very similar fact pattern to Burdick, but the court rejected the reporter's Fifth
Amendment claim. Elwell v. United States, 275 F. 775 (7 th Cir.), cert denied, 257 U.S. 647
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sources to dry up, rendering them incapable of engaging in the business of news-
gathering. Such claims usually failed; most judges reasoned that the pursuit of
truth in the courtroom outweighed any negative impact on the reporter's busi-
ness interests.20 3
But these claims were not always rejected outright. In 1933, for example, a
reporter from the Philadelphia Record was subpoenaed to testify about his source
of information for a story alleging corruption in the state alcohol licensing board.
The reporter refused on the grounds that he would lose his job if he revealed his
source, and the judge accepted his defense.2 04
While these loss-of-livelihood defenses were usually cast as threatening the
individual business interests of the journalist, they sometimes strayed into larger
claims about the importance of ensuring that reporters could engage in the work
of newsgathering more broadly. For example, in 1914, the editor of a Hawaii
newspaper argued the reporter's privilege should be recognized for the same rea-
son as "any gentleman of the jury" would have "against giving his private busi-
ness secrets publicity. It is our source of news that we rely on to enable us to get
out a newspaper; and if we break confidence with the source of news we would
lose all of our sources and would have no newspaper."2 0 5
In some ways, these arguments can be viewed as precursors to similar claims
explicitly grounded in the First Amendment. When reporters described the
harms that would flow from revealing a source, they did not always draw clear
lines between the personal harm - or the negative impact to their business - and
the public harm, or the fact that such disclosure would staunch the flow of in-
formation to the public.
203. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 785-86 (Ga. 1911) (rejecting a forfeiture of estate
defense).
204. See Distillery Seeks Alcohol Permit, HARUSBURG TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 1933, at 1. One commenta-
tor wrote that there are different explanations for the court's lenient attitude. The fact that the
testimony was relevant to a civil rather than a criminal proceeding may have compelled the
court to expand the scope of the traditional forfeiture of estate defense to provide an alterna-
tive ground for protecting the reporter. Alternatively, the witness who took the stand after the
reporter revealed that the deputy attorney general had been the confidential source, and the
court may have protected the journalist on the ground that testimony was available from an-
other source. See Talbot D'Alemberte, journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential
Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 316-17 (1969).
205. In re Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 475, 475-76 (1914).
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c. The Honor Defense
In rare instances, reporters were also excused from testifying on the grounds
that they had promised confidentiality to a source. The privilege was articulated
in humanistic rather than instrumental terms: it was seen as morally necessary
for a man to be permitted to keep his word.2 06 This "honor defense"-which
permitted witnesses to withhold testimony on the grounds that violating an oath
tarnished a man's reputation- undergirded many early evidentiary privileges,
including the attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges.207
As scholars have noted, early British cases emphasized that "[a] gentlemen
does not give away matters confided to him."208 But by the eighteenth century,
British courts started to reject this defense. In 1776, a British court rejected the
claim that it would violate an attorney's obligations as a "man of honor" to be
compelled to reveal a client confidence.209 A year later, the court wrote, "[T] he
law knows nothing of that point of honour."2 10 The desire for uncovering the
truth in judicial proceedings had won out over the desire to protect the honor of
witnesses, and several evidentiary privileges disappeared in the late eighteenth
century as a result.211 This also marked the moment at which many privileges
were first justified on instrumental grounds. The attorney-client privilege, for
example, survived in this way -without a privilege, the courts reasoned, clients
would not speak freely, and lawyers would be unable to provide adequate repre-
sentation.21
2o6. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
31, 48. But see JONATHAN AUBURN, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: LAW AND THEORY 7-8
(2000) (arguing that early privileges "may from the start have been grounded on fairly
straight-forward considerations of practicality that are closer to the modem instrumental ra-
tionale").
207. Edward Livingston, writing in the early 18oos, explained that " [e]very feeling of justice, hon-
our and humanity would be shocked" by an attorney's disclosure of a client's secrets. EDWARD
LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW, FOR THE STATE OF LOuISIANA 277 (1833).
2o8. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 1061, 1070 (1978).
209. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES § 2.4 (citing The Duchess of Kingston's Case (1776) 168 Eng. Rep. 175 (HP)).
210. Id. (citing Trial of James Hill, 2o How. ST. TR. 1317, 1362-63 (1777)).
211. See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), ajf'd sub nom. Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
212. Id. (explaining that the attorney-client privilege remained "on the new theory that it was nec-
essary to encourage clients to make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to enable the
latter properly to advise the clients").
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While the honor defense was formally eliminated in British courts in the late
eighteenth century, it continued to animate judicial decisions in early America.
For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut accepted an honor defense in
1792.213 And even in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, after the honor
defense had been formally eliminated in the United States,2 14 reporters often
continued to raise some form of an honor argument. These efforts were almost
always rejected, but occasionally a judge would be sympathetic to an honor
claim.
Such was the situation in an 1887 case arising from a story published in the
Atlanta Constitution, which provided a detailed account of secret grand jury pro-
ceedings.215 The reporter, E.C. Bruffey, refused to reveal the identity of his
source. He was found in contempt and ordered jailed for ten days.2 16 The deci-
sion was overturned on appeal, with the appellate court reasoning, in part, that
" [h] ad the respondent estified, his testimony would have tended to incriminate
himself and bring upon himself disgrace and public contempt."2 17
Once again, some observers viewed this decision as conferring broader pro-
tections on the press. "Mr. Bruffey is entitled to the thanks of the newspaper men
in this country for his courageous and successful defense of his professional
rights," the Atlanta Constitution wrote.2 18
His conduct in this matter proves that he was faithful to the newspaper
he represents, true to his relations to the public as a gatherer of news,
and determined to stand up to his duty as a man. By pursuing these
clearly defined lines of conscientious conduct, Mr. Bruffey has done
much to settle a long disputed question.2 1 9
And like the forfeiture of estate defense, this loss-of-honor argument often
surfaced broader questions about the importance of newsgathering writ large.
213. Mills v. Griswold, 1 Root 383, 383 (Conn. 1792) (holding that confidential communications
that are "necessary in the course of business" will be honored).
214. See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. at 15 (noting that " [i]n the eighteenth century, when the desire
for truth overcame the wish to protect the honor of witnesses ... several testimonial privileges
disappeared").
215. A Pen Picture of the Inside of the Grand jury Room, As Given by a Member of the jury, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 25, 1887.
216. Bully Boy Bruff The "Little Giant" Refuses To Betray an Informant. Is Sent to jail in Consequence,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 9, 1887.
217. Brufy Free Again. Judge Marshallj. Clarke Renders His Decision: The Reporter Is Congratulated,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 12, 1887. This was one of three grounds offered for reversal.
218. Rights of a Newspaper Man, ATLANTA CONST., NOV. 20,1887.
219. Id.
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Reporters who argued that the privilege was necessary to protect their honor
occasionally raised larger claims about the importance of the privilege to the
newsgathering process.220
4. Ad Hoc Privileges
Judges also cobbled together various ad hoc protections as a way to shield
reporters who refused to reveal confidential information before the court. This
Section offers some examples. It describes judicial efforts to protect reporters by
deeming their testimony immaterial to the proceedings or by declining to hold
them in contempt. It then chronicles the ways in which judges conferred special
treatment on reporters who had been held in contempt-for example, by grant-
ing reduced jail time or by permitting special conditions of confinement.
a. Reporter Testimony Held Not Material
Cases turning on the materiality or relevance of a reporter's confidential in-
formation have not traditionally been considered part of the reporter's privilege
canon-with good reason. The bounds of this category can be porous and hard
to draw. It can be difficult to distinguish between a decision motivated by a desire
to protect the press and one motivated by a sincere belief that the reporter's tes-
timony was immaterial to the proceeding. Nonetheless, this Article's methodol-
ogy casts at least some of these cases in a new light. In some, news commentary
surrounding the case, combined with the text of the decision itself, suggests that
the judge may have relied on the relevance or materiality requirements as a
means of protecting reporters.
For example, in 1891, the Helena DailyJournal published an article criticizing
a local judge. The judge targeted in the article pressed the editor of the paper to
reveal the identity of the source quoted in the story. The editor refused, and the
judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to jail.221 The Montana Supreme
Court subsequently granted the editor's habeas petition, reasoning that even if
220. See, e.g., Elwell v. United States, 275 . 775, 779 (7 th Cir. 1921) (noting that the following
exchange occurred between an editor and the grand jury over the identity of the author of an
article: "Q. Will you tell the grand jury the name of that man? A. I will not. I decline to give
the name of the writer of that article, because I feel in honor bound to protect him, because,
if newspapers do not protect people who furnish them news, it would be impossible for them
to get news.").
221. In re MacKnight, 27 P. 336, 337 (Mont. 1891).
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the article were libelous, the identity of the source would not be relevant because
the editor of the paper could be held liable.222
The court then went further, admonishing the lower court judge for using
his contempt power to achieve political ends. Judicial contempt authority should
not be used "to enforce sentimental respect" for the courts, the Montana Su-
preme Court wrote. "That must be gained by other means, and will
flow ... where law and justice is administered with able, fearless, and impartial
fidelity."223 While the decision nominally turned on the court's determination
that the source's identity was not material, newspapers from the time cast the
decision as one intended to protect the press. One newspaper ran a story about
the reporter's release under the headline: "A case of press privilege."224
The press took a similar view of an 1884 case out of Massachusetts. The Mas-
sachusetts judge had found that a grand jury could not compel a reporter to re-
veal his source for an article recounting secret grand jury proceedings.22 5 The
source of the leaks, the judge reasoned, was not relevant to the grand jury's un-
derlying murder investigation.2 26 But dozens of newspaper articles cast the de-
cision as one intended to ensure that the press would be protected in court. The
Boston Globe, for example, wrote an editorial analogizing the reporter's privilege
to the attorney-client privilege:
222. Id. at 337-39.
223. Id. at 339.
224. A Case of Press Privilege, Russell Harrison's Paper Wins Against Judge McHatton, ICUAMAZOO
GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1891, at 8. Observers sometimes interpreted decisions that turned on the
materiality of a source's identity as granting an express privilege. From an instrumental per-
spective, this perception matters. If the public believes the privilege exists, the instrumental
benefits of a privilege are enjoyed, even if such privilege does not exist in the law. Of course,
this also raises the question of the accuracy and reliability of news reports about reporter's
privilege cases. I have tried, where possible, to cross-reference reports about a case across var-
ious outlets and with other historical sources to verify their accuracy. But it is possible that
there are some inaccuracies in the news reports cited in this Article. See discussion supra Sec-
tion II.A.i.a (discussing the limitations of relying on newspapers as a source of legal history).
225. Charles F. Jones' Bail Reduced, CHI. DAILY TIB., Dec. 4,1884; The Contumacious Reporters Sus-
tained, PHILA. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1884; The Lane Murder. Dorchester's Tragedy of Twelve Years Ago.
Alleged Confession of the Murderer in a Western Jail. The Matter Before the Suffolk County Grand
Jury, Bos. DAILY GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1884.
226. The Contumacious Reporters Sustained, supra note 225. Some judges ruled differently on this
question, holding that a grand jury was empowered to subpoena a reporter for his source of
information about he grand jury proceedings themselves, rather than about the underlying
crime that the grand jury was empaneled to investigate. See, e.g., In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011,
1012 (N.J. 1913) (articulating a broad view of a grand jury's power to subpoena witnesses).
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The decision is important as establishing and recognizing the principle
that newspapers to do successful work must be permitted if they so desire
to keep their sources of information secret. That principle enables them
to ferret out and secure valuable news for the people and oftentimes for
the authorities which otherwise they would be unable to get. It places
journalists in somewhat the same relation to those who give them news
that a lawyer bears to his client and is qui [te] as important for the general
good.2 27
These and other cases demonstrate that judges and judicial observers may
have looked to the materiality requirement as an important source of protection
for the press. They also serve as early examples of the idea that confidential
sources play a critical role in holding government officials and others in power
accountable.
b. Declining To Hold Reporters in Contempt
While judges occasionally conferred an express privilege on the press, they
more often protected reporters by simply declining to hold them in contempt.
In these cases, no express privilege was granted, but reporters were able to pro-
tect their sources nonetheless. As these examples mounted, outside observers
began to argue that judges were acting out of a desire to protect the press. They
reasoned that reporters who were able to protect their sources without conse-
quence had secured the same benefits as they would have with a formal privilege.
Whether the judge expressly conferred this privilege, they reasoned, mattered
little - the source was shielded either way.
The earliest example of such leniency can be seen in one of the most cele-
brated cases in American legal history - and a rare case in which protection came
in the form of a sympathetic jury, rather than a judge. In 1735, John Peter Zenger,
the publisher of the New York WeeklyJournal, refused to reveal the identity of the
anonymous author of articles criticizing the British Governor of New York.228 In
response, the Governor charged Zenger for seditious libel. 22 9 It was a difficult
charge to fight. At the time, truth was not a defense to libel, and the jury only
227. An Important Decision, Bos. DAILY GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1884.
228. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (de-
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needed to find that Zenger had published the offending material. A judge would
then determine whether the publications were in fact libelous.2 30
Zenger's attorney decided to pursue a risky legal strategy. He conceded to the
jury that Zenger had published the material -the only factual inquiry that the
jury was charged with resolving. But he urged jury members to consider the
stakes of the case. "[1It is not the cause of a poor printer, nor of New York alone,
which you are now trying," he told them.23 1 "No! It may, in its consequence, af-
fect every freeman that lives under a British government on the main of America.
It is the best cause; it is the cause of liberty. . . ."23
In one of the earliest and most famous examples of jury nullification in U.S.
history, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Zenger was freed.233 This case
offers the earliest recorded American example of a jury stretching the bounds of
the law to shield the identity of a confidential source or author. As Justice
Thomas wrote in the landmark First Amendment case McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, the Zenger trial "signified at an early moment the extent to which
anonymity and the freedom of the press were intertwined in the early American
mind."234
The question of a reporter's ability to shield a confidential source surfaced
again nearly a century later in United States v. Sheldon.235 in January Of 1829, the
Detroit Gazette published an article claiming that the Supreme Court of the Ter-
ritory of Michigan had erred in its selection of jury members for a burglary
trial.236 The court ordered the editor of the Gazette to demonstrate why he should
not be held in contempt for the publication. The editor argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hold him in contempt, that the offending article was not
contemptuous, and that his right to publish the article was protected by the First
230. Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 763
n.4 (1986).
231. T.B. HOWELL, XVII A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER MISDEMEANORS 722 (1816).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 723; see also WILLIAM LOWELL PUTNAM, JOHN PETER ZENGER AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOM (1997) (chronicling the Zenger trial and its effect on the development of First
Amendment law).
234. 514 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring). Constitutional protections for anonymous speech
are also intertwined with reporter's privilege claims. Most recently, one scholar has argued
that the privilege should be reconceptualized as the right of a source to speak anonymously,
rather than the right of a reporter to protect the source's identity. See Jones, supra note 21.
235. 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337 (Mich. Terr. 1829).
236. Id. at 338-39.
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Amendment.23 7 The court rejected all three claims. It held that the article "is
upon the face of it an open, undisguised, and disingenuous attack upon the offi-
cial character of the judges of this court."238 And it further held that any First
Amendment protections granted to the press did not extend so far as to permit
the publication of "what is false or malicious, or of unlawful tendency."2 39 The
case stands out as an early example of the courts' long struggle to define the con-
tours of the First Amendment. The editor raised a First Amendment defense at
a time when members of the press rarely looked to the Bill of Rights as a source
of protection.24 0
Although the literature has never characterized it as such, the case is also no-
table because the court declined to find the reporter in contempt for refusing to
reveal a source. Prior to its decision, the court had submitted a series of interrog-
atories to the editor. They included the following: "Whether you was the author
or writer of the [article], or any part thereof, and what part; and if you was not
the author or writer thereof, state who was such author or writer, and whether
the same was composed and written by you request or procurement [sic]."241
The editor responded that he had written some parts of the offending article
and that other parts were "communicated to me at my request."24 2 But, he wrote,
I cannot inform this court or any other individuals from whom I obtained
the matters and information contained in the aforementioned 4 th & 5th
paragraphs and extracts [of the article], without rendering myself ob-
noxious to the contempt of all honorable men-I can only say, that that
information and those extracts were given me by a respectable and intel-
ligent citizen, or by respectable and intelligent citizens.243
The court explained that it had the power to press the issue, but that it would
not do so. "You have confessed that you have had other aid: -And we cannot
237. Id. at 339-40, 346.
238. Id. at 356.
239. Id. at 346.
240. This was in large part because the Supreme Court had not yet held that the Bill of Rights
applied to the states. Cf David M. Rabban, TheFirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE
L.J. 514, 557 (1981).
241. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. at 340.
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avoid the suspicion, painful as the reflection may be, that your anonymous cor-
respondent, is some vain- some recreant member of the bar!"244 But, the court
noted:
We do not feel disposed to exercise, further than our duty may compell
us, any inquisitorial power to obtain that knowledge; -for if we were
possessed of it, public justice - self respect - respect for the laws of the
land, would impose upon us a duty, so painful, that, if practicable, we
could wish to avoid it. 2 45
The court's decision not to compel the editor to reveal his source was moti-
vated by a desire to avoid punishing a lawyer, rather than by a desire to protect
a member of the press.2 46 But the decision nonetheless offers a glimpse into how
early American courts may have conceived of reporters' efforts to protect the
identities of their confidential sources. It suggests that these courts may not have
considered a reporter's refusal to reveal a source as an affront to their authority
and power. The court was outraged by the source's behavior. And yet the re-
porter's refusal to answer the interrogatory warranted barely a mention.
With the exception of Sheldon and Ex Parte Nugent, discussed above,247 the
jury's decision in Zenger was followed by nearly 150 years of relative silence on
the issue of a reporter's privilege.248 Questions surrounding the existence and
244. Id. at 363.
245. Id.
246. The court fined Sheldon one hundred dollars for writing contemptuous articles, which he
refused to pay. The court then ordered him to jail. The city was outraged. A public dinner was
arranged at the jail in his honor. Nearly three hundred people attended, at a time when Detroit
had only 2,200 residents. According to a history of the state of Michigan, "[t]he meeting was
both serious and hilarious. Songs, toasts, and speeches were the order of the day, and the old
jail rang and rang again with the cheers of the gathered throng. The first toast, for John P.
Sheldon, was offered by Major Kearsley; the second, 'The Press, by D. C. McKinstry; and the
third, 'Liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed to every citizen by our laws and consti-
tution - ajury must decide on the abuse of either, was offered by John Farmer." SILAS FARMER,
THE HISTORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN OR THE METROPOLIS ILLUSTRATED: A CHRONOLOG-
ICAL CYCLOP/EDIA OF THE PAST AND PRESENT 672 (2d. ed. 1889).
247. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
248. Claims of privilege arose in the course of congressional investigations at this time. See infra
Section II.B. But the courts seem to have addressed few privilege claims. One explanation for
the dearth of case law on this issue is that there were relatively few reported cases in this era
overall. Another is that efforts to identify the source or author of an article during this era
arose most often in the course of libel charges. A publisher was equally liable for any libel,
obviating the need to ascertain the identity of an author or the source in order to win a libel
claim. See, e.g., Pugh v. Starbuck, i Ohio Dec. Reprint 143, 145-46 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1845);
Dexter v. Spear, 7 F. Cas. 624, 625 (C.C.D.R.I. 1825) (No. 3,867).
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scope of a reporter's privilege only began to resurface in the wake of the Civil
War. In the early 1870s, the New York Times became embroiled in a two-front
war with powerful Tammany Hall boss William Tweed on one side and rival
newspaper the New York Tribune on the other. It was a historic moment-the
Times' efforts to expose Tweed would become a turning point in American po-
litical and journalistic history.249 Both fights would also raise important ques-
tions about the existence and scope of a reporter's privilege.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1871, the Times published a series of ar-
ticles alleging that Tweed's campaign of graft, corruption, and extortion had
robbed the city of somewhere between $30 and $200 million.25 0 That fall,
prompted by the Times' expos6, a federal grand jury opened an investigation into
the city's mayor, who was a member of the four-man "lunch club" that Tweed
used to control the city's finances.2 51 George Jones, the co-founder and publisher
of the Times, was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. The Times reported
that Jones was asked to give the names of the paper's confidential sources but
that he declined, arguing that the information was privileged. He was then re-
leased.252
The incident is notable for the leniency granted to Jones. But it also stands
out as an early example of the ways in which newspapers publicly grappled with
the scope of the privilege they asserted. The following year, Jones was again sub-
poenaed to testify. This time, he was called before a legislative committee inves-
tigating the Times' reports that the city's insurance superintendent had commit-
ted fraud. Once again, Jones refused to reveal the names of the Times'
249. N.R. Kleinfield, 15oth Anniversary: 1851-2ool; Investigative Reporting Was Young Then, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/20ol/11/14/news/15oth-anniversary-1851
-2001-investigative-reporting-was-young-then.html [http://perma.cc/8CQC-UDU8].
250. Robert C. Kennedy, On This Day: August 19, 1871, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 19, 2001), http://www
.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/o819.html [http://perma.cc/4PAB-L5531.
In the summer of 1871, one of Tweed's subordinates approached George Jones, the co-founder
and publisher of the New York Times. The man offered Jones $5 million (the equivalent of
nearly $1oo million today) if the Times would stop exposing Tweed's corruption. "Why, with
that sum, you can go to Europe and live like a prince," the man reportedly said to Jones. "Yes,
but I should know that I was a rascal," Jones replied. David W. Dunlap, A Happy 2ooth to The
Times's First Publisher, Whom Boss Tweed Couldn't Buy or Kill, N.Y. TIMES: CITY RooM (Aug.
16, 2011, 1:o6 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2o11/o8/16/a-happy-200th-to-the
-timess-first-publisher-whom-boss-tweed-couldnt-buy-or-kill [http://perma.cc/3FHK
-MJYH].
251. Pete Hamill, 'Boss Tweed': The Fellowship of the Ring, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2005), http://www
.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/books/review/boss-tweed-the-fellowship-of-the-ring.html
[http://perma.cc/7NYS-8UVA].
252. Journalistic Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1873, at 4.
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confidential informants on the grounds that this information was privileged.2 53
At the time, the Tribune criticized Jones for his tance, insinuating that the Times
editor was motivated not by a sense of professional duty, but instead by a desire
to protect corrupt New York officials.2 54
A year later, however, the Tribune found that the tables had turned. In the
fall of 1873, the Tribune's own editor, William Shanks, found himself in the
court's crosshairs for refusing to reveal the author of an allegedly libelous arti-
cle.255 After Shanks was jailed for this refusal, the Tribune penned a full-throated
defense of the reporter's privilege. "A free press is one of the chief safeguards of
a free government, and it is owing in no slight degree to the watchfulness of the
newspapers that some virtue remains in public officers," the Tribune wrote.2 56
But the press is not really free if an editor can be forced to tell the secrets
of his office, or a subordinate questioned about matters which ought to
be confidential between him and his employers. Journalists could never
obtain news unless it were an understood thing that they would shield
their contributors, and take the full responsibility for whatever they pub-
lish.257
The benefits of these early accounts are twofold. They reveal that judges
could be lenient with reporters who refused to reveal a source, even in very early
reporter's privilege disputes. But they also reveal important insights into the evo-
lution of the press's conception of the privilege. The Times-Tribune dispute
253. Miller's Defense. Examination of Two Conductors of the Times, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1872, at 2.
254. See Harboring Bad Characters, N.Y. TMuB., November 28, 1871, http://chroniclingamerica.loc
.gov/lccn/sn83o3o214/1871-11-28/ed-1/seq-4.pdf [http://perma.cc/7VV2-N2YJ]. The Trib-
une argued that Jones's refusal served as evidence that the Times was protecting the Tammany
Hall mayor. Id.; see also The Other Side. Some Necessary but Hard LessonsforMr. Greeley - Candid
Opinions of the Independent Press About the New York Tribune, N.Y. TIMEs, NOV. 22, 1871, at 5.
The Tribune reported that during Jones's grand jury testimony, Jones whitewashed the corrupt
mayor and became so agitated by the questioning that he nearly threw an inkstand at one of
the members of the jury and calmed down only after a pail of water was dumped over his
head. The Mayor's Case. The Jones Inquest, N.Y. TMuB., Nov. 21, 1871, at 1.
255. People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 4 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 467 (App. Div. 1874); see also supra notes 32-
33 and accompanying text.
256. Personal Liberty, N.Y. TMuB., Oct. 29, 1873, at 4. The Times criticized the Tribune's hypocrisy by
republishing the Tribune's 1872 column criticizing the reporter's privilege alongside the Trib-
une's 1873 column defending the privilege. Journalistic Responsibility, supra note 252, at 4. The
Times noted that the contrast allowed for a "better understanding of [the Tribune's] present
humiliating position," and that the Times would "leave our readers to draw their own conclu-
sions." Id.
257. Personal Liberty, supra note 256, at 4.
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marks a critical shift in how the privilege was formulated. Arguments that the
privilege was necessary to protect the individual reputational or business inter-
ests of a reporter had begun to give way to broader claims about the role of the
press and their sources in the democratic system.
Judges in subsequent decades continued to quietly dismiss, without punish-
ment, reporters who refused to reveal their sources. Presumably, many of these
instances were never recorded at all.258 But examples of such leniency can be
found scattered throughout the newspapers of this era and of the early twentieth
century.2 59 in 1891, a New Orleans reporter successfully argued that he could not
"jeopardize his chances of securing news by telling what took place."2 6 0 The local
newspaper reported that "for a time it looked as if [the reporter] would be sent
to jail for contempt; but after being out for a few minutes the jury reported it
had dropped the matter."2 6 1 In 1896, a reporter from the Oswego Daily Times was
released without punishment after refusing to reveal his source to a grand jury. 262
258. See discussion supra note 157 and accompanying text.
259. Some of these cases do not fit neatly into a single category. For example, in January of 1921,
two editors who refused to reveal their sources were jailed "for a few minutes," and then re-
leased. Editor Jailed for His Silence, NEW CASTLE HERALD, Jan. 28, 1921, at 11. Other privilege
cases of this era fell somewhere between the right to invoke a reporter's privilege and the right
to publish anonymously. For example, in April of 1894, the editorial team of the New Haven
Register was summoned before a judge "to show cause why they should not be held for con-
tempt for inaccurately reporting the proceedings in a recent murder trial." Reporters in Trouble,
COLUMBIAN (Bloomsburg, Pa.), Apr. 27, 1894, at 1. The editors refused to reveal who wrote
the story, and the judge, frustrated, temporarily dismissed the case.
26o. The Grand Jury at Work: A New Orleans Reporter Refuses To Tell What He Knows, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 11, 1891, at 1. To provide another example from this era, in 1879, a reporter with
the St. Louis Globe-Democrat was initially jailed for refusing to reveal who had leaked the con-
tents of secret grand jury proceedings. The judge soon relented. After confirming that the
source was not a member of the grand jury, he allowed the reporter to be released. St. Louis
Items, DAILY COMMONWEALTH (Topeka, Kan.), Feb. 1, 1879, at 1 ("Morris Renshaw, the
Globe-Democrat reporter who was sent to jail some days ago for contempt of court in refusing
to answer certain questions of the Grand Jury, was before that body again to-day, and in reply
to a question asking if he obtained the information he published from any member of the
grand jury, he answered No, whereupon he was discharged, and is now breathing the air of
freedom.").
261. New Orleans Grand Jury: A Reporter Sternly Refuses To Tell What He Knows, PITTSBURGH PRESS,
Apr. 11, 1891, at 1.
262. Reporter Would Not Tell: Grand Jury Could Not "Pump Him" and Let Him Go, FOURTH EST.
(New York), Oct. 22, 1896, at 3 (noting that the grand jury "made a desperate effort to make
[the reporter] reveal how and from whom he has been getting inside information about the
business of the grand jury" but that the reporter refused, "saying that the matter came to him
in his professional capacity and was what might be termed a privileged communication,' and
that " [a] fter trying for some time to 'pump' him, with no success, he was allowed to depart").
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In 1903, a Detroit journal reporter was permitted to shield his source of infor-
mation from a grand jury without penalty.2 6 3 In 1905, the editor of a newspaper
in Pennsylvania was permitted to protect his source of information for a story
alleging embezzlement of public funds.264 And in 1923, a reporter from the Mi-
ami Daily Metropolis successfully refused to reveal his confidential sources for a
story about a ring of con artists that was preying on winter tourists.26 5
c. Lenient Treatment for Reporters After a Finding of Contempt
The final category of cases is the broadest and most difficult to define. It con-
sists of cases in which a reporter was formally held in contempt but was subse-
quently granted some form of special treatment by the judge, such as early re-
lease or lenient conditions of confinement.2 66 There are inherent difficulties with
identifying and cabining such cases. Unless a judge explicitly acknowledged that
he was granting special treatment to a reporter, it is hard to prove that he was
motivated by a desire to protect the press. In the examples below, either the
judge's language or the commentary surrounding the incident suggests that the
court may have extended special treatment based on a reporter's status as a mem-
ber of the press.
Through the decades, one familiar pattern in this kind of case emerged: after
a judge jailed a reporter for refusing to reveal a source, the press would grow
outraged, and the judge would quicldy release the journalist, often without ex-
planation. Such was the case of John Dennis, Jr., a Rochester-based Democrat and
Chronicle reporter. In 1885, Dennis published an article alleging that city officials
had been bribing jury members. He was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
263. The judge dismissed the journalist without punishment, reportedly on the grounds that "the
grand jury could not investigate itself." Contempt Case Was Dismissed: Proceeding Against
Schmedding Came to Nothing, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 16, 1903, at 4.
264. The attorney conducting the investigation "several times characterized the witness' [s] silence
as 'contempt' and intimated that there might be serious consequences if refusal to testify was
persisted in." The editor "replied that the ethics of journalism did not permit him to reveal his
sources of information." The county controller overseeing the proceedings excused the editor
without punishment. TheAlmshouse Probe: Investigation Being Continued in the County Control-
ler's Office After the Manner of the Grand Jury, READING TIMES, Apr. 18, 1905, at 3.
265. Miami Daily's Editors Get Subpoenas for "Inside" Wiretapping Story, FOURTH EST. (New York),
Jan. 6, 1923, at 22.
266. In some cases, the language in the decision or the circumstances urrounding the case suggest
that the judge is acting out of sympathy for the reporter. In others, the judge seems to be
acting out of a desire to avoid or put an end to negative publicity.
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jury.2 6 7 When he refused to disclose his source, the judge held him in contempt
and sent him to jail until he agreed to reveal the informant's identity.2 68
The press was appalled. By that afternoon, "a majority of the journalists of
the city assembled at the jail, and being granted the use of the sheriff's parlors,
held a meeting" in which they drafted a resolution "approving Mr. Dennis' po-
sition and criticising a law that would condemn an innocent man to incarcera-
tion, without bail, for refusing to divulge sources of information while engaged
in the work of exposing corruption."2 6 9 AS one paper reported, "At the jail, Mr.
Dennis held a levee in the afternoon. Lawyers, business men, physicians, clergy-
men, and others, called on him, and his apartment was strewn with remem-
brances from personal friends."2 70 The Democrat and Chronicle reported that the
police commissioner and chief of police both visited Dennis to "extend their sym-
pathy."
271
Dennis was released the next day. Under the headline "An Imprisonment
Quickly Ended," the New York Times reported that Dennis's incarceration "came
to an unexpectedly sudden termination," and noted that the judge who commit-
ted Dennis "departed suddenly from his home [that same day], leaving a case
unfinished and a jury out." 2 7 2 Although the case nominally refuted the existence
of a privilege, the reporter's swift release seemed to observers to legitimate D n-
nis's claim to a testimonial privilege. Indeed, years later, in Dennis's obituary,
one newspaper wrote, "[i]t was Mr. Dennis who established, some years ago,
the principle that in New York State a newspaper reporter need not divulge the
source of information given him."2 73
In other cases, the judicial system afforded reporters particularly lenient con-
ditions of confinement. For example, in 1886, Baltimore Sun reporter John T.
Morris refused to disclose his source of information about secret grand jury pro-
ceedings.274 The judge rejected Morris's claim to a privilege, explaining that he
was "extremely sorry that it [was his] duty to have to do anything," but that he
267. SAMUEL MERRILL, NEWSPAPER LIBEL: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRESS 123 (1888).
268. No Information Obtained: A Reporter with a Secret Sent to jailfor Contempt of Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1885, at 6. Curiously, a second reporter who refused to reveal a source that same af-
ternoon was released without punishment. Id.
269. MERRILL, supra note 267, at 123.
270. Id.
271. HeBreathes the AirAgain: Unconditional Release of the Obstinate Democrat and Chronicle Reporter,
DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester), Jan. 31, 1885, at 7.
272. An Imprisonment Quickly Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1885.
273. Well Known Newspaper Man Passes Away, FOURTH EST. (New York), Jan. 10, 1920, at 30.
274. Gordon, supra note 23, at 449.
1230
127:1176 2018
THE DE FACTO REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
could not permit the reporter to withhold his source simply because he had given
his word.27 5 The judge ordered Morris into the sheriff's custody until he an-
swered the grand jury's questions.
The sheriff, however, took pity on Morris. Rather than detain the reporter in
jail, the sheriff took Morris to his own home and held him there for the duration
of his term of confinement. The papers reported that Morris was permitted to
spend Christmas with his family and to entertain guests, and that he received a
bottle of champagne from a friend each night of his two-week confinement.2 76
One paper reported, "He has spent the time pleasantly, receiving many calls and
getting a good rest. He was congratulated right and left today upon his manli-
ness and determination."27 7 Morris's detention was widely condemned by the
press, and backlash from the incident eventually contributed to Maryland's en-
actment of the nation's first statutory shield law.2 78
Similarly, when William Nugent was imprisoned in 1848 for refusing to re-
veal the identity of a confidential source to the Senate, his conditions of impris-
onment were hardly spartan.2 79 Nugent spent his days locked in a committee
room in the Senate and his nights at the home of the Senate's Sergeant at Arms.
Eventually, the Senate released him for "health reasons."28 0 In a subsequent con-
gressional dispute over whether to compel a member of the press to surrender
confidential information, one senator argued that it would be futile for them to
punish reporters who refused to testify, citing Nugent's case as an example. The
senator reminded Congress that when Nugent was imprisoned, "the Sergeant-
at-Arms took him to his house, gave him the best room in his house, the best
meat and the best liquor that the city afforded, and boarded him, and we paid
the bill." 2 8 1
275. Id. at 455. There are other examples of a judge expressing sympathy for a reporter's position.
In one case, a judge ordered two reporters jailed for contempt for refusing to disclose the
identity of a source. But he did so with the following lament: "It is unfortunate to see two
young men such as you are with splendid records go to jail, but if you feel you are fighting for
a cause and upholding your code of honor, that is for you to determine. The law leaves nothing
else for me to do." Id. at 258.
276. The Brave Reporter's Christmas, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26,1886.
277. Reporter Morris Free, WILKES-BARRE REc., Jan. 10, 1887, at 1.
278. Although Morris's imprisonment was a factor in the enactment of the subsequent legislative
shield, the link was not as direct as is often reported. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 462-71.
279. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
28o. Mark Bowden, Lowering My Shield, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., July/Aug. 2004, at 24, 28.
281. CONG. GLOBE, 34 th Cong., 3d Sess. 438 (1857).
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In this way, two distinct tracks of reporter's privilege cases emerge. In the
reported case law, reporter's privilege disputes are infrequent and almost uni-
formly rejected. The unpublished case law, however, tells a more complex story.
These cases reveal that judges often exercised their discretion to protect the
press. And for a time, these parallel tracks functioned smoothly; until the 196os,
reporter's privilege disputes surfaced only sporadically, and reporters were rarely
jailed for refusing to surrender a source.
But the number of reporter's privilege controversies began to increase in the
late 196os and 1970s, fueled by a confluence of social and political factors.282
During this era, judges also shifted from using their discretion to protect report-
ers implicitly towards grappling more seriously with reporters' claims to a con-
stitutional privilege. Some even conferred a First Amendment privilege in re-
ported cases.283 This trend was reflected in unreported decisions as well, where
judges began to hold that the First Amendment conferred some form of testi-
monial privilege on members of the press -a pattern that continued until the
Branzburg decision.284
B. The Legislative Branch: Protecting Reporters by Legislative Discretion
The judicial branch has long discovered creative ways to shield reporters. But
the role of the legislative branch in protecting the press has been largely over-
looked. While the legislative branch has the power to compel reporters to reveal
confidential information in the context of legislative proceedings, it has often
declined to do so. And this exercise of prosecutorial discretion to shield reporters
and their sources historically has operated as an important, yet underexamined,
protection for the press.
Congress has the power to hold uncooperative witnesses in contempt, 28 5 and
in the first decades of the new republic, it held recalcitrant reporters in contempt
282. See supra text accompanying note 55-57.
283. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d lo81, 1083-86 ( 9 th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
284. For example, in May 1969 a judge in Kansas ruled that three reporters were not required to
reveal their sources, despite the absence of a state statutory shield. Judge Protects Newsmen
Status, DAILY INDEP. J. (San Rafael, Cal.), May 28, 1969, at 28. The author of a PhD thesis on
the reporter's privilege wrote the following year that the District Attorney told the reporters
that the judge had been "trying to build a constitutional case for the defendant's right to in-
formation." Gordon, supra note 23, at 699.
285. When a witness refuses to respond to a subpoena to hand over documents or testify before
Congress, the legislative body can rely on its inherent powers to punish a nonmember for
contempt. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204,229 (1821). Congress may either take the individual
directly into custody, certify the contempt to the U.S. Attorney, or seek a civil judgment from
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on a number of occasions.28 Though rarely mentioned in reporter's privilege
discussions today, disputes over the reporter's privilege surfaced more often in
Congress than in the courts in the early years of the new republic. Legislators
sometimes opted not to escalate these conflicts to the point of legal action, in-
stead permitting reporters to simply withhold confidential information.
These early battles over a reporter's privilege led to highly publicized debates
over the rights and duties of the press more broadly.28 7 Because these debates
often received substantial public attention, they likely exerted an outsized influ-
ence on popular conceptions of the reporter's privilege.288 In 18oo, for example,
the publisher of the Aurora newspaper in Philadelphia printed the leaked text of
a proposed Federalist bill. Subsequent debates over whether to hold the pub-
lisher in contempt for refusing to reveal his source forced members of Congress
to grapple with their role in relation to the press. One senator asked what Con-
gress proposed to do if the publisher refused to say where he obtained the bill:
what pressure would it apply? And in the process of forcing the reporter to reveal
his source, the senator asked, " [W] hat becomes of the grand palladium of Amer-
ican freedom? Where is the liberty of the press, which is secured to the citizens
of the Union against Federal usurpation?"2 89
a federal court stating that the individual has a legal obligation to comply with a congressional
subpoena. Michael A. Zuckerman, The Court of Congressional Contempt, 25 J.L. & POL. 41, 42
(2009) ; Todd Garvey, Congress's Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoe-
nas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (May 12, 2017), http://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3C8-FSZQ]. Congress has not exercised its
inherent powers of contempt since 1935. Garvey, supra, at 12. But when it certifies the con-
tempt to the U.S. Attorney, the Executive then has the discretion to determine whether to
prosecute. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (noting that "the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case").
286. See infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text.
287. See Gregg, supra note 23, at 47-48, 57.
288. For this reason, this Section focuses on these disputes at the federal level. But controversies
over the scope and existence of the privilege flared in state legislative bodies across the country
over many decades. State legislatures, like Congress, often permitted reporters to protect their
sources. See, e.g., Bribery Investigation Stirs Hooker Session, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1905 (reporting
that a journalist was released without consequences after refusing to reveal his source to the
New York legislature); Gordon, supra note 23, at 551 (reporting that a journalist was permitted
to withhold the identify of a source in an impeachment rial of a state corporation commis-
sioner).
289. 2 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 416 (Thomas Hart Ben-
ton ed., N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1857). This same senator argued that the text of the bill
should never have been made secret in the first place, declaring:
You are to inquire how [the editor of the Aurora] became possessed of a certain bill
which he published; what kind of an inquiry is this? How he procured the sight of
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In subsequent decades, reporters were occasionally successful in protecting
their sources in the face of congressional pressure. In 1820, two publishers of the
National Intelligencer were permitted to protect the identity of an anonymous au-
thor: a resolution to hold them in contempt failed by a vote of 8-140.290 in 1850,
Congress voted not to hold an editor in contempt after he refused to reveal who
wrote a story about congressional interference in elections.9 1 In the ensuing de-
bate, one congressional representative compared the reporter's privilege to the
priest-penitent and attorney-client privileges.292
In the decades that followed, Congress did not maintain a uniform response
to reporter's privilege claims. Some reporters were jailed for refusing to reveal a
a bill, while it was pending in Senate. Why, is there any crime in printing a minute
of our transactions?
Id.
290. 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1694-95 (1820). The publishers explicitly linked their efforts to protect
the author's identity with individual rights. To reveal the author's identity in the face of con-
gressional pressure, they argued, would lead to "a labyrinth of doctrines, dangerous in the
extreme to the rights of the citizen." Id. at 1698.
291. ASHER C. HINDS, 3 HINDs' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES 68 (1907).
292. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., ist Sess. 1693 (1850) (statement of Rep. Fitch) (responding to the
claim that an editor must reveal his correspondents by noting that "a priest is not compelled
to betray the secrets of the confessional, nor a physician the ailment of his patient"). Not all
such efforts succeeded. In 1857, the House of Representatives imprisoned New York Times re-
porter James Simonton for refusing to reveal a source. They released him after nineteen days
out of the belief that Simonton would never reveal the identity of his informant. See WHALEN,
supra note 23, at 20-21; Opinion, Judith Miller Goes to jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A22;
News of the Day, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. io, 1857, at 4. But the controversy led Congress to enact a
statute expanding its powers to punish witnesses who refused to testify. This, in turn, led to
a fierce public debate over whether Congress had enacted the statute specifically to silence the
press. See The New Law of the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1857 (arguing that the "ostensible
purpose of this bill is to favor the ends of justice,' but that one "must be particularly blind
who does not see that its real design is to cripple and muzzle the Public Press"). It also led some
papers to argue that Simonton's imprisonment implicated the First Amendment. This is sur-
prising, given that the articles were written in an era when the First Amendment was widely
viewed as serving only as a limit against prior restraint. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado ex rel.
Att'y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). These constitutional arguments were also raised a full
century before Marie Torre would argue that the First Amendment protected her right to
shield a source. See Gregg, supra note 23, at 384 (quoting the Alexandria Gazette and Virginia
Advertiser as quoting the Richmond Examiner, which argued that Congress's action "is a gross
and palpable violation of the Constitution, in so far as it is intended to, and shall in practice,
be enforced upon those connected with the press" (emphasis omitted)).
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source.29 3 But many others were permitted to withhold a source without pun-
ishment. In 1870, for example, a New York Evening Post reporter refused to reveal
his source of information. A congressional committee argued against ejecting the
reporter from the proceedings, reasoning that the reporter's "fault is not of such
flagrant character as to justify his expulsion from the gallery, or even to warrant
any formal resolution of censure."'2 94 In 1882, a reporter who refused to reveal his
source was simply "permitted to retire."2 9 5 In 1890, a Senate committee voted
not to hold five reporters who published the proceedings of secret committee
sessions in contempt.2 9 6 In 1906, a reporter pressured to reveal his sources de-
clared that the legislators "can put me on bread and water" but "can not make
me give away people who have not given me authority to quote them."2 9 7 He was
also released. And in 1920, the chairman of a Senate subcommittee told a reporter
who refused to surrender confidential information that "these newspaper men
whom we subpoenaed, where they have said to us that they secured it in confi-
dence, and could not reveal the name, we have not asked to do it. We do not
want to ask anybody to break the faith."2 98 TWO months later, a member of that
same subcommittee argued that a reporter who refused to reveal a confidential
source, "in view of the well-known ethics of the profession, is justified in assum-
ing the stand he has taken, whatever side it affects."2 99
These disputes continued to spark broader debates about the role of the press
in the American political system. The legislative controversy that had perhaps
the greatest impact in this respect involved a privilege claim raised by United Press
293. See, e.g., Nugent v. Beale, 1 Hay & Haz. 287, 291 (C.C.D.D.C. 1848). Another notable privilege
dispute in 1871 led to the jailing of two reporters, but it also sparked a broader debate over the
roles and responsibilities of the press. The New York Tribune published a copy of a secret treaty
then under consideration in the Senate. Two reporters for the paper refused to reveal their
source on grounds of "professional honor." They were found in contempt and committed to
the sergeant at arms until the end of the legislative session. This led some members of Con-
gress to argue that the text should not have been secret in the first place. WHALEN, supra note
23, at 22. It also prompted the Tribune to argue that " [i]f the government can't keep its own
secrets, we do not propose to undertake for it the contract." Id. at 24.
294. WHALEN, supra note 23 at 22.
295. A Case of Sun-Stroke: An Editor Refuses To Divulge, NEwS J. (Wilmington), June 16, 1882, at 3.
296. 27 J. EXECUTIVE PROC. SENATE 487-88 (1890); Dolph's Labors in Vain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1890, at 1; The Dolph Committee's Recommendations Rejected, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Apr. 19, 1890, at 1.
297. Investigation ofPanama Canal Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interoceanic Canals, 5 9 th
Cong. 2d Session lo9 (1907) (statement of Poultney Bigelow, reporter before the committee).
298. Presidential Campaign Expenses: Hearing on S. Res. 357 Before the S. Subcomm. on Privileges &
Elections, Part I, 66th Cong. 399 (1920) (statement of the Chairman).
299. Id. at Part II, 1818.
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reporter Paul Mallon. In 1929, Mallon published an article in the United Press
revealing the tally behind the closed-door vote on a presidential nominee.00 The
tally was inaccurate, and several senators, angered by both the leak and the fac-
tual error, called for an investigation. In a subsequent debate, one senator de-
fended the reporter, arguing:
The conflict between secrecy and publicity has gone forward through the
ages, with men in power asserting their privilege to conceal their acts
from the people, and a free press, wherever it has existed in any country
in the civilized world, challenging that right, and newspaper men often
suffering imprisonment to give the people the facts concerning their own
representatives and their own government."o1
The Senate Rules Committee subsequently voted to amend the rules to allow
for open executive sessions.302 The press had secured a major victory in its re-
peated battles with the legislature.
As the Senate continued to accede to reporters' refusals to reveal their
sources, the belief that reporters had a right to protect confidential sources grew
more entrenched.o In April of 1963, Parade magazine correspondent Jack An-
derson, who appeared voluntarily before the House Administration Committee,
300. From 1789 to 1795, the Senate conducted all legislative debates behind closed doors. Begin-
ning in 1795, it opened up many of these proceedings to the public, but it continued to hold
"executive sessions" in secret for nearly a century and a half longer. Executive sessions included
any session in which the Senate debated "issues and other business received from the presi-
dent,' including providing advice and consent to treaties and confirming presidential nomi-
nees. The Senate in Executive Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory
/history/common/generic/FeatureHomepageExecutiveSessions.htm [http://perma.cc
/5QK7-FFWR]. Notes from these secret proceedings were invariably leaked to the press, in-
citing a number of disputes over a reporter's ability to maintain the confidentiality of his
source of information about the sessions. Many high-profile controversies in Congress over
the reporter's privilege occurred when the Senate attempted to press a reporter to reveal his
source of information about a secret executive session. It was this fact pattern that precipitated
the arrest of reporter William Duane in 18oo; New York Herald reporter John Nugent in 1848;
and New York Tribune reporters Zebulon White and Hiram Ramsdell in 1871, among others.
See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 439 (1991) (describing examples of reporters being questioned about their
source of information from a closed executive session).
301. United Press, Can'tEnforce Secrecy, View of La Follette, PITTSBURGH PRESS, June 2, 1929.
302. PATRICK J. MANEY, YOUNG BOB: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR. 64-65 (2003).
These sessions can be closed with a vote of two-thirds of the Senate.
303. In December 1931, a Washington Post reporter was allowed to protect a confidential source
before a House subcommittee investigation. Gordon, supra note 23, at 535-36. In 1943, two
reporters with the Akron Beacon-Journal were permitted to protect a confidential source after
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refused to reveal his source of information for a story about a corrupt congres-
sional representative.304 According to news reports, Anderson told the Commit-
tee that members of the press had a constitutional right to protect their sources.
The chair of the Committee "agreed, and said that since Mr. Anderson took that
position, there was nothing further to say."Os
While the legislative branch initially took an aggressive stance toward re-
porter's privilege claims, congressional demands for confidential press sources
abated over time. By the mid-twentieth century, legislators had largely aban-
doned their efforts to compel reporters to reveal press sources.306 One explana-
tion for this divergence between judicial and legislative treatment of reporter's
privilege claims is that the "search for truth" may be more pressing in the context
of judicial proceedings.o7 An alternative explanation may be that elected officials
proved more sensitive than unelected judges to the political backlash that often
follows the jailing of a reporter.
C. The Executive Branch: Protecting Reporters by Prosecutorial Discretion
When the executive branch chooses to protect reporters, it does so most of-
ten via prosecutorial discretion.0" Prosecutors may determine, for example, that
a House subcommittee acknowledged "the customary practice of newspapers in not revealing
the source of such stories." Id. at 640-41. And in 1945, when a House subcommittee voted to
hold a reporter in contempt for refusing to reveal a source, some objected. Associated Press,
House Group Holds Reporter in Contempt; He Refused To Name Veterans' News Sources, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1945, at 8. In the course of that 1945 dispute, one congressional representative
argued that the press merited a testimonial privilege similar to that granted to doctors and
lawyers, and that to "compel a member of the newspaper profession to expose the source of
his information would, in many cases, revolt against the public good." 91 CONG. REC. 4859
(daily ed. May 22, 1945) (statement of Rep. O'Toole). A few days later, the committee re-
scinded the contempt charge. Reporter Cleared in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1945, at
17.





For a discussion of congressional treatment of reporter's privilege claims from the 1990s to
the present, see discussion infra note 342.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972).
Of course, such discretion can extend even further to protect the sources themselves. For ex-
ample, a Government Accountability Office audit reviewed sixty-eight Department of Defense
leak investigations between 1975 and 1982. It found that " [i]n no case was there any indication
that an individual was removed from a position of trust." Pozen, supra note 11, at 541 (citing
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-1 5 , REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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the cost of compelling a reporter to reveal a confidential source is too high -
perhaps because the public backlash will be significant, or because initiating legal
action will force the government to reveal additional pieces of confidential infor-
mation.' This discretion can be extended in different ways, and, critically, at
different junctures in the prosecutorial process. The executive branch can protect
reporters by declining to initiate an investigation or legal proceeding against a
source or reporter, or by deciding not to compel a reporter's testimony even after
winning a protracted legal battle to do so.3 1 o This discretion extends beyond the
prosecutorial context as well. The executive branch can protect the press by, for
example, adhering to longstanding norms and practices governing press access
to executive officials. The current de facto system grants substantial deci-
sionmaking authority to the executive branch, which presents both benefits and
drawbacks.
While federal prosecutors have long exercised their prosecutorial discretion
to protect reporters, parts of this practice were codified in the early 1970s,"'
when the DOJ adopted a policy addressing the use of subpoenas to obtain infor-
mation from the press.312 These guidelines, which have been updated regularly,
impose a number of obligations on the DOJ, including the requirements that the
Attorney General (or another senior official) sign off on all subpoenas to report-
INVESTIGATION OF LEAK OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE WASHINGTONPOST5 (1982)). In-
ternal, administrative sanctions are rarely used to punish suspected leakers or to deter future
leakers. Id. at 558.
309. For a comprehensive examination of the many reasons why the executive branch declines to
prosecute leakers, see id. at 516. The press may also take measures to increase the political costs
of issuing or enforcing a subpoena. For example, Carl Bernstein has said that when he received
a subpoena in a civil suit brought by the Nixon reelection committee against the Democratic
National Committee, he transferred all of his notes to the custody of Katherine Graham, the
Washington Post's publisher, so that "if anybody was going to go to jail, she was going to go
also. As [Editor Ben] Bradlee said: 'Wouldn't that be something? Every photographer in town
would be down at the courthouse to look at our girl going off to the slam."' Interview: Carl
Bernstein, FRONTLINE (July 10, 20o6), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar
/interviews/bernstein.html [http://perma.cc/CR3B-RM4Q]. Bernstein explained that the
government hen "backed off.... They didn't want to take on Katherine Graham." Id.
310. This was the case with the government's decision not to compel New York Times reporter's
James Risen's testimony even after securing a favorable appellate court decision. See United
States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4 th Cir. 2013); Sari Horwitz, Justice Department




311. Pozen, supra note 11, at 538. The regulations were announced in 1970 and codified in 1973. Id.
312. S. REP. No. 113-118, at 11 (2013).
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ers; that prosecutors exhaust all alternative sources of information before sub-
poenaing a member of the press; and that the government provide notice to
members of the press when their records are requested by a third party."'
A longstanding question is whether these guidelines offer sufficient protec-
tion to the press. In Branzburg, the Court suggested that they might. "These
rules are a major step in the direction the reporters herein desire to move," the
Court reasoned.314 "They may prove wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of dis-
agreements and controversies between press and federal officials.""' Others ad-
vanced this argument as well. During Edward Levi's 1975 Attorney General con-
firmation hearings, for example, Levi noted that while the guidelines did not
offer an absolute privilege, they provided "certainly, presumptively a privilege,
and therefore one would be very careful before abusing the limited right to call
newspaper men or women before the grand jury."316 And Wright and Graham
have noted that "the combined effect of the federal decisions and the Attorney-
General's guidelines meant that most of the post-Branzburg conflicts over com-
pulsory disclosure of sources arose in state courts."1
This favorable view of the guidelines was largely reinforced by DOJ's prac-
tices in the following decades. Two scholars have argued that in the years fol-
lowing the Pentagon Papers decision in 1971, the press and the government
reached an "informal ditente," in which "leaks of government information took
place, secrets were judiciously disclosed, national security was not obviously
harmed, and the courts and Congress remained on the sidelines.""' There was,
313. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2016).
314. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1971).
315. Id. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the number of subpoenas issued to journalists had
fallen around the time of Branzburg. See Pozen, supra note II, at 538 ("All evidence suggests
that this policy substantially depresses the number of subpoenas issued, and that the lack of
access to journalists' records and testimony makes it substantially more difficult to identify
and build cases against leakers.").
316. Nomination of Edward Hirsch Levi To Be Attorney General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 96 (1975) (statement of Edward Levi).
317. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, S 5426. David Pozen has noted that there is little indication
that past presidents or attorneys general have sought to amend the guidelines. Pozen, supra
note II, at 557. One former DOJ official told Pozen that the policy is "respected more than
resented." Id.
318. McCraw & Gikow, supra note II, at 473.
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they argued, "an unspoken bargain of mutual restraint in which the press em-
braced an ethos of responsibility and the government generally treated the leaks
as an accepted, if not fully condoned, part of modern governance."1
The executive branch has also protected the press by declining to impose
criminal penalties for publishing classified information,320 in spite of broad stat-
utory authority to do so.21 This norm of non-enforcement is so entrenched that
its significance is often overlooked. Jack Goldsmith has noted that the belief that
publishing classified materials plays a vital role in the democratic process is now
so deeply rooted that "even the theoretical legal possibility" of prosecuting a
journalist for publishing classified information has "evaporated."322
Whether such a prosecution would violate the First Amendment remains an
open question.323
319. Id. at 473; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control f Information, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 889,
899 (1986) (setting forth the equilibrium theory of justice, which postulates that a competi-
tive but undefined relationship between the press and government "ensures that if both follow
their self-interest, the resulting system will work, as if by an invisible hand, to benefit the
public as a whole").
320. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLI-
CATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 16 (2013). Members of the Bush administration
mentioned the possibility of prosecuting the New York Times for disclosing the Terrorist Sur-
veillance Program in 20o5, but they never seriously considered such prosecution a viable op-
tion. Jack Goldsmith, Extraordinary U.S. Press Freedom To Report Classified Information, LAw-
FARE (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:o5 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/extraordinary-us-press-freedom
-report-classified-information [http://perma.cc/K2FW-XLLE]. It appears the closest the
government has come to prosecuting the press for publishing classified information was in
1942, when the Chicago Tribune published information that had the potential to alert Japan to
the fact that the United States had broken its secret codes. Geoffrey R. Stone, Government
Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REV. 185, 197 n-38 (2007).
321. For discussions of the overlapping patchwork of statutes that protect against the disclosure of
classified information, see ELSEA, supra note 320, at 26-30; and Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate
Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARv. L.
& PoL'Y REV. 219 (2007). Vladeck notes that "there are numerous statutes under which the
press may find itself liable for the gathering and reporting of stories implicating governmental
secrecy." Vladeck, supra, at 221. These include 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2012), which relates to
cryptography and communication intelligence and provides that " [w] hoever knowingly and
willfully ... publishes ... in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States . . . any classified information . . concerning the communication intelligence activities
of the Unites States . . . [s] hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both."
322. Goldsmith, supra note 320. This may now be changing. In February 2017, President Trump
reportedly asked then-FBI Director James Comey to punish reporters for publishing classified
information. See infra note 399 and accompanying text.
323. In Pentagon Papers, Justice White suggested that reporters could be prosecuted for publishing
classified information, and a majority of the Justices seemed to agree. N.Y. Times Co. v.
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The executive branch has extended protection in less explicit ways as well.
Theoretically, the executive branch has a variety of other, less punitive tools at its
disposal, such as denying access to uncooperative reporters and outlets or mak-
ing public statements intended to delegitimize the press.3 24 Historically, such
measures have been infrequently invoked.32 5 Reporters who routinely publish
confidential information have still been granted access to the highest levels of
government. For example, Bob Woodward continued to be granted access to the
United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (White, Stewart, J. concurring)
(noting that "terminating the ban on publication of the relatively few sensitive documents the
Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the law either requires or invites news-
papers or others to publish them or that they will be immune from criminal action if they
do"); id. at 745-57 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that Justice White's interpretation of the
application of the Espionage Act to the press was valid); id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that he was "in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice White has expressed
with respect to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or in-
formation relating to the national defense"); id. at 759 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting, in a
dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, that he was in "substantial ac-
cord" with Justice White's opinion). But the Court has subsequently emphasized that any
penal sanction imposed on the press for publishing truthful information that was lawfully
obtained "requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity." Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979). Other subsequent cases emphasizing the importance of
press immunity include Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), and Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). The Court has held that there are strong First
Amendment protections for the publication of truthful information lawfully obtained by the
press. SeeBartnicki, 532 U.S. at 515; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103. This holds true even when the
party that provides the information to the press obtained that information by unlawful means.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540. The Court has not addressed whether the same protections apply
when the publisher itself has acquired information unlawfully. Cf Fla. Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S.
524, 534 (1989) (" [T]he Daily Mail formulation only protects the publication of information
which a newspaper has 'lawfully obtain[ed],"' (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103)). A sepa-
rate, related question is whether constitutional protection differs in the context of the act of
publishing classified information versus the act of soliciting it. For a discussion of this issue,
see generally Vladeck, supra note 321. The Court has also yet to squarely address this question.
Goldsmith, supra note 320.
324. RonNell Anderson Jones and Lisa Grow Sun have argued that while every presidential ad-
ministration criticizes the press, the executive branch has rarely engaged in statements and
actions intended to undermine the very legitimacy of the press as an institution. They char-
acterize such efforts as "enemy construction" of the press, and argue that it should be distin-
guished with more traditional tensions between the executive and the press. See RonNell An-
derson Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 1301 (2018).
325. Pozen, supra note 11, at 549. However, President Trump has proved far more willing than past
presidents have been to deny access to reporters or outlets based on the content of their cov-
erage. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, White House Blocks CNN, New York Times from Press Briefing
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highest levels of government in the aftermath of Watergate.3 26 And even Presi-
dent Nixon, in the midst of the Watergate scandal, issued his harshest criticisms
of the press only in private.3 27
Finally, the press derives substantial benefits from the executive branch's up-
stream protection of leakers themselves. The vast majority of leaks of classified
information violate at least one criminal statute, and such leaks occur almost
daily.328 But agencies refer roughly only forty suspected leak reports per year to
the DOJ for further investigation.329 Of those referred reports, the DOJ actually
opens an investigation into about fifteen percent of cases.3 o In other words, the
vast majority of leaks of classified information are simply ignored. The forces
and motivations driving this tolerance for leaks are varied and complex and in-
volve considerations beyond the potential impact on the press."' Regardless,
such upstream protection for sources has the effect of protecting reporters who
might otherwise have been dragged into legal proceedings further down the line.
There are benefits to the current system of protecting reporters through
prosecutorial discretion. The substantial amount of discretion granted to the
326. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Bob Woodward Throws an Interception, NEw YORKER (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/bob-woodward-throws-an-interception
[http://perma.cc/QE76-A94V] (noting that " [e]ver since he and Carl Bernstein shot to fame
with their Watergate reporting, he's been trooping in and out of the offices of senior officials,
writing down (and presumably taping) what they say").
327. See Jones & Sun, supra note 324.
328. Pozen, supra note II, at 524-25 (noting that for the past few decades, "virtually any deliberate
leak of classified information to an unauthorized recipient is likely to fall within the reach of
one or more criminal statutes").
329. When an agency believes confidential information has been leaked, its members may submit
a crime report to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which will then decide whether to open
an investigation. Id. at 537-38. In 20oo, Attorney General Janet Reno reported that the "over-
whelming majority" of such referrals came from the CIA and NSA. Id. at 537. The DOJ re-
ported that it received about fifty such referrals per year in the 1990s and thirty-seven per year
on average from 2005-2009. Id. The Department opens an investigation into roughly fifteen
percent of these referrals on average. Id. at 538. The FBI also has the authority to pursue leak-
ers but rarely invokes it. Id. at 537.
330. Id.
331. The broader ecosystem surrounding leaks and the substantial slack in this system offers the
government a wide variety of benefits. See Pozen, supra note II, at 513 (arguing that few leakers
are prosecuted as part of an adaptive response to external liabilities and internal pathologies).
These two ecosystems -those surrounding leakers and the reporters who publish these
leaks - are intertwined. But they are nonetheless distinct; for example, there are ways to pur-
sue leakers without pursuing reporters, such as using new technological methods to identify
a confidential source solely through an electronic record of their interactions. As a result, shift-
ing the ecosystem around leakers to more aggressively pursue government officials who reveal
confidential information may not necessarily increase the pressure on reporters.
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government preserves flexibility in the system.332 But there are also drawbacks.
By definition, protection extended by a grant of prosecutorial discretion can be
withdrawn at any time. There are no formal barriers preventing the attempted
prosecution of a reporter for publishing classified information. The DOJ guide-
lines situate the decision of whether to subpoena a reporter firmly within the
executive branch. And these guidelines lack the force of law -they can be over-
ridden whenever the Attorney General deems it necessary."'
III. THE DE FACTO REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE TODAY
Historically, these de facto protections have played a critical role in shielding
the press and preserving the flow of information to the public. Yet this web of
de facto privileges has not remained static; it has continually shifted and evolved
over time. A final piece of the de facto privilege puzzle, then, is determining the
extent to which these de facto protections shield reporters and their sources to-
day. This Part addresses that question. It describes which historical protections
remain available to the press today and which have been weakened or eliminated.
Specifically, it describes how the executive and legislative branches have recently
withdrawn many of the protections once conferred on the press. It then exam-
ines the extent to which broader societal change may be further undermining the
de facto privilege today.
A. Resilient De Facto Protections
Many forms of protection historically extended to the press remain available
today. In the judicial branch, confidential information sought by a jury still must
be relevant and material.3 34 Many circuits extend a qualified reporter's privilege
in some contexts.' And some reporters facing a subpoena may still rely on a
332. For a discussion of the benefits of preserving flexibility in the system, see id. at 559-86.
333. For example, in 2005 the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas argued
before Congress that the primary drawback of a statutory shield is that it would eliminate
prosecutors' ability to override the guidelines. He testified that the law would harm national
security because it would "impose[] inflexible, mandatory standards in lieu of existing, vol-
untary guidelines that can be adapted to changing circumstances." Reporter's Privilege Legisla-
tion: An Additional Investigation of Issues and Implications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 111 (2005) (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of Texas).
334. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
335. See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
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Fifth Amendment defense.3 3 6 Because the federal criminal code contains exten-
sive penalties for eliciting, reviewing, or publishing classified information" -
and given the government's tendency to classify even routine information"' -
this defense may be available in cases where the government cannot or will not
grant immunity."' The Fifth Amendment defense has already been successful in
some circuits in shielding reporters subpoenaed by a grand jury. In 2009, for
example, David Ashenfelter, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Detroit Free
Press, was subpoenaed to reveal his source for a series of articles about the DOJ's
investigation into the alleged misconduct of a prosecutor during the first post-
September 11 terrorist trial.340 Ashenfelter successfully invoked a Fifth Amend-
ment defense. One of the Detroit Free Press's lawyers later suggested that Ash-
enfelter's case showed that reporters should recognize the Fifth Amendment as
a key "weapon in the arsenal of their defenses."341
Legislative and executive protections also persist. Congress has not held a
reporter in contempt for failing to surrender a confidential source in decades.342
336. See discussion supra Section II.A.3.a.
337. For a discussion of the ways in which the Espionage Act criminalizes the receipt and retention
of information, see Vladeck, supra note 321, at 231-32.
338. For a discussion of the increase in classified records since September 11, see McCraw & Gikow,
supra note 11, at 485-87.
339. Id. When the government offers immunity, the reporter is no longer excused from testifying
on Fifth Amendment grounds. Peter Scheer, Take the Fifth, SLATE (July 6, 20o6, 6:58 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/jurisprudence/2oo6/o7/take-the_fifth
.html [http://perma.cc/939J-JNBJ].
340. Latara Appleby, Judge Rules Reporter Can Claim Ffth Amendment and Keep Source Secret, REPs.
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse
-media-law-resources/news/judge-rules-reporter-can-claim-fifth-amendment-and-keep
-source-secre [http://perma.cc/H4X2-JUFL].
341. Kimberly Chow, Taking the Fifth To Protect a Source, 39 NEWS MEDIA & L. 60 (2015),
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law
-summer-2015/taking-fifth-protect-source [http://perma.cc/B95U-24LR]. Reporters and
their lawyers may consider other forms of protection as well. See, e.g., Susan Webber Wright,
A TrialJudge's Ruminations on the Reporter's Privilege, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 103, 116
(20o6) (arguing that judges who want to avoid reaching the question of a constitutional priv-
ilege might be willing to provide protection under evidentiary rules and reminding reporters
to "[k]eep in mind that federal judges have discretion under the rules of evidence with respect
to the evidence").
342. James J. Mangan, Contempt for the Fourth Estate: No Reporter's Privilege Before a Congressional
Investigation, 83 GEo. L.J. 129, 146 (1994) ("Congress historically has failed to vote for con-
tempt proceedings against a reporter who asserts such a privilege."). In 1992, an attorney in-
vestigating leaks surrounding Justice Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination hearings
urged the Senate to hold NPR legal correspondent Nina Totenberg in contempt for declining
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And the DOJ guidelines governing press subpoenas till urge prosecutors to take
certain measures and precautions prior to issuing subpoenas to the press. The
government has yet to prosecute a reporter for publishing classified information.
And there are also political and institutional checks in place to prevent the gov-
ernment from pursuing leak investigations.3 43 For example, the political costs of
investigating and identifying those who leak confidential information can still
be significant,344 and the government still derives substantial benefits from cer-
tain types of leaks.345 Moreover, reporters may still rely on the press at large to
pressure judges and prosecutors. Today, as in the time of Branzburg, the press is
not wholly lacking protection.34 6
B. Weakening De Facto Protections
Yet, while some facets of the de facto privilege remain available to the press
today, both courts and the executive branch have significantly curtailed their tra-
ditional protections. There are two central forms of protection that the courts
extended in the wake of Branzburg: (1) reading the Supreme Court's decision to
permit some form of qualified privilege, and (2) either declining to punish or
granting special treatment to reporters who refused to reveal confidential infor-
mation. This Section shows that both forms of judicial protection are eroding.
At the same time, the executive branch is withdrawing protections long con-
ferred upon the press. This Section presents evidence that the number of sub-
poenas issued to reporters has increased, as has the number of leak prosecutions.
to answer legislators' questions. The Senate refused, and the Chairman of the Rules Commit-
tee explained that such an action "could have a chilling effect on the media" and "close a door
where more doors need opening." Id. at 129-30 (quoting Editorial, Misguided Business; Senate
Committee Decides To Quit Abusing Reporters, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 27, 1992, at Bio).
343. For a discussion of the various reasons why the executive branch may decline to prosecute
leakers, see Pozen, supra note II, at 544-59.
344. Id. at 550 (explaining the institutional barriers and political costs of investigating the source
of leaks).
345. By declining to prosecute all leakers, for example, the executive branch preserves its ability to
effectively communicate information through intentional leaks, or "plants." Id. at 563-64.
Pozen outlines additional benefits as well, such as enhancing the government's legitimacy and
credibility by signaling to the public that despite the official secrecy measures in place, the
public will eventually be permitted access to the government's internal decisions and inner
workings. Id. at 573-77. Another benefit to this strategy is that it avoids addressing the difficult
problem of overclassification head-on. Id. at 582.
346. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (" [T]here is much force in the pragmatic view
that the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from help-
less to protect itself from harassment or substantial harm.").
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It then argues that the effect of these diminished protections is compounded by
broader changes in society and in the role of the press.
1. The judicial Branch
The Court's decision in Branzburg left the lower courts with more questions
than answers. For the past forty-five years, the Court has rejected petitions ask-
ing for clarification of its decision.3 47 After decades of lower court rulings, the
circuits are now split on both the meaning and scope of Branzburg.34 8 The central
point of confusion concerns Justice Powell's concurrence.34 9 Uncertainty over
how this concurrence should be read has spawned dozens of opinions and nearly
as many different interpretations of the case. This Section examines these cases
in light of the de facto reporter's privilege lens.
In the years following Branzburg, the lower courts tended to read the case in
a way that was favorable to the press. Some courts treated the concurrence as
ancillary and emphasized that the meaning of the decision was spelled out in the
Court's opinion.so But many other lower courts narrowed the majority's hold-
ing to the corners of Justice Powell's concurrence, analogizing it to a plurality
opinion."' In the five years following Branzburg, lower courts granted reporters
immunity in fifteen of the twenty-seven reported cases where disclosure was
sought; they required disclosure in only nine cases.3 5 2 In 1977, the Tenth Circuit
declared that the existence of a qualified constitutional privilege for the press was
347. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4 th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2696
(2014); Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187 (20o6);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1150 (2005); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1015
(1987).
348. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.
349. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 ( 7th Cir. 2003) ("Some of the cases that recognize
the privilege, such as [In re] Madden, essentially ignore Branzburg; some treat the 'majority'
opinion inBranzburg as actually just a plurality opinion, such as [United States v.] Smith; some
audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter's privilege, such as [Shoen v.]
Shoen and von Bulow v. von Bulow." (internal citations omitted)).
350. See, e.g., Sterling, 724 F.3d at 492.
351. See id. at 523 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (providing an overview of the circuit split regarding the
meaning and application of Branzburg); United States v. Smith, 13 5 F-3d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir.
1998).
352. Stephen R. Hofer, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure To Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's
Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 320-21, 321 n-131 (1979). The
remaining cases did not involve a final determination of the reporter's privilege question. Id.
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"no longer in doubt.""' These post-Branzburg decisions are consistent with a
much longer history and tradition of judges conferring protection upon the press
when possible. In other words, to the extent that the lower courts' interpretation
of Branzburg has been doctrinally anomalous, the de facto reporter's privilege
offers at least a partial explanatory theory.
Yet more recent case law indicates that federal courts may be less willing to
read Branzburg to create a qualified constitutional privilege today.354 In 2005, the
Chair of the American Bar Association's Litigation Section issued a report assert-
ing that "[f] or decades, federal prosecutors and courts have rarely tried to punish
reporters for protecting confidential sources. However, recent actions by the
courts and prosecutors, including special prosecutors, have threatened that pro-
tection.""
Judicial treatment of privilege claims has only become more hostile in the
decade since. The central voice of dissent leading this shift was Seventh Circuit
Judge Richard Posner, who criticized many lower court decisions for failing to
hew closely enough to binding precedent. In a 2003 decision, Judge Posner ar-
gued that Branzburg clearly rejected a constitutional privilege and that some
court decisions to the contrary had stretched the permissible zone of legal inter-
pretation. 356 Surveying the circuits' application of Branzburg, Judge Posner
noted that some decisions "essentially ignore" the decision; others "treat the 'ma-
jority' opinion in Branzburg as actually just a plurality opinion"; and some go so
far as to "audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter's privi-
lege."31 7 He reserved his strongest language for courts that had recognized a re-
porter's privilege for nonconfidential information in order to prevent the gov-
ernment from harassing reporters, thereby using the press as an investigative
arm of the government. "Since these considerations were rejected by Branzburg
even in the context of a confidential source," Posner warned, "these courts may
be skating on thin ice."3"
353. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (1oth Cir. 1977).
354. This is not the only area of the law where the press is less likely to find protection from the
courts. For a discussion of other areas of law where the courts are less likely to protect the
press, including privacy and defamation law, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West,
The Fragility of the Free American Press, 112 Nw. U. L. REv. 567 (2017).
355. DENNIS J. DRAsco, AM. BAR AsS'N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION 1o4B, at 5
(2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/standards/docs
/fslr report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QVJ-ZPQB].
356. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7 th Cir. 2003).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 533.
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Judge Posner's opinion seemed to elicit, or at least presage, abroader shift in
the lower courts' views." 9 In 2004, the First Circuit held that the Branzburg
Court "flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter's privilege for
confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or of a newly
hewn common law privilege."3 60 In 2005, the D.C. Circuit applied a weaker bal-
ancing test in a civil case, declining to weigh the need for disclosure against the
First Amendment interests at stake. Instead, the court concluded that the plain-
tiff overcame the qualified privilege by demonstrating a bare need for the infor-
mation and exhaustion of all reasonable alternative sources of information361 _
an approach that Judge Tatel criticized for "allow [ing] the exigencies of even the
most trivial litigation to trump core First Amendment values."3 62 That same year,
the D.C. Circuit again took a dim view toward privilege claims when it addressed
New York Times reporter Judith Miller's claim to a constitutional and common-
law reporter's privilege.3 63 Although the panel was split on its reasoning, Judge
Sentelle, writing for the court, emphasized that Justice Powell's concurrence
should not be read as a vote for the dissent.3 64 And in 2013, the Fourth Circuit
359. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note II, at 526 (noting that Judge Posner's decision in McKevitt "appears
to have anticipated a swing in the doctrinal pendulum back toward the more restrictive
view"). For a discussion of the impact of Judge Posner's decision on other lower courts, see
Dalglish & Murray, supra note 114, at 37.
360. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (ist Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The case involved
a reporter's refusal to identify his source in the context of an investigation by a special prose-
cutor into video footage leaked in violation of a protective order. The court noted that while
"[t]he three leading cases in this circuit require 'heightened sensitivity' to First Amendment
concerns and invite a 'balancing' of considerations (at least in situations distinct from
Branzburg)," those cases "in substance" suggest only that "the disclosure of a reporter's confi-
dential sources may not be compelled unless directly relevant to a nonfrivolous claim or in-
quiry undertaken in good faith; and disclosure may be denied where the same information is
readily available from a less sensitive source." Id. at 45. The court held that these constraints
had been satisfied in the present case. Id.
361. Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). Judge Tatel criticized the court for departing from its precedent in Zerilli
v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which required the court to balance the public and
private interests at stake when considering a reporter's privilege claim in the civil context. Id.
Also in a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Garland argued that the court's
approach in Lee was "inconsistent with the commitment we made in Zerilli." Id. at 303 (Gar-
land, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
362. Id. at 301 (Tatel, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
363. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (limiting Zerilli
to the civil context).
364. Id. at 1148 ("Justice White's opinion is not a plurality opinion of four justices joined by a sep-
arate Justice Powell to create a majority, it is the opinion of the majority of the Court. As such
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strongly rejected New York Times reporter James Risen's privilege claim, holding
that there is no First Amendment or federal common-law privilege available to
shield reporters from testifying in criminal proceedings, so long as the infor-
mation is relevant and sought in good faith.365
This shift in interpreting Branzburg is not the only way that judges are with-
drawing protection. There are also indications that judges today are more willing
to find reporters in contempt for refusing to reveal confidential information.3 66
During his 2007 testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, media l wyer
Lee Levine stated that he had not found a single example of a reporter being held
in contempt for refusing to disclose a confidential source in federal court be-
tween 1976 and 2000; by contrast, "at least a dozen" were held in contempt be-
tween 2001 and 2007.367 Moreover, when reporters are jailed for contempt,
judges appear more willing to impose lengthy terms of confinement. Prior to
Branzburg, judges rarely jailed reporters for more than a month, often ordering
reporters jailed for mere days.3 68 By contrast, from 2001 to 2007, federal appeals
it is authoritative precedent. It says what it says. It rejects the privilege asserted by appel-
lants.").
365. United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492, 499 (4 th Cir. 2013). The Sterling court limited the
three-part est for reporter's privilege claims outlined inLaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co.,
780 F.2d 1134 (4 th Cir. 1986), to the civil context. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 496-97.
366. One explanation for the judiciary's more hostile treatment of reporter's privilege claims is that
these disputes increasingly involve classified information, and judges are less likely to protect
the press when national security interests are involved. If so, this trend could be viewed as a
gap in the de facto privilege, which would seem to lend weight to the argument in favor of
formalization: a formal shield could theoretically help close this gap. However, many national
security reporters have opposed recently-proposed shield laws on the grounds that they pro-
vide insufficient protection. See, e.g., Eric Newton, Paying Attention to the Shield Law's Critics,
CoLuM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept. 24, 2013), http://archives.cjr.org/behind thenews/paying
moreattentionto the s.php [http://perma.cc/7WUR-MQWS] (quoting investigative
journalist Scott Armstrong as arguing that " [t] here's not a national security reporter I can find
who supports the shield law .... We're going to get exempted out of it one way or another").
For a discussion of the national security exemption in the 2013 Free Flow of Information Act,
see generally Brad A. Greenberg, The Federal Media Shield Folly, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 437
(2013). For further discussion of how the de facto privilege applies in the context of national
security disputes, see supra note 175.
367. Free Flow of Information Act of 2oo7: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., ioth
Cong. 36, 75 (2007) [hereinafter FFIA Hearing] (statement of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sul-
livan Koch & Schulz, LLP).
368. Judges may have been more willing to jail reporters for longer around the time of Branzburg.
See, e.g., State v. Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93, 93 (Wis. 1971) (noting that a Wisconsin district court
judge ordered a university newspaper editor to serve five months and seven days in prison for
his refusal to reveal his source of information about a university bombing- the longest known
sentence for a reporter at the time). But reports of members of the press receiving very long
jail sentences were rare in the period between the late 1970s and September 2001.
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courts issued a series of harsh punishments for reporters found in contempt,
with "each court imposing prison sentences on reporters more severe than any
previously known in American history."3 69 In 2007, for example, videographer
Joshua Wolf spent seven months in jail for refusing to turn over unpublished
footage from a G-8 protest.7 o
There is also evidence that judges today are more willing to impose very large
fines. In 2005, for example, five reporters were held in contempt for refusing to
reveal the identities of confidential sources, and their respective employers paid
$750,000 to avoid the imposition of judicial sanctions.' In 2008, a judge or-
dered a reporter to pay up to $5,ooo a day for a week for refusing to disclose a
confidential source, and took the "unprecedented step"372 of barring anyone else
from helping to pay the reporter's fines. 7' By contrast, a federal district court in
1980 fined CBS one dollar per day for refusing to comply with a court order to
surrender unpublished video and audio tape. 37 Commenting on this case,
Wright and Graham observed that " [o] ne may suspect that some ... charade is
being enacted when a wealthy television network that refuses to produce mate-
rial needed by a criminal defendant on grounds of privilege is subjected to civil
contempt with a sanction of a $1 per day fine."3 7 And, at least anecdotally, the
harshest penalties today far exceed the costliest fines imposed prior to Branzburg,
even accounting for inflation.3 7 6
Faced with this evidence, some members of the press have concluded that
they can no longer rely on the judiciary for protection. In a 20o6 New York Times
column, David Carr observed, "Within the news business, there is a consensus
369. FFIA Hearing, supra note 367, at 32 (statement of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP).
370. Id. at 37.
371. Id. at 32.
372. Ken Paulson, The Real Cost of Fining a Reporter, USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2008), http://
usatoday3o.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080312/opcomwednesday.art.htm [http://
perma.cc/Y8HS-MRKB].
373. Samantha Fredrickson, Nearly in the Clear?, NEWS MEDIA & L. (2009), http://WWW.rcfp.org
/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-winter-2oo9/nearly
-clear [http://perma.cc/YD3M-U6NC]. The order was vacated when the case settled.
374. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1980).
375. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, S 5426 n.28.
376. For example, when editor John Sheldon was fined $ioo in 1829, it caused a public uproar. See
supra note 246. That amount appears to equal, very roughly, around $2,300 today. See Con-
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that the roof is caving in on the legal protections for working journalists.""
Some legal scholars agree. In 2014, David Pozen noted that in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, courts have "pulled back on the reporter's privilege," particularly in
the national security context. 17
2. The Executive Branch
There is also evidence that the executive branch is less willing today to exer-
cise its prosecutorial discretion to protect reporters. The number of subpoenas
issued to reporters appears to have increased in recent years.79 In 2005, First
Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams testified before Congress that in the previous
year and a half,
more than 70 journalists and news organizations ha[d] been embroiled
in disputes with federal prosecutors and other litigants seeking to dis-
cover unpublished information. Dozens ha[d] been asked to reveal their
confidential sources. Some are or were virtually at the entrance to jail.so
A 2013 Senate Judiciary Committee report on a proposed shield law argued
that the recent trend toward subpoenaing reporters in civil cases represented "a
break from a nearly 50-year precedent of not requiring journalists to disclose
confidential sources in civil cases to which they are not parties."8
377. David Carr, Subpoenas and the Press, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 20o6), http://www.nytimes.com
/20o6/11/27/ business/media/27carr.html [http://perma.cc/D6DR-LAV9].
378. Anna Stolley Persky, So Years After New York Times v. Sullivan, Do Courts Still Value Journalists'
Watchdog Role?, ABAJ. (Mar. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/5oyears
after-new-york times v._sullivan do courts-still value journalists [http://perma.cc
/WZM6-WU9M].
379. Structural changes within the executive branch may have contributed to an increase in the
number of subpoenas issued to reporters. The creation of the National Security Division
(NSD) of the DOJ in 206 altered the process for referring and investigating alleged leaks.
Pozen, supra note II, at 537. The NSD now coordinates these investigations and prosecutions
with the FBI, and this restructuring may have brought "additional resources or a more ag-
gressive mindset to the Department of Justice's work on leak matters." Id. at 630. The estab-
lishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the mid-2000s to coordinate
the work of the CIA, NSA, and other actors within the intelligence community may have also
contributed to a more aggressive mindset with regards to leaks. Id. at 590 n.361, 630 n.532.
380. Reporters' Privilege Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, lo9th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel
LLP).
381. S. REP. No. 113-118, at 5 (2013).
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The 2013 Senate Judiciary report also found it likely that far more subpoenas
for confidential information had been issued to reporters than the DOJ had
acknowledged. The report noted that while the DOJ claimed that it had ap-
proved only nineteen subpoenas seeking confidential source material from re-
porters between 1991 and 2007,382 an independent survey found that it had is-
sued thirty-four subpoenas for confidential information in 20o6 alone.' The
report also noted that the DOJ's official subpoena tallies failed to count subpoe-
nas issued in civil cases.384 It compared the recent uptick in subpoenas to the late
1960s, "when subpoenas to reporters had become not only frequent but virtually
de rigueur.""
This tally is bound to increase. Recently, Attorney General Sessions an-
nounced that he plans to "review" the DOJ guidelines governing press subpoe-
nas.38 6 There is also evidence that the government has begun to rely more heavily
on other legal tools to identify leakers, such as search warrants, warrants issued
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and border searches of reporters'
electronic devices.' Such efforts may have a chilling effect on potential sources
but fall outside of the DOJ guidelines regulating subpoenas to the press.
In addition, the executive branch has increased the amount and type of in-
formation it classifies, which in turn has had an impact on the reporters who
receive and publish classified information. Nearly twice as many documents
were classified in 2004 as in 2001.' Simultaneously, the declassification process
382. Id. at 4. The 2013 Senate Judiciary report also argued that the DOJ figures did not take into
account incidents like the secret subpoenas obtained in 2013 for two months of all Associated
Press call records, which affected an estimated one hundred reporters around the country. Id.
at 5. One scholar has argued that this numerical discrepancy arose out of differences in how
both sides were defining the universe of relevant subpoenas. Jones, supra note 114, at 609.
383. S. REP. No. 113-118, at 5 (2013).
384. Id.
385. Id. at 6-7.
386. Charlie Savage & Eileen Sullivan, Leak Investigations Triple Under Trump, Sessions Says, N.Y.
TiMEs (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump
-leaks-attorney-general.html [http://perma.cc/C4N9-5Y47].
387. See Sarah Ellison, What Was New York Times Reporter James Risen's Seven-Year Legal Battle
Really For?, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2o15/o3/james-risen
-anonymous-source-government-battle [http://perma.cc/DV6D-BTM7]; Sources and Sub-
poenas (Reporter's Privilege), REPs. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PREss, http://www
.rcfp.org/digital-journalists-legal-guide/sources-and-subpoenas-reporters-privilege [http://
perma.cc/J9Z8-AGN3].
388. Scott Shane, Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the Government, N.Y. TIMEs
(July 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/politics/increase-in-the-number-of
-documents-classified-by-the-government.html [http://perma.cc/99UZ-PBHW]. These
high rates of classification began to decrease under the Obama Administration. See Info. Sec.
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has slowed: 204 million pages were declassified in 1997, compared with 28 mil-
lion pages in 2004."9 This over-classification makes it more likely that sources
sharing information with the press will be "leaking" secret information, which
in turn increases the chance of conflict between the press and the executive.9 0
Finally, recent administrations have been more aggressive regarding enforce-
ment. The Obama Administration prosecuted nine cases involving whistle-
blowers and leakers-three times as many as all past administrations com-
bined.'9 Attorney General Sessions announced in August 2017 that the Depart-
ment of Justice is pursuing three times as many leak investigations as the number
of investigations open at the end of the Obama Administration.39 2 In November,
he testified before Congress that the government had twenty-seven leak investi-
gations open.'93 And a September 2017 memo from National Security Advisor
H.R. McMaster requested that the head of every federal agency organize a train-
ing on the "importance of protecting classified and controlled unclassified infor-
mation, and measures to prevent and detect unauthorized disclosures."3 94 Such
efforts "remind[] us of the responsibilities that come with access to, and penal-
ties for unauthorized disclosure of, classified information," the memo contin-
ued. 39
Oversight Office, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., 2014 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2
(2014), http://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2o14-annual-report.pdf [http://perma
.cc/YB4R-NSXB].
389. Shane, supra note 388.
390. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Vhistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First
Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449,485-86 (2014).
391. James Risen, If Donald Trump TargetsJournalists, Thank Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/12/30/opinion/sunday/if-donald-trump-targets-journalists
-thank-obama.html [http://perma.cc/LW56-8Q27]. For a discussion of the forces that helped
drive this uptick in leak investigations under the Obama administration, see Papandrea, supra
note 390, at 455-64.
392. Savage & Sullivan, supra note 386. Although there is some confusion in how Sessions arrived
at this ratio, Sessions was not the only member of the executive branch to take an aggressive
stance toward the press. Id. In that same news conference, Director of National Intelligence
Dan Coats stated: "Understand this: If you improperly disclose classified information, we will
find you, we will investigate you, we will prosecute you to the fullest extent of the law, and
you will not be happy with the results." Id.
393. Brian StelterJeffSessions: We're Investigating 27Leaks of Classified Information, CNN (Nov. 14,
2017, 2:03 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/14/media/leak-investigations-jeff-sessions
/index.html [http://perma.cc/GBN8-ZLPR].
394. Matthew Yglesias, The TrumpAdministration'sBig NewAnti-Leak Memo Leaked Last Night, Vox
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The Trump Administration has also demonstrated an increased willingness
to penalize uncooperative reporters in ways short of invoking legal proceedings.
President Trump has engaged in a range of efforts to deny access to specific jour-
nalists or outlets as a form of political retaliation.39 6 He has also demonstrated
substantial animosity toward the press more broadly."'
Such actions may damage the credibility of the press and undermine
longstanding democratic traditions and norms.'9 But they also raise the specter
that these smaller threats are merely the precursors to more aggressive action
against the press, such as the selective enforcement of laws criminalizing the
publication of classified information or the selective subpoenaing of reporters as
a means of silencing political dissent. Indeed, former FBI Director James Comey
disclosed that in a February 2017 meeting, President Trump criticized leaks to
the news media and asked Mr. Comey to consider imprisoning reporters for
publishing classified information.'99 Such an action would break with a century-
long tradition of declining to prosecute reporters for receiving or disseminating
classified material.400
3. Changing Times
De facto protections for reporters are not conferred in a vacuum. Changes in
the press and in society - ushered in against a background of rapid technological
change -have influenced the behavior of both the press and the government.
The internet has facilitated the rise of new information-sharing entities, like
396. For a summary of the ways that the Trump Administration has denied access to the press, see
Jones & West, supra note 354, at 585-89. For a discussion of the ways in which the current
administration's efforts to exclude and demonize the press are uniquely harmful, see Jones &
Sun, supra note 324, at 7-20.
397. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Intensifies His Attacks on
Journalists and Condemns F.B.L "Leakers," N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.nytimes
.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/white-house-sean-spicer-briefing.html [http://perma.cc/B7X3
-XCWL] (reporting that prominent news outlets were barred from a White House press
briefing); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2017, 1:48 AM), http://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632o65 [http://perma.cc/52WS-VH2V]
("The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not
my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!").
398. For a discussion of the harmful effects of the Trump Administration's efforts to deny access to
the press, see generally Jones & West, supra note 354.
399. Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him To End Flynn Investigation,
N.Y. TIMEs (May 16, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey
-trump-flynn-russia-investigation.html [http://perma.cc/HN4-75FV].
400. See supra notes 308-313 and accompanying text.
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WikiLeaks, which do not abide by the same norms and ethical rules that the in-
stitutional press has long followed.4 01 The willingness of WikiLeaks to release
large troves of documents to the public has prompted the government to take a
more aggressive stance towards all leakers402 and has most likely prompted the
traditional press to grow more sophisticated in its own pursuit of leaked infor-
mation, which in turn increases the likelihood of confrontation with the govern-
ment over the identity of sources.4 03 This has most likely also led to reduced de
facto protections for reporters.4 04
Moreover, while government officials once relied almost exclusively on the
institutional press to communicate with the public, they can now turn to media
platforms like Facebook and Twitter to communicate directly with constitu-
ents.40 5 This reduces elected officials' dependence on the press, and this reduced
dependence, in turn, lowers the cost of punishing uncooperative reporters or
outlets.406 When an elected official no longer needs traditional news outlets to
communicate with his or her constituents, it becomes easier to advocate for
harsher treatment of the press.
The internet has also disrupted the institutional press's advertising model.
This has led to financial upheaval throughout the industry, hitting print news
401. McCraw & Gikow, supra note II, at 496. WikiLeaks also does not face the same pressure as
the institutional press to report stories that have strong narrative value. See Pozen, supra note
11, at 615.
402. Pozen, supra note II, at 6o8 (explaining that by eschewing targeted leaks by high-ranking
officials in favor of large document dumps from lower-level dissenters, WikiLeaks has placed
"enormous pressure on the source/distributor divide").
403. Nausicaa Renner, The Symbiotic Relationship Between WikiLeaks and the Press, COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REv. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/tow center/wikileakstrump election
julian assange.php [http://perma.cc/9EVR-TT9U].
404. See Pozen, supra note II, at 631 (describing the various social and technological factors that
may have contributed to the Obama Administration's more aggressive pursuit of leakers, and
noting that " [o]n account of such exogenous shocks, the downside of lax enforcement may
seem qualitatively scarier now" and may be disrupting the balance between plants - which are
beneficial to the government -and leaks, which, generally, are not).
405. See, e.g., Trump Uses Twitter To Bypass Media, PBS (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.pbs
.org/newshour/extra/daily videos/trump-uses-twitter-to-bypass-media [http://perma.cc
/FSK4-J6ME].
4o6. For a discussion of how the decline of the institutional media as a middleman between the
government and the public affects the press more broadly, see Jones & West, supra note 354,
at 582-84. See also Jones & Sun, supra note 324, at 33 (arguing that the President's ability to
communicate directly with the public "is perhaps the most important factor in opening the
door to a president constructing the press as a public enemy").
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outlets particularly hard.4 0 7 Such financial difficulties make it harder for media
organizations to fund protracted legal battles against the government. The re-
duced economic strength of the institutional press also reduces the power and
authority of the press more broadly.408 In Branzburg, the Court confronted the
press's claim that it needed special judicial protection with skepticism. At the
time, the nation's media organizations were among the most powerful institu-
tions in the country4 09 : " [T] he press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of
communication and is far from helpless to protect itself from harassment or sub-
stantial harm," the Justices noted.4 10 The power and position of the media has
since changed. While the institutional press undoubtedly remains influential,
the reduced economic position of many news organizations today undermines
the press's ability to protect itself against government overreach or misconduct.
In some cases, the full effect of these technological changes i  not yet wholly
clear. For example, it is now easier to track leaks electronically, either directly to
the source or by tracing the reporter's electronic communications.4 11 On the one
407. See, e.g., Rick Edmonds, Newspaper Declines Accelerate, Latest Pew Research Finds, Other Sectors
Healthier, POYNTER (June 15, 2016), http://www.poynter.org/2o16/newspaper-declines
-accelerate-latest-pew-research-finds-other-sectors-healthier/416657 [http://perma.cc/JN3F
-V9J6].
408. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper Amer-
ica, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 557, 571 (2011) (discussing the financial decline of newspapers
and the negative impact that this has on American democracy); Jones & West, supra note 354,
at 575, 576-78 (demonstrating how the reduced economic strength of the press has reduced
the media's ability to "take on governmentally created obstacles to newsgathering through
manpower, time, and effort").
409. See Robert G. Kaiser, The Bad News About the News, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 16, 2016),
http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2o14/bad-news.html [http://perma.cc
/4BW6-XXD 7 ] (describing the power and wealth enjoyed by print and broadcast media in
the 1970s).
410. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
411. See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Feds Have Interviewed More Than loo People in Two Leak Investigations,
WASH. POST (June 15, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/feds-have-interviewed-more-than-loo -people-in-two-leak-investigations/2o12/o6/15
/gJQA5u21fV story.html [http://perma.cc/GV8Z-XGFY] (noting that administration offi-
cials had stated the process of investigating leaks has been made easier by "the proliferation
of technology, especially email, which allows investigators to track contacts between reporters
and alleged leakers"). The government has also turned to other legal tools to identify sources,
such as search warrants, warrants issued by the FISA court, and border searches of reporters'
electronic devices. See Ellison, supra note 387; Sources and Subpoenas, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/digital-journalists-legal-guide/sources-and
-subpoenas-reporters-privilege [http://perma.cc/X3BL-ECZG]. Some have argued that the
government relies on these alternative legal and technological tools so heavily as to render the
reporter's privilege issue moot. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Robinson, Note, Post-Sterling Develop-
ments: The Mootness of the Federal Reporter's Privilege Debate, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1314, 1315 (2017).
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hand, when the trail to a source can be illuminated using these alternative inves-
tigative tools, a reporter's compelled testimony may no longer be as relevant.4 12
The underlying concern that pursuing confidential sources will have a chilling
effect on the flow of information to the public persists. But strengthening the
reporter's privilege may not necessarily offer a cure. On the other hand, reporters
are increasingly relying on tactics such as encrypted secure drops and burner
phones to protect sources.413 This may leave enough of a digital trail to raise sus-
picion, but not enough for the government to prosecute the source of a leak with-
out obtaining corroborating testimony from reporters.4 14
A variety of additional factors, including the disaggregation of the media in
the internet age, has reduced the public's confidence in the press today.4 15 in
September 2016, a Gallup poll reported that Americans' trust and confidence
that the mass media will "report the news fully, accurately, and fairly" had
dropped to its lowest level in Gallup polling history.4 16 President Trump's verbal
attacks on the press have likely contributed to this decline.4 17 As the press be-
comes less trusted, the public may be less willing to support and defend it. This,
I would argue this view underplays the extent to which the government still can and does rely
on reporter subpoenas, as well as the threat that these subpoenas and the anticipatory fear of
such subpoenas pose to the reporter-source relationship.
412. McCraw & Gikow, supra note 11, at 495.
413. News outlets are increasingly relying on encrypted sources of information. The homepage of
the New York Times now prominently features a section describing how to securely provide
the paper with a news tip, including an encrypted SecureDrop. Got a Confidential News
Tip?, N.Y. TIMEs, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2ol6/news-tips [http://perma.cc
/8CT7-P94W]. And Human Rights Watch has reported that U.S. reporters are increasingly
relying on burner phones and encryption to protect sources. With Liberty To MonitorAll: How
Large-Scale US Surveillance Is HarmingJournalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (July 28, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/report/2o14/o7/28/liberty-monitor-all/how
-large-scale-us-surveillance-harming-journalism-law-and [http://perma.cc/5CJS-XIvTN].
414. It may also lead reporters to simply avoid using technology altogether. See, e.g., With Liberty
To MonitorAll, supra note 413 (noting that U.S. journalists report "abandoning all online com-
munication and trying exclusively to meet sources in person").
415. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 11, at 335-36.
416. Art Swift, Americans' Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx [http://
perma.cc/62Z7-SLMB].
417. See, e.g., Joel Simon, Trump Is Damaging Press Freedom in the U.S. and Abroad, N.Y.
TiMEs (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/opinion/trump-is-damaging
-press-freedom-in-the-us-and-abroad.html [http://perma.cc/HVA2-4PRN] (arguing that
Trump's attacks on the press were "part of a deliberate strategy to undermine public confi-
dence and trust" in the institution); Margaret Talbot, Trump and the Truth: The "Lying"Media,
NEW YoRKER (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-and
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in turn, reduces incentives for government officials to rely on the functional tools
at their disposal to protect the press.4 18
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DE FACTO REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE FOR
REFORM DEBATES
Understanding the importance - and the limits - of the de facto reporter's
privilege allows law and policy makers to understand what is at stake in the cre-
ation of more formal protections. It suggests that simply pointing to the histor-
ical absence of a formal privilege is not a sufficient reason to oppose its creation.
Rather, judges and legislators must ask whether these other, oft-overlooked
forms of protection remain sufficiently robust to ensure the continued flow of
information to the press. Fleshing out the scope of the de facto reporter's privi-
lege allows for a more accurate and informed debate about the extent to which
reporters have been protected throughout U.S. history- and the extent to which
this protection has engendered a more robust press.
This Part applies the lessons of the de facto privilege to ongoing debates over
the establishment of formal protections for the press. These debates often focus
on establishing a formal federal reporter's privilege in one of three ways: 1) a
congressionally-enacted statutory privilege, 2) a judicially-recognized federal
common-law privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, or 3) a judicially-
recognized constitutional privilege rooted in the First Amendment.
A. Statutory Privilege
In the immediate aftermath of Branzburg, a number of federal shield laws
were introduced in quick succession. These proposed bills appeared to garner
widespread congressional support.41 The few dissenting voices, however, op-
posed the bills largely on the grounds that the press had never before enjoyed a
-the-truth-the-lying-media [http://perma.cc/USY-3BFZ] (noting that Trump referred to
the media as "slime" and "lying, disgusting people").
418. Declining popularity of the press has been cited as a factor in the executive's decision to serve
more subpoenas. See, e.g., WRIGHT &GRAHAM, supra note 7, S 5426 (arguing that "the political
power of the press, which had previously made prosecutors eluctant to try to compel news-
men to disclose sources, was substantially diminished during the Nixon administration,"
which may have explained the increase in number of subpoenas issued to reporters during
that time). For a further discussion of the drop in public confidence in the press, see Jones &
West, supra note 354, at 580-81.
419. The idea that protection was conferred in fact, if not in law, surfaced repeatedly in the context
of legislative debates in the wake of Branzburg. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text;
see also Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
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privilege. During the 1972 legislative hearings on a proposed shield law, for ex-
ample, Assistant Attorney General Roger Cramton argued that the "news media
have functioned effectively and efficiently in this country for almost two hundred
years without a reporter's privilege."420 Since the early days of the new republic,
he continued, anonymous ources have faced "the remote possibility that a grand
jury investigating criminal activity might require the reporter to divulge the
identity of his source."421 Yet, in spite of these risks, these informants were not
deterred, he argued. "Indeed, the flow of confidential information to the media
has continued unabated if not increased."4 22
This argument reemerged in the wake of September i, when the high-pro-
file jailing of prominent reporters infused the issue with new urgency. A number
of shield laws were proposed in Congress between 2004 and 2013.423 Once again,
much of the opposition to these bills was rooted in the view that a statutory
shield was unnecessary because the press had never enjoyed such protection in
the past. In a 2007 congressional debate on a proposed shield law, for example,
Texas Representative Lamar Smith argued that the bill was "simply a solution in
search of a problem. 4 24 "For 200 years, information has flowed freely to the
press. Congress need not enact [the bill] when the status quo is working and the
legislation's potential harm to our national security is so significant."4 25 In other
words, he argued, " [t]he system is not broken. So why are we trying to fix it?"4 26
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 295 (1973) (statement by Stanford Smith, President of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association) (noting that "[w]e thought we had lived through 200
years of history in this country where the news media were exempt from this type of
subp[o]ena"); id. at 395 (statement of Rep. Glenn M. Anderson) ("For nearly 200 years, we
rarely challenged the right of the press to investigate and report o the American people. Today
that is no longer true."); Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 837, H.R 1o84, H.R. 15891, H.R.
15972, H.R. 16527, H.R. 16713, and H.R. 16542 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 236 (1972) [hereinafter Newsmen's Privilege I] (statement of Victor S.
Navasky, American Civil Liberties Union) (arguing that "journalists, like doctors, lawyers and
priests, were able to have a confidential relationship with their client, their source," and
" [w]hat we are asking Congress to do is restore a situation that existed before"); id. at 165
(statement of Rep. William S. Moorhead) (stating that " [a] few years ago it was generally
assumed that freedom of the press protected not only the right to publish information but the
right to gather information").
420. Newsmen's Privilege I, supra note 419, at 24.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See supra notes 119-123.
424. 153 CONG. REC. 27302 (2007) (statement of Rep. Smith).
425. Id. at 27309.
426. Id. at 27302. Iowa Representative Steve King echoed this view. " [The bill] would protect jour-
nalists in most circumstances from having to reveal their sources or produce documents and
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Similarly, in a 2009 House Judiciary Committee report on a proposed shield
law, representatives opposing the bill argued that such a privilege "has no prec-
edent in American legal history."42 7 That same year, Iowa Congressman Steve
King echoed this view in congressional debates over the privilege. "This goes on
and on, 200-plus years, and now we have journalists that have to have special
protection without having at least a breadth of statistical data that would support
this advocacy that is part of this bill." 428 King then touched upon the very idea
that this Article fleshes out. "The protections are there," he argued. "There is
already sufficient judicial restraint on moving to bring to cause these journalists
who speak. Their sources are protected substantially by the tradition and effects
of the court."42 9 But he did not describe the scope of those traditions and effects,
nor did he ask whether there has been any meaningful change in these protec-
tions that would necessitate a statutory shield.
This Article demonstrates that the assumption that reporters lacked any pro-
tection at common law is inaccurate.430 This misperception has skewed the leg-
islative debate surrounding the creation of a statutory privilege, and this Article
attempts to serve as a corrective. Legislators should not confine their inquiry to
whether formal protections were afforded in the past. Rather, they should ask
also whether the functional protections once extended to the press are still work-
ing. If these functional protections are so weak that they no longer sufficiently
protect the press, legislators must consider whether a statutory shield will serve
as an effective remedy.
But how weak is too weak? The question defies an easy answer. For decades,
the press itself has been divided over whether a statutory shield would be helpful
or harmful. Initially, much of this opposition was rooted in the belief that any-
thing short of an absolute constitutional privilege would be insufficient.431 Over
time, many members of the press have concluded that even limited protection in
notes to government," he stated. "This is not a problem. The press has flourished for over 200
years without a Federal privilege." Id. at 27308.
427. H.R. REP. No. 111-61, at 12 (2009).
428. 155 CONG. RPC. 922 (2009) (statement of Rep. King).
429. Id.
430. It is not always clear from the record whether legislators were arguing that the press has never
enjoyed a formal shield or whether they were arguing that the press has never enjoyed any
federal protection of any kind. But ultimately, this distinction matters little: the former argu-
ment is normatively flawed because the broader ecosystem of less formal protections matters,
while the latter argument is factually wrong.
431. See Timothy L. Alger, Promises Not To Be Kept: The Illusory Newsgatherer's Privilege in California,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 155, 172 n.102 (1991); Dalglish & Murray, supra note 114, at 18-19. One
reporter described the media's lobbying efforts for a federal shield law as "convicts building
gallows from which they will hang." Jones, supra note 114, at 603.
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statutory form is better than no formal protection at all. The most recent pro-
posed shield law-the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013- elicited broad, if
tepid, support from the press.432 The Washington Post, for example, published an
editorial noting that while critics argued the bill defined the press too narrowly,
the judicial catch-all provision would nonetheless "build flexibility into the sys-
tem to recognize those who don't fit neatly into the mold."433 And Bill Keller
wrote in the New York Times that he supported the bill even though it featured
"an intolerably large loophole for cases in which the government claims national
security is at risk."4 34 Despite such flaws, he reasoned, "[e]ven an imperfect
shield law would restore a little balance in the perpetual struggle between nec-
essary secrets and democratic accountability."4 35 Even so, opposition to the bill
remained fierce in some corners. National security reporters, in particular, ex-
pressed concern that the national security carve-out was so large that much of
their reporting efforts would not be covered.436
Ultimately, a shield law in any form is likely to garner some criticism. But
critical questions at the heart of the statutory shield debate -whether weak leg-
islative protections are better than none at all, whether the de facto shield has
degraded to the point where formalization is needed- can only be answered once
the full scope of protections conferred upon the press, both formal and informal,
are illuminated. The de facto privilege lens suggests that legislators have been
blind to the full ecosystem of protections used to shield the press and their
sources, and that this myopic view of the reporter's privilege history has dis-
torted the legislative debate.
432. See, e.g., Michael Calderone, Media Coalition Endorses Journalist Shield Law, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-calderone/newspaper-association
-america-media-shield-lawb-3915192.html [http://perma.cc/Y8C4-T8LH].




434. Bill Keller, Secrets and Leaks, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o6
/03/opinion/keller-secrets-and-leaks.html [http://perma.cc/TLD4-GSKQ].
435. Id.
436. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 366. The bill provided that the government could obtain confi-
dential source material from a covered journalist when it could show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information would "materially assist ... in preventing or mitigating an
act of terrorism or other acts that are reasonably likely to cause significant and articulable
harm to national security." See S. RP. No. 113-118, at 7 (2013). In any other case involving
national security, the government could obtain the information if it showed by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it would "materially assist in preventing, mitigating, or identifying
the perpetrator of an act of terrorism or other acts that have caused or are reasonably likely to
cause significant and articulable harm to national security." Id. at 7-8.
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But this history is also applicable to the legislative shield debate in other,
smaller ways. Legislators have long debated how to define legislative protection
for the press, and whether protection should be extended to broad segments of
the population, such as the part-time blogger, or tailored more narrowly to con-
fer protection on those who fit the traditional mold of a reporter.4 37 In 2013, leg-
islators struck a bargain in the shield law then pending in the Senate: protection
would be conferred more narrowly, but judges would be permitted to extend the
privilege more broadly when they saw fit.4 3 8 The latter half of this bargain finds
some support in the de facto privilege. This history reveals that judges have long
relied on their discretion to confer ad hoc protections tailored to the needs of the
particular reporter and the particular case; and it suggests that for many decades,
this approach worked remarkably well. These and other lessons can be used to
inform the legislative process and the construction of any statutory shield.
B. Common-Law Privilege
In 1975, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 5o, which provides that
"the common law - as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason
and experience - governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following pro-
vides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court."4 39 This rule vested federal courts with the power
to create new evidentiary privileges as the courts saw fit, consistent with "reason
and experience."440 The legislative history of Rule 5o reveals that Congress ex-
pressly contemplated the creation of a reporter's privilege with this new rule.441
437. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 113-118, at 36-38 (2013) (criticizing the proposed shield law for defining
"journalist" to cover "criminals and other individuals with countless opportunities to leak
damaging information without worrying about any sort of consequence").
438. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. § 11(1) (B) (2013) ("In the case of a
person that does not fit within the definition of 'covered journalist' described in subclause (I)
or (II) of paragraph (A) (i), a judge of the United States may exercise discretion to avail the
person of the protections of this Act if, based on specific facts contained in the record, the
judge determines that such protections would be in the interest of justice and necessary to
protect lawful and legitimate news-gathering activities under the specific circumstances of the
case.").
439. FED. R. EVID. 5ol. It also provides that "in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a
claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision."
440. Id.
441. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, S 5426 & n.4 (noting that the legislative history of Rule Sol
"read like an invitation to courts to create" a reporter's privilege and that the chairman of the
House subcommittee that drafted the rules stated expressly that " [t]he language of Rule Sol
permits the courts to develop a privilege for newspaper-people on a case-by-case basis.").
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As a result, one plausible avenue for establishing a federal source of protection
for the press is through a judicially-crafted federal common-law privilege under
Rule 501.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it takes an expansive approach to the
"reason and experience" prong of Rule 501.442 In 1995, for example, the Supreme
Court established a new federal common-law therapist-patient privilege under
the evidentiary rule.443 In its decision, the Court explicitly rejected the govern-
ment's recommendation that it adopt a more rigid understanding of what infor-
mation and practice may be considered in the context of Rule 5o1. Instead, the
Court extended its inquiry beyond the judicial branch to consider state legislative
practice as well.444 The Court has also examined whether changing circum-
stances or beliefs warrant a corresponding change in other common-law eviden-
tiary rules, like the spousal privilege.44 5
Some of this history and practice surely cuts against the establishment of a
federal common-law reporter's privilege under Rule 5o1. For example, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that when Congress contemplates but rejects a pro-
posed privilege, the courts should refrain from stepping in where Congress has
declined to act.446
But other examples of history and practice cut the other way. In the executive
branch, the DOJ guidelines have enshrined special protections for reporters in
the federal code. In the legislative context, state and federal legislators have con-
sistently permitted reporters to withhold confidential sources during legislative
proceedings, even where their names could have been legally compelled. And in
the judicial context, there is a pattern of extending protections in other ways,
442. The origins of this phrase can be traced back to Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934),
in which the Court held that federal common law privileges should be subject to revision over
time as society evolved and changed; and to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, adopted in 1944, which provides that " [i]n every trial the testimony of witnesses must
be taken in open court, unless otherwise provided by a statute or rules adopted" by statute.
Rule 26's committee notes clarify that the rule permits courts to apply federal common law
rules interpreted by the courts "in the light of reason and experience."
443. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1996).
444. Id. at 13; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980) (placing substantial
weight on evidence of state practice when deciding whether to revisit the spousal privilege
rule articulated in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958)).
445. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (finding that "time and changing legal prac-
tices" had not undermined the rule barring testimony of one spouse against he other).
446. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (declining to construct a federal common law
privilege under Rule 5o against the disclosure of peer review materials).
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short of conferring an express privilege.4 47 These practices emphasize the im-
portance of ensuring that reporters and their sources are shielded.
Moreover, as of 2013, all states but one had established some form of eviden-
tiary privilege for the press.448 The Court has previously indicated that such
overwhelming state consensus supports the creation of a federal common-law
privilege.449 Taken together, this web of de facto protections demonstrates that
the impulse to privilege the relationship between the press and its sources has
long been a facet of the American legal and political systems. This information
could be marshaled in favor of a common-law privilege for the press under Rule
501.
C. Constitutional Privilege
The extent to which the de facto lens affects the debate over a First Amend-
ment-based privilege is perhaps less clear. In Branzburg, the Court acknowledged
the press's argument that changes in society had placed new demands on report-
ers:
It is said that currently press subpoenas have multiplied, that mutual dis-
trust and tension between press and officialdom have increased, that re-
porting styles have changed, and that there is now more need for confi-
dential sources, particularly where the press seeks news about minority
cultural and political groups or dissident organizations suspicious of the
law and public officials.4 50
Even if true, the Court reasoned, such developments are "treacherous
grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the First Amendment fastening a
447. In his concurrence in In re Miller, Judge Tatel relied on much of this history and practice in
determining that the courts should create a federal common law privilege under Rule 501. In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 20o6) (Tatel, J., concur-
ring). He invoked the near-uniformity among the states and the DOJ press subpoena guide-
lines in support of his argument for acommon law privilege. Id.; see also TheodoreJ. Boutrous,
Jr. & Seth M.M. Stodder, Retooling the Federal Common-Law Reporter's Privilege, COMM. LAw-
YER, Spring 1999, at 24-25 (arguing that DOJ policy should be factored into the courts' con-
sideration of whether a privilege is warranted "in light of reason and experience").
448. In re Miller, 438 F.3d at 1164 (Tatel, J., concurring) (listing legislative and judicial protections
by state). Hawaii's shield law expired in 2013, and the state has not yet reinstated it. See supra
note 134 and accompanying text.
449. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996) (noting that "it is appropriate for the federal courts
to recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 5o" given that "all 5o States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege").
450. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 699 (1972) (citation omitted).
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nationwide rule on courts, grand juries, and prosecuting officials everywhere."4 51
This language suggests that the Court did not consider these changing circum-
stances to be relevant to the question of a constitutional privilege.
On the other hand, the Branzburg Court also explicitly considered the pro-
tections extending from other branches and levels of government when it de-
cided not to establish a constitutional privilege. Declining to recognize a First
Amendment-based privilege would not leave the press defenseless, the Court
reasoned. It noted that Congress still had the power to formulate a legislative
privilege; state legislatures remained free to enact statutory protections; and the
Attorney General had already written discretionary rules extending certain pro-
tections to the press.452 This language implies that the Court may have consid-
ered these other forms of protection as mitigating the need for constitutional
protection. In other words, the extent to which constitutional protections are
required may depend in part on the extent to which protection emanates from
other sources.
If so, then the question of whether these other sources of protection are still
available to the press today is a relevant one. Because, as this Article demon-
strates, these protections now may be weakening, the Court's reasons for eject-
ing a constitutional shield may no longer hold true. The factual landscape since
Branzburg has shifted. The press no longer enjoys the financial stability and deep
and widespread support of the public that it enjoyed in 1972.45 And other, more
alarming changes may be on the horizon: the Trump administration will likely
scale back the Attorney General guidelines, and it has threatened to pursue leak-
ers far more aggressively and prosecute reporters for publishing classified infor-
mation.454 And if the factual foundation upon which the Branzburg decision rests
begins to crumble, then the case for revisiting the question of a First Amendment
privilege grows more persuasive.
There are other indications that the Court may be more amenable today to
the idea that changing circumstances alter how constitutional protections are
formulated. For example, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in the GPS-tracking
case United States v. Jones suggests that the Fourth Amendment's third-party doc-
trine should be revisited in light of technological changes. She argues that the
third-party doctrine "is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks."45 s If recent technological changes warrant a reexamination
451. Id.
452. Id. at 706-07.
453. See supra notes 407-408 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 399-400 and accompanying text.
45s. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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of core Fourth Amendment principles, then other changing circumstances might
similarly warrant a reevaluation of the First Amendment protections offered to
the press.
In sum, the de facto privilege lens offers two central conclusions: first, those
with decisionmaking authority over whether to establish a formal shield have
long ignored the critical role that informal protections have played in shielding
the press; and second, many of the informal protections historically extended to
the press are now contracting. On the one hand, these conclusions, taken to-
gether, bolster the case for a formal shield. As this section shows, this history can
be used to amplify or even generate new legal arguments in favor of a statutory,
common law, or constitutional shield. On the other hand, the lessons of the de
facto privilege history are not so determinative. The de facto privilege lens also
illuminates the benefits of the current approach -and, in turn, what might be
lost with the establishment of a formal shield.
CONCLUSION
Whether a formal federal reporter's privilege is necessary is a long-disputed
question. Congress - by refusing to craft a shield- and the Supreme Court - by
declining to revisit the Branzburg decision -have "profoundly minimize [d] the
rule of law" in this realm.4 56 A threshold question in the debate over enacting a
formal shield is whether the present approach- eschewing strict legal bounda-
ries in favor of softer, more malleable norms - is working.
There are strong indications that a formal shield would offer more robust
and consistent protections for the press across both the executive and judicial
branches. Formalizing the privilege would likely increase uniformity and pre-
dictability in the law. In the context of the executive branch, the Attorney General
guidelines are not binding -failure to follow them results in only an "adminis-
trative reprimand" or some other "appropriate disciplinary action."45 And while
the Obama Administration aggressively pursued whistleblowers in the name of
456. McCraw & Gikow, supra note II, at 479 (noting that the Court's decision in New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), together with the FOIA regime, have likewise con-
tributed to "minimiz[ing] the rule of law" in this area).
457. 28 C.F.R. § 5o.io(i) (2017). In the Judith Miller case, the government's Special Counselor did
not follow the guidelines for issuing subpoenas to reporters. But the court found that this had
little relevance to Miller's case because the guidelines create no enforceable right. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 20o6).
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national security,45 it also exercised substantial prosecutorial discretion to pro-
tect them in other contexts.4 59 This is all likely to change. Indeed, there are al-
ready signs that the current administration will be far less protective of the
press.4 60 Formalizing the privilege will ensure that protection of the media will
not be left to the whims of executive-branch decision makers. The mere existence
of a formal shield may have a deterrent effect on the issuance of subpoenas to the
press.4 61
A formal shield will likely have similar benefits in the judicial context. Judges
appear less likely today to read Branzburg to permit a qualified privilege and more
likely to impose harsh sanctions on a reporter who refuses to surrender a source.
Formalizing a privilege -in statutory, constitutional, or common law form -
would likely reduce judicial discretion. It would also provide sympathetic judges
with firmer grounds on which to extend protections to the press.
A formalized privilege also would allow for a more accurate calculation ex
ante - by both reporter and source - of whether a reporter will be permitted to
withhold the identity of an informant. Those who advocate for a federal shield
statute argue that without clear protections, the mere threat of exposure may be
enough to deter a source. As Geoffrey Stone has noted, the current discrepancy
between state and federal protections "generates uncertainty, and uncertainty
breeds silence."4 6 2
But not all press advocates support formalization. Some argue that leaving
the law underdefined preserves much-needed flexibility for judges and prosecu-
tors, particularly in light of the growing difficulty of defining who qualifies for a
privilege.463 And some scholars and reporters have criticized proposed shield
458. Risen, supra note 391.
459. The director of the D.C.-based Government Accountability Project, which advocates for whis-
tle-blowers, has called the Obama years the "golden age" for whistle-blower reform. Eyal
Press, Obama Leaves Trump a Mixed Legacy on Whistle-Blowers, NEW YORKER (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/obama-leaves-trump-a-mixed-legacy
-on-whistle-blowers [http://perma.cc/Z2EZ-AWYC]. Major legislative initiatives under
Obama, including the Affordable Care Act and the economic stimulus plans, all included
strengthened protections for whistleblowers. Id.
460. See supra note 399-400 and accompanying text.
461. See Newton, supra note 366 (quoting Charlie Savage, arguing that moving decisionmaking
authority on the issuance of a subpoena from an attorney general's office to ajudge's chambers
"alone is a deterrent to frivolously or overly broad requests and it may in fact have a significant
change in how often such a subpoena is issued").
462. Stone, supra note 4, at 43.
463. For a discussion of the difficulties of defining who qualifies for the privilege, see, for example,
Eliason, supra note 104, at 1366-70. For a more general discussion of the benefits of preserving
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laws for providing insufficient protection for the press, particularly for journal-
ists who cover national security issues.4 64
There is also the risk that formalizing the privilege would make it more dif-
ficult for the press to rely on the persuasive power of public opinion. David Pozen
has argued that the downside of a statutory shield is that it risks legitimizing the
practice of subpoenaing reporters and distributing responsibility for the sub-
poena across multiple branches, which may have the paradoxical effect of reduc-
ing protections for the press.4 65 He argues that " [a]ccusations of overreach
would have less bite within a legal framework that had been blessed by all three
branches of government plus the Fourth Estate."4 66
Ultimately, whether and how to establish a formal shield will depend on a
wide array of factors - including the form the privilege takes and which branch
of government represents the most significant threat to the press. A full account-
ing of these many legal and factual considerations is beyond the scope of this
Article. But the benefit of the de facto lens constructed here is that it illuminates
the many diverse ways that protection is and has been conferred upon the
press - it fleshes out the full ecosystem of protections, both formal and informal,
that the press has long enjoyed. Judges and legislators must carefully evaluate
and continually monitor the health and robustness of these de facto protections.
If they determine that the de facto privilege has buckled under the weight of
increasing pressures, these law and policymakers must take measures to ensure
the continued protection of the press.
ambiguity in the law, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 7 (1996) (describing the benefits of "decisional minimalism").
464. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 366.
465. David Pozen, Why a Media Shield Law May Be a Sieve, JUST SEC. (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:2o AM),
http://www.justsecurity.org/2232/media-shield-law-sieve-david-pozen [http://perma.cc
/K3TY-B49K].
466. Id.
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